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The First Amendment generally favors the marketplace testing of ideas
and information rather than their arbitrary control by the government.
As it is, the government itself, and especially its top officials, speak
loudly in our society. Such volume is tolerable in part because the gov-
ernment does not speak in one voice. The First Amendment ensures
that under most circumstances even the most junior government clerk
typist can criticize the speech and acts of the top officials in her office as
freely as any citizen can.I
I. INTRODUCTION
INCE Judge Goldberg so wrote in 1979, both the United States
Supreme Court and the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth
Circuit have considerably narrowed the range of circumstances under
which public or government employees 2 can speak freely, assured that the
first amendment will protect them from reprisals by their superiors in office.
Such employees now may be at risk not only for criticizing the speech and
acts of higher officials; they may be at risk for merely daring to suggest
changes in institutional policies or proceedings, for innocently communicat-
ing relevant information to other governmental agencies, and even for keep-
ing secret diaries containing critical comments.
To understand how this narrowing process has occurred, this Article first
reviews relevant Supreme Court decisions going back to 1968. These deci-
sions have created a complex structure of steps (or hurdles) that government
employees must surmount in order to prevail on claims alleging violations of
their first amendment speech rights. The Court's current test particularly
leaves in doubt a major category of speech most typical of employee dis-
course: speech concerning the policies and operations of the government
agencies where the employees themselves work.
Largely because of major uncertainties in the Supreme Court's analytical
framework, the Fifth Circuit has developed supplemental doctrines and cri-
teria, some of which constitute additional hurdles to government employees
trying to vindicate their first amendment speech rights. Part III traces this
development. Part IV then explores a number of issues as to the adequacy of
current Supreme Court and Fifth Circuit3 jurisprudence with respect to the
first amendment speech rights of government employees.
I. Porter v. Califano, 592 F.2d 770, 779 (5th Cir. 1979).
2. This article is concerned only with speech rights of public employees who are unaf-
fected by civil service systems. Thus it does not consider special statutory limitations on ex-
pression such as 5 U.S.C. §§ 7324-7328 (1988) and similar state or local laws, or special
procedures and protections mandated for civil servants such as 5 U.S.C. §§ 7501-7543 (1988,
amended 1990) and any equivalent state or local laws.
3. The Fifth Circuit is particularly significant for several reasons. During the 1960s and
1970s it decided many leading civil rights cases. See generally H. COUCH, A HISTORY OF THE
FIFTH CIRCUIT 1891-1981 (1981); F. READ, LET THEM BE JUDGED; THE JUDICIAL INTE-
GRATION OF THE DEEP SOUTH (1978). Four major Supreme Court cases concerning first
amendment speech rights of government employees originated in the Fifth Circuit. See infra
notes 28, 51-156 and accompanying text. In recent years the Fifth Circuit has decided numer-
ous such cases and developed several additional doctrines and tests. Fifth Circuit case law
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II. SUPREME COURT CONSTRUCTIONS AND LIMITATIONS
By 1968, first amendment protection of public employee speech had come
a long way since the days of Mr. Justice Holmes' ipse dixit, "[A policeman]
may have a constitutional right to talk politics, but he has no constitutional
right to be a policeman." 4 In 1967, the Supreme Court expressly rejected
the sweeping proposition that public employees may be required to surren-
der first amendment rights as a condition of employment.5 But what was the
extent of public employees' first amendment rights? The Court undertook to
answer that question the following year.
A. Pickering v. Board of Education
6
Mr. Pickering, a high school teacher, wrote a letter to a local newspaper
criticizing the manner in which the school board and superintendent had
handled plans to raise new school revenue through a bond election. Picker-
ing's letter also criticized the board's allocation of resources and charged
that the superintendent had attempted to prevent teachers from criticizing
the proposed bond issue. The board dismissed Pickering on the grounds that
some of the statements he had made in the letter were false and that its
publication had been "detrimental to the efficient operation and administra-
tion" of the schools of the district.7 The state supreme court upheld Picker-
ing's dismissal on the theory that accepting a teaching position in a public
school obliged a teacher "to refrain from making statements about the oper-
ation of the schools 'which in the absence of such position he would have an
undoubted right to engage in.' "8
Justice Marshall, writing for the Pickering Court, firmly rejected the state
supreme court's position "to the extent that [it] may be read to suggest that
teachers may constitutionally be compelled to relinquish the First Amend-
ment rights they would otherwise enjoy as citizens to comment on matters of
public interest in connection with the operation of the public schools in
which they work." 9 On the other hand, the Court opined that a state "has
interests as an employer in regulating the speech of its employees that differ
significantly from those it possesses in connection with regulation of the
speech of the citizenry in general." 10 Thus, with two conflicting interests
before it, the Court determined that the way to resolution was through bal-
amply illustrates the difficulties lower federal courts have experienced in construing and apply-
ing the Supreme Court's various pronouncements as to government employees' speech rights.
4. McAuliffe v. Mayor of New Bedford, 155 Mass. 216, 220, 29 N.E. 517, 517 (1892),
quoted in Rankin v. McPherson, 483 U.S. 378, 395 (1987) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
5. Keyishian v. Board of Regents, 385 U.S. 589, 605-06 (1967). See generally Thompson
v. City of Starkville, 901 F.2d 456, 460 (5th Cir. 1990). For a critique of earlier developments,
see generally Emerson, Toward a General Theory of the First-Amendment, 72 YALE L.J. 877
(1962).
6. 391 U.S. 563 (1968).
7. Id. at 564.
8. Id. at 567.
9. Id. at 568. The Court cited its prior holdings in Keyishian, 385 U.S. 589 (1967);
Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479 (1960); and Wieman v. Updegraff, 344 U.S. 183 (1952).
10. Pickering, 391 U.S. at 568. The Court cited no authority for this proposition.
1991]
SOUTHWESTERN LAW JOURNAL
ancing. "The problem in any case is to arrive at a balance between the inter-
ests of the teacher, as a citizen, in commenting upon matters of public
concern and the interest of the state, as an employer, in promoting the effi-
ciency of the public services it performs through its employees."'" What
constitutes a matter of public concern became a critical focal point in subse-
quent first amendment public employee speech jurisprudence. Concern for
efficiency (here expressly related to public services performed by the state)
also became centrally important.12
The Court had no difficulty finding that the balance tipped in favor of
Pickering's first amendment rights. Noting the "enormous variety of fact
situations" in which public employee first amendment claims arise, the
Court declined to lay down a general standard for balancing.13 It under-
took, however, to set forth some guidelines for future analysis.' 4 In doing
so, the Court did not indicate any particular order in which that analysis
should proceed.
The Court found that school funding is a matter of "legitimate" public
interest, to which "free and open debate is vital to informed decision-making
by the electorate."' 5 Later cases, building, perhaps, on the adjective legiti-
mate, added that speech regarding "significant" or important matters of
public concern was entitled to greater protection than speech concerning
matters of minimal public interest. 16 Noting that teachers generally "have
informed and definite opinions" as to how school funds should be spent, the
Court concluded, "it is essential that they be able to speak out freely on such
questions without fear of retaliatory dismissal."' 17 It also observed that the
school board could have used less intrusive means to correct any possible
harm.'8
The Court began discussion of its general analytical guidelines by inquir-
ing whether Pickering's statements had had any negative impact on the effi-
ciency or orderly administration of the schools. The Court set out three
types of considerations. One type addressed possible harm to close working
relationships. The Court observed that Pickering's statements had not been
11. Id. Whether the employee's interest in so commenting is the same as his First
Amendment speech right, the Court did not say. Later cases leave this question conceptually
uncertain as well. See infra note 118.
12. Concern for such efficiency appears to derive from the school board's claim that Pick-
ering's conduct had been "'detrimental to the efficient operation and administration of the
schools of the district.'" Id. at 564. The Court has not explained how such concern achieved
implicit constitutional status. The Court did not seem to consider that employees might also
properly be concerned with their agency's efficiency in performing public services. See infra
note 230 and accompanying text.
13. Id. at 569.
14. Id.
15. Pickering, 391 U.S. at 571-72. See infra note 394.
16. See infra notes 388-99 and accompanying text.
17. Pickering, 391 U.S. at 572.
18. "The Board could easily have rebutted appellant's errors by publishing the accurate
figures itself, either via a letter to the same newspaper or otherwise." Id. A later Fifth Circuit
case likewise noted that the government employer could have utilized less intrusive means. See
infra notes 560-61 and accompanying text.
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aimed at persons with whom he would normally come into contact in the
course of his teaching activities.
Thus no question of maintaining either discipline by immediate superi-
ors or harmony among coworkers is presented here. Appellant's em-
ployment relationships with the Board and ... with the superintendent
are not the kind of close working relationships for which it can persua-
sively be claimed that personal loyalty and confidence are necessary to
their proper functioning.19
In a footnote, the Court speculated that in some circumstances public state-
ments about or public criticisms of one's superior might harm working
relationships:
It is possible to conceive of some positions in public employment in
which the need for confidentiality is so great that even completely cor-
rect public statements might furnish a permissible ground for dismissal.
Likewise, positions in public employment in which the relationship be-
tween superior and subordinate is of such a personal and intimate na-
ture that certain forms of public criticism of the superior by the
subordinate would seriously undermine the effectiveness of the working
relationship between them can also be imagined. 20
Several of the expressions quoted here became important criteria in subse-
quent cases.
The Court next turned to the type of harm allegedly resulting from false
statements in Pickering's letter.21 The Court found that the particular false
statements were not per se detrimental to the interest of the schools, and that
certain of these statements would have had no impact on the schools' opera-
tion beyond their tendency to anger the Board. 22 Implicitly, the Court
seemed to be saying that false statements that anger higher officials do not,
as such, impair the efficiency of a public agency's operation. The Court even
suggested that false statements might be protected under the first amend-
19. Id. at 570.
20. Id. at 570 n.3.
21. In an Appendix, the Court not only reproduced Pickering's published letter, but also
undertook to determine which statements in it were false. In this Appendix the Court also sets
out the following standards of review for first amendment government employee free speech
cases.
This Court has regularly held that where constitutional rights are in issue an
independent examination of the record will be made in order that the controlling
legal principles may be applied to the actual facts of the case. [citations omitted.]
However, even in cases where the upholding or rejection of a constitutional
claim turns on the resolution of factual questions, we also consistently give
great, if not controlling, weight to the findings of the state courts.
Id. at 578 n.2. As phrased, it is unclear whether the Court meant to enunciate one standard of
review or two, or what precisely that standard (or those standards) are. The independent
examination standard mentioned in the first quoted sentence appears similar to, if slightly
more deferential than, de novo review. The "great, if not controlling weight" standard articu-
lated in the second sentence, however, appears to be only somewhat less deferential than the
clearly erroneous standard. The Court does not refer to this great, if not controlling weight
standard in later cases. The relation between questions of law and questions of fact in Supreme
Court and Fifth Circuit review remains somewhat uncertain. See infra notes 88-89 and accom-
panying text.
22. Pickering, 391 U.S. at 571.
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ment, provided they were not knowingly false or recklessly made.23
The Court concluded its balancing analysis (and, evidently, its discussion
of guidelines) by stating that Pickering's statements neither had been
"shown nor can be presumed to have in any way either impeded his proper
performance of his daily duties in the classroom or to have interfered with
the regular operation of the schools generally." '24 The expressions "im-
peded" workers' performance and "interfered" with institutions' operations
are picked up in balancing formulae in later cases. Curiously, the Court's
holding did not mention the possibly harmful impact of statements on the
efficiency of schools' operations: "In sum, we hold that, in a case such as
this, absent proof of false statements knowingly or recklessly made by him, a
teacher's exercise of his right to speak on issues of public importance may
not furnish the basis for his dismissal from public employment."'25
Partly because of its disjointed structure, Pickering was difficult to ap-
ply.26 For instance, Pickering provides no guidance as to where courts
should begin their analysis of public employee's first amendment claims.
Later Supreme Court cases organized Pickering's various statements into a
somewhat more coherent pattern of analysis. Most of Pickering's compo-
nents reappear in the tests articulated in later cases, albeit in considerably
revised format. These later cases also supplement new elements that add
obstacles for first amendment plantiffs. The first major supplement occurred
in the area of causation, a matter not considered in Pickering.
B. Mt. Healthy City School District Board of Education v. Doyle27
For almost a decade, Pickering remained virtually the sole standard for
appraising public employees' first amendment claims. 28 Then, in 1977, the
23. Id. at 574. See infra note 25 and accompanying text. In a footnote, the Court adds
that it was an open question whether even a statement that is knowingly or recklessly false, but
without harmful effects, would be protected by the first amendment. Id. at 574 n.6. In later
cases, the Fifth Circuit has suggested that negligently false speech by agency or institutional
employees is not necessarily protected by the first amendment. Neubauer v. City of McAllen,
766 F.2d 1567, 1579-82 (5th Cir. 1985); Megill v. Board of Regents, 541 F.2d 1073, 1082-86
(5th Cir. 1976).
24. Pickering, 391 U.S. at 572-73 (footnote omitted).
25. Id. at 574 (footnote omitted). Presumably the Court meant this holding to apply only
to the question whether employees' false speech was within the first amendment. In Moore v.
City of Kilgore, 877 F.2d 364, 376 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 562-63 (1989), the Fifth
Circuit read Pickering to mean that knowingly or recklessly false statements are not protected.
26. See Gonzalez v. Benavides, 774 F.2d 1295, 1299 (5th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 475 U.S.
1140 (1986). See generally Note, The Nonpartisan Freedom of Expression of Public Employees,
76 MICH. L. REV. 365, 365-404 (1977) (discussing application of Pickering balancing test).
27. 429 U.S. 274 (1977).
28. Other cases contributed particular doctrines during this period. In Perry v.
Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593, 598 (1972) the Court established that even though an academic
employee without tenure could have been discharged for no reason whatever, he might be
entitled to reinstatement if the decision to terminate his employment was made on the basis of
his exercising constitutionally protected first amendment freedoms. Perry had originated in
the Fifth Circuit. Later decisions extended this doctrine to other categories of probationary
employees and persons employed at will. In Elrod v. Burns, 427 U.S. 347 (1976), addressing
the question of patronage dismissals, the Court held that a "nonpolicymaking, nonconfidential
governmental employee [cannot] be discharged or threatened with discharge from a job that he
[Vol. 45
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Court decided Mt. Healthy City School District Board of Education v.
Doyle,29 another case in which a school board had terminated a public
school teacher. The teacher, Mr. Doyle, had called a radio station and re-
ported the contents of a new dress code that the school board was about to
promulgate. The board apparently formulated the dress code in order to
gain public support for pending bond issues. 30 In addition, Doyle had been
involved in several incidents, including arguing with school cafeteria em-
ployees about their service, referring to certain students as sons of bitches,
and making an obscene gesture at two female students who failed to follow
his instructions. 31 The board's statement of reasons for the termination
charged: "You have shown a notable lack of tact in handling professional
matters which leaves much doubt as to your sincerity in establishing good
school relationships."' 32 The statement referred to two particular incidents:
notifying the radio station regarding the board's proposed dress code, and
using obscene gestures to handle students in the cafeteria incident. 33 The
district court found that the first amendment protected Doyle's communica-
tion to the media. The court concluded that since this episode had played a
substantial part in the Board's termination decision, Doyle was entitled to
reinstatement with back pay.34 The Court of Appeals affirmed.
Applying the Pickering balancing test, the Supreme Court accepted the
district court's conclusion that Doyle's call to the radio station was pro-
tected speech. The Court, however, was not satisfied with the lower court's
holding that "[i]f a non-permissible reason, e.g., exercise of First Amend-
ment rights, played a substantial part in the decision not to renew-even in
the face of other permissible grounds-the decision may not stand."' 35 Now
the Court confronted an issue not addressed in Pickering: causation. The
critical question was whether a government employer's decision to terminate
an employee's contract based in substantial part on retaliation against the
employee for engaging in constitutionally protected speech would justify re-
medial action. 36 Writing for the Court, Justice Rehnquist concluded that
remedial action was not justified. 37 Instead, analogizing to a line of criminal
cases relating to admissibility of involuntary confessions, the Court created a
new two-part proof of causation text, equipped with shifting burdens:
Initially, in this case, the burden was properly placed upon respon-
dent [Doyle] to show that his conduct was constitutionally protected,
and that this conduct was a "substantial factor"--or to put it in other
is satisfactorily performing upon the sole ground of his political beliefs." Id. at 375 (Stewart,
J., concurring). Fifth Circuit patronage dismissal cases are reviewed in infra notes 198-207
and accompanying text.
29. 429 U.S. 274 (1977).
30. Id. at 282.
31. Id.
32. Id. at 283 n.l.
33. Id. at 282-83.
34. Mt. Healthy, 429 U.S. at 284.
35. Id.




words, that it was a "motivating factor" in the Board's decision not to
rehire him. Respondent having carried that burden, however, the Dis-
trict Court should have gone on to determine whether the Board had
shown by a preponderance of the evidence that it would have reached
the same decision as to respondent's reemployment even in the absence
of the protected conduct. 3
8
The Court then vacated the district court's judgment, remanding so that the
lower court could apply this new, second-level causation test in further
proceedings. 39
The effect of this added causation test has been to permit government em-
ployers4O to retaliate against employees for exercising their first amendment
speech rights so long as the employers can convince the trial court that they
would have dismissed or otherwise sanctioned the employees for other rea-
sons.4 ' Obviously this result poses a new hurdle for public employees seek-
ing redress for violation of their first amendment speech rights. The first
part of the Mt. Healthy causation test appropriately requires that employee
plaintiffs show that they were terminated (or otherwise sanctioned) because
they exercised a protected right. The "substantial factor" or the arguably
less stringent "motivating factor" test is a necessary part of the order of
proof.
The Court's policy reasoning in imposing the further stage, which allows
the offending employer to escape liability by showing that it would have
made the same decision anyway, is highly questionable. The Court ex-
plained its rationale as follows: "[T]he proper test to apply in the present
context is one which... protects against the invasion of constitutional rights
without commanding undesirable consequences not necessary to the assur-
ance of those rights."' 42 The "undesirable consequence" the Court visualized
was that, under the "substantial factor" test alone, an employee who was
38. Id. at 287.
39. Mt. Healthy, 429 U.S. at 287.
40. The term "governmental employer" is necessarily ambiguous. "The government" (ul-
timately, in a democracy, the public) could be said to employ all of its personnel from highest
elected officials and agency heads through the lowest ranking workers. Thus officials and su-
pervisors who hire and fire on behalf of the government are, themselves, "employees." In this
article, the terms "government," "governmental employers," "employers," "supervisors," and
agency "superiors" are used interchangeably. The courts have only rarely observed that the
interests of "the government," and the interests of governmental officials or agency supervisors
are not necessarily identical. For example, see supra note 22 and accompanying text and infra
notes 170-79, 403, 426 and accompanying text.
41. Although Mt. Healthy is silent on the point, later Fifth Circuit cases have established
that both stages or steps in the Mt. Healthy causation process are regarded as questions of fact
for determination by the trier of fact, subject to appellate review on the clearly erroneous
standard. Kinsey v. Salado Indep. School Dist., 916 F.2d 273, 281 n.10 (5th Cir. 1990); Coats
v. Pierre, 890 F.2d 728, 732-33 (5th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, Il l S. Ct. 70, 112 L. Ed. 2d 44
(1990); Frazier v. King, 873 F.2d 820, 826-27 (5th Cir.), cert. denied sub nom. Davoli v. Fra-
zier, 110 S. Ct. 502, 107 L. Ed. 2d 504 (1989); Brawner v. City of Richardson, 855 F.2d 187,
193 (5th Cir. 1988); Kelleher v. Flawn, 761 F.2d 1079, 1084-85 (5th Cir. 1985); Bowen v.
Watkins, 669 F.2d 979, 984, 987 (5th Cir. 1982). But see Price v. Brittain, 874 F.2d 252, 259-
60 (5th Cir. 1989) (suggesting that the appellate court might engage in its "own review of the
record," to some degree "de novo").
42. Mt. Healthy, 429 U.S. at 287.
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otherwise due to be terminated might engage in constitutionally protected
conduct, and thereby prevent his employer from deciding not to rehire on
the basis of his performance record. 43 Such an employee would then be "in
a better position as a result of the exercise of constitutionally protected con-
duct than he would have occupied had he done nothing." 44 The Court's
hypothetical scenario appears rather implausible: a cunning employee, other-
wise destined for well-deserved termination, shrewdly clings to his job by
deliberately setting out to "commit" a constitutionally protected exercise of
his right to speak freely. Even if such a scenario should occur, one might
expect that a reasonable employer could dismiss the employee on appropri-
ate grounds without, in the process, punishing him for exercising his first
amendment rights. It strains credulity to suggest that an employee's exercise
of such rights could prevent the government employer from dismissing him
for otherwise sufficient, constitutionally permissible reasons.45 It is not ap-
parent that the second or "but for" part of the Court's Mt. Healthy causa-
tion test "protects against the invasion" of public employees' first
amendment rights. What it assures is that a government employer can pun-
ish an employee for exercising such rights. It also opens the door for such
employers later to invent pretexts for so doing, and thereby escape liability. 46
The Court should have affirmed the lower courts' holding and remanded
only for determination of the appropriate remedy. Doing so would have had
the desirable consequence of making clear that public employers may not
sanction employees for a mixed bag of reasons that include retaliation for the
exercise of first amendment speech rights. This consequence would have
been "desirable" because it would have assured, rather than undermined,
43. Id. at 286.
44. Id. at 285. The Court added: "This is especially true where, as the District Court
observed was the case here, the current decision to rehire will accord 'tenure[,]'... [the] long-
term consequences of [which] are of great moment both to the employee and to the employer."
Id. at 286. It is unclear to what the expression "the current decision to rehire" refers. The
Court did not explain what the long-term consequences of an award of tenure might be. Possi-
bly, the Court was under the mistaken impression that a tenured faculty member's employ-
ment could not be terminated for cause. Evidently it did not consider that relief could take
any form other than reinstatement with tenure. See infra notes 46-48 and accompanying text.
The possibility that the Court was actuated by pro-management or pro-government bias is
suggested by the fact that what the Court considered "undesirable," id. at 287, was "undesir-
able" only from the standpoint of the government employer who has violated an employee's
first amendment speech rights. Such bias surfaced plainly in a later decision. See infra notes
80, 118.
45. See Megill v. Board of Regents, 541 F.2d 1073 (5th Cir. 1976). As one commentator
points out, "the Court apparently failed to recognize that it is the state's attempt to punish
constitutionally protected behaviour, not the employee's exercise of a constitutional right, that
places the worker in a better position under the district court's test." Note, supra note 27, at
378. As to Megill, see id. at 382-83.
46. See Massaro, Significant Silences: Freedom of Speech in the Public Sector Workplace,
61 S. CAL. L. REV. 3, 18-20 (1987). See also Note, Free Speech and Impermissible Motive in
the Dismissal of Public Employees, 89 YALE L.J. 376, 393 (1979). The writer endorses Mt.
Healthy's "substantive cause" test, but urges discontinuation of its employer rebuttal or "but
for" test: "The standard of 'substantial or motivating factor' would focus a court's attention
on the actual decision to remove the employee, asking whether constitutionally improper con-
siderations played a significant, important, or appreciable part in the decision. It would dis-
courage pro-defendant speculation on conjectural alternative causes." Id.
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first amendment protection of public employees' speech. That protection is
important not only to enable employees to express themselves, but also to
assure "the market place testing of ideas and information rather than their
arbitrary control by the government."' 47 Appropriate relief could have in-
cluded some or all of the full range of remedies available under section 1983,
such as reinstatement, 48 back pay, lost income or other damages, and attor-
ney's fees or punitive damages for dismissals in bad faith.49
In addition, affirming the decision below would have benefited the judicial
system by encouraging government employers to "do it right the first
time." 50 The emerging process of proofs and balancing was complicated
enough without requiring the courts to determine what government employ-
ers might have done if they had not improperly retaliated against an em-
ployee's exercise of constitutionally protected rights. Both the first
amendment and judicial economy would have been better served if the Court
had refrained from inventing this second stage of causation proof, one that
could only benefit persons or agencies already shown to have violated the
constitutional rights of public employees.
C Givhan v. Western Line Consolidated School District 51
Here, again, a school district terminated a school teacher for a mixed bag
of reasons. 52 Among the grounds for dismissal produced by the school dis-
trict at trial was the contention that, in several private encounters with the
principal in his office, Ms. Givhan had "made 'petty and unreasonable de-
mands' in a manner variously described by the principal as 'insulting,' 'hos-
tile,' 'loud,' and 'arrogant.' ,,53 The district court, however, found that
certain of these demands or complaints were neither petty nor unreasonable
because they concerned employment policies and practices Givhan consid-
ered racially discriminatory. Morever, the district court "concluded that
'the primary reason for the school district's failure to renew [Givhan's] con-
tract was her criticism of the policies and practices of the school district,
especially [of] the school to which she was assigned to teach.' -54 The court
held that the school district's actions had violated Givhan's first amendment
47. See supra note 1 and accompanying text.
48. Reinstatement need not have resulted in instant tenure: the district court might have
ordered the tenure process deferred for an additional period, during which Doyle could have
continued as a probationary employee.
49. Gonzalez v. Benavides, 774 F.2d 1295, 1298 n.7 (5th Cir. 1985). See Wolly, What
Hath Mt. Healthy Wrought?, 41 OHIO ST. L.J. 350, 394-95 (1980). Wolly argues that some
relief, if only nominal, "is necessary to ensure that the constitutional violation is not trivialized
to the point of irrelevancy." Id. at 395 (footnote omitted).
50. "[S]ome relief.., should be granted so that the employer who escapes having to
reinstate the employee is nevertheless put on notice that the decision-making process he fol-
lowed was improper." Wolly, supra note 49, at 394.
51. 439 U.S. 410 (1979).
52. On special factors relating to teachers' speech rights, see generally Eagle, First Amend-
ment Protection For Teachers Who Criticize Academic Policy, 60 CHI.[-]KENT L. REV. 229
(1984).
53. Givhan, 439 U.S. at 412.
54. Id. at 412-13.
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rights as identified in Perry v. Sindermann 55 and Pickering and ordered her
reinstated. 56 The Fifth Circuit reversed, in relevant part, on the ground that
private expression (i.e., Givhan's statements to the school principal in his
office) was not constitutionally protected. 57 The Supreme Court vacated the
appellate court's judgment in part, and remanded to the district court, to
apply the second part of its new Mt.Healthy causation test. 58
What Givhan added to the Court's emerging first amendment jurispru-
dence was explicit recognition that not only public, but also private speech is
within its protection: "The First Amendment forbids abridgment of the
'freedom of speech.' Neither the Amendment itself nor our decisions indi-
cate that this freedom is lost to the public employee who arranges to com-
municate privately with his employer rather than to spread his views before
the public."5 9 As will be noted, some subsequent Fifth Circuit opinions
failed to remain cognizant of this clear statement. 6° The Court's holding
was, to some extent, qualified in a footnote setting forth certain additional
factors that might be applicable in balancing the right to private expression
against a government office's need for "efficiency":
Although the first amendment's protection of government employees
extends to private as well as public expression, striking the Pickering
balance in each context may involve different considerations. When a
teacher speaks publicly, it is generally the content of his statements that
must be assessed to determine whether they "in any way either impeded
the teacher's proper performance of his daily duties in the classroom or
... interfered with the regular operation of the schools generally." [Ci-
tation omitted.] Private expression, however, may in some situations
bring additional factors to the Pickering calculus. When a government
employee personally confronts his immediate superior, the employing
agency's institutional efficiency may be threatened not only by the con-
tent of the employee's message but also by the manner, time, and place
in which it is delivered. 61
55. 408 U.S. 593 (1972). See supra note 28 and accompanying text.
56. Givhan, 439 U.S. at 414.
57. Ayers v. Western Line Consol. School Dist., 555 F.2d 1309, 1318 (5th Cir. 1977),
vacated in part, 439 U.S. 410 (1979). The Fifth Circuit's other ground for reversal was its
conclusion that "there is no constitutional right to 'press even "good" ideas on an unwilling
recipient.'" Givhan, 439 U.S. at 413. The Supreme Court tersely rejected this "captive audi-
ence" rationale: "Having opened his office door to petitioner, the principal was hardly in a
position to argue that he was the 'unwilling recipient' of her views." Id. at 415.
58. "[W]hile the District Court found that petitioner's 'criticism' was the 'primary' reason
for the School Board's failure to rehire her, it did not find that she would have been rehired but
for her criticism." Givhan, 439 U.S. at 417. The district court's judgment antedated the
Court's Mt. Healthy decision. Writing for the Court in Givhan, Justice Rehnquist, who had
also authored Mt. Healthy, did not limit the necessity for this new level of proof to situations in
which reinstatement purportedly would have resulted in awarding tenure. See supra note 44
and accompanying text. There is no indication in the report that reinstating Ms. Givhan
would have accorded her tenured status.
59. Id. at 415-16.
60. See infra notes 288-95, 301-09 and accompanying text.
61. Givhan, 439 U.S. at 415 n.4. The footnote did not explain what was meant by "per-
sonally confronts," or how such confrontation might affect institutional efficiency. See infra
notes 80, 447 and accompanying text.
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It is noteworthy that these new, post-Pickering factors of "manner, time, and
place," were meant to apply only to analysis of the effects on institutional
efficiency of private speech when "a government employee personally con-
fronts his immediate superior." A few years later, the Supreme Court im-
ported these same factors into another formula for balancing first
amendment rights involving public speech against institutional efficiency
without apparently noting the change in context. 62
D. Connick v. Myers63
Ms. Myers had served for over five years as an assistant district attorney
in New Orleans. Mr. Connick was the district attorney. Upon learning that
she might be transferred to a different section of the office, Myers objected
on the basis that her new assignment would result in a conflict of interest."
She expressed her views to various superiors including Connick. She was
then notified formally that the transfer would take place. Myers further dis-
cussed this and some additional office matters with another superior who
suggested that other staff in the office did not share her concerns. 65 Myers
then prepared a questionnaire on these matters and distributed it to fifteen
other assistant district attorneys, assuring them of anonymity. The ques-
tions covered "office transfer policy, office morale, the need for a grievance
committee, the level of confidence in supervisors, and whether employees felt
pressured to work in political campaigns."' 66
Connick later told Myers that she was being dismissed because she refused
to accept the transfer, because distributing the questionnaire amounted to
"insubordination," and because certain questions contained in the question-
naire were objectionable. Myers sued under Section 1983, alleging violation
of her first amendment speech rights. The district court found that "the
facts showed that the questionnaire was the real reason for her termination,"
and held that it "involved matters of public concern" and that the state had
not "clearly demonstrated" that its distribution "substantially interfered"
with the office's operations. The court then ordered Myers reinstated with
back pay, damages, and attorney's fees. The Fifth Circuit affirmed.67
The Supreme Court reversed by a 5-4 vote.68 In doing so, the majority
fabricated an intricate assortment of considerations for weighing public em-
62. Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 152-53 (1983). See infra notes 104-08 and accompa-
nying text. In Rankin, the Court applied these factors even though the employee had not
personally confronted her superior. Rankin v. McPherson, 483 U.S. 378, 388 (1987); see infra
note 150 and accompanying text. Lower courts have been criticized for applying these factors
in public speech analysis prior to Connick. Note, First Amendment-Public Employees May
Speak A Little Evil, 3 W. NEw ENG. L. REV. 289, 307, 309-10 (1980).
63. 461 U.S. 138 (1983).
64. Myers v. Connick, 507 F. Supp. 752, 753 (E.D. La.), aff'd, 654 F.2d 719 (5th Cir.
1981), rev'd 461 U.S. 138 (1983).
65. Connick, 461 U.S. at 140-41.
66. Id. at 141.
67. Id. at 141-42.
68. Justice Brennan wrote a lengthy dissent, joined by Justices Marshall, Blackmun, and
Stevens. Id. at 156 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
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ployee free speech interests against appropriate governmental interests.
These new considerations constituted further formidable obstacles for public
employees seeking vindication of their first amendment speech rights. Jus-
tice White wrote the opinion for the Court.
Connick has two principal foci. First, the Court discusses the kinds of
public employee speech entitled to constitutional protection. Second, the
court sets out criteria for weighing government interests against public em-
ployee free speech rights.
1. Matters of Public Concern
What kinds of public employee speech are protected? The Court inti-
mates that only speech pertaining to matters of public concern comes within
the protection of the first amendment. Its formula, however, appears to di-
vide employee speech into only two categories: matters of public concern
and matters of purely personal interest. 69 Some speech relating to matters of
public concern is more important than other such speech, and, accordingly,
can be outweighed only by matters of greater governmental importance.
70
Both of these basic doctrines and the factors the Court sets forth for their
analysis present serious conceptual as well as practical difficulties. Some of
these difficulties are suggested in what follows.
a. Sine Qua Non?
Pickering identified speech on matters of public concern as a basic element
of the balancing analysis, but did not treat its presence vel non as the thresh-
old question. Connick came closer to asserting that only speech regarding
matters of public concern is worthy of first amendment protection, 7' hinting
that inquiry on this point might be the threshold of the public employee free
speech analysis. 72 The Court's "matter-of-public-concern" language does
not purport to be the holding in the case. 73 Nevertheless, virtually all com-
mentators credit (or blame) Connick for establishing the "matters of public
concern" inquiry as the threshold question.
The Connick Court insisted that each of its previous public employee
speech cases, Pickering, Perry, Mt. Healthy, and Givhan, had dealt with
"matters of public concern."'74 In other earlier cases, too, it had "invali-
69. See infra note 79 and accompanying text.
70. See infra notes 85-87 and accompanying text.
71. Connick, 461 U.S. at 146. The most explicit intimation is the following: "Pickering,
its antecedents, and its progeny lead us to conclude that if Myers' questionnaire cannot be
fairly characterized as constituting speech on a matter of public concern, it is unnecessary for
us to scrutinize the reasons for her discharge." Id. The Court's statement of its holding on the
next page, however, excludes from first amendment protection only speech "upon matters only
of personal interest," and not necessarily all such speech. Id. at 147. See infra notes 79-81 and
accompanying text.
72. Id. at 146-47. The Connick Court observed that the district court had viewed the
issue whether Myers' speech related to a matter of public concern as a "threshold inquiry" but
did not endorse that characterization or adopt it as a necessary element in its formula for
review. Id. at 149-50.
73. See supra note 71 and accompanying text.
74. Connick, 461 U.S. at 145-46. But see Note, Beyond "Public Concern": New Free
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dated statutes and actions [which] sought to suppress the rights of public
employees to participate in public affairs."75 Having reviewed these cases,
the majority concluded: "When employee expressions cannot be fairly con-
sidered as relating to any matter of political, social, or other concern to the
community, government officers should enjoy wide latitude in managing
their offices without intrusive oversight by the judiciary in the name of the
First Amendment. '76 This statement left in doubt whether to qualify as a
"matter of political, social or other concern to the community" the subject
must already be a topic discussed in the community, or whether it might be
one that, should it come to public attention, probably would be of interest to
the community. Nor did it indicate the kinds of matters with which the
community might be concerned. Nor did it specify the scope of the inter-
ested community; local neighborhood, municipality, state, or nation. Nor
did it say whether its concern to protect agency officials from "intrusive
oversight" 77 meant that supervisors' decisions affecting employee speech on
all other matters would be exempt from judicial review.
b. Matter of Public Concern vs. Only Personal Interest: Who Decides
and How?
It is not clear from Connick whether first amendment protection extends
only to public employee speech relating to a "matter of public concern."' 78
The Court's only statement phrased in terms of a holding is as follows:
We hold only that when a public employee speaks not as a citizen upon
Speech Standards for Public Employees, 57 U. CHI. L. REV. 249, 256 (1990): "But the fact that
these previous cases had involved speech of public concern was not the reason, in itself, to limit
constitutional protections to speech of public concern." Pickering had not stated that only
such speech was protected. "Pickering specifically referred to "matters of public concern"
because the speech at issue concerned a highly publicized local referendum. The Pickering
Court had no reason to discuss other issues about which employees might speak." The
Supreme Court, 1982 Term-Constitutional Law-Freedom of Speech, Press and Association,
97 HARV. L. REV. 70, 167 (1983). We see here an instance of a familiar pattern in appellate
jurisprudence: in one decision, a court notes a sufficient condition; later the court construes the
condition as necessary. See Hiers, Normative and Ostensibly Norm-Neutral Conventions in
Contemporary Judicial Discourse, 14 LEGAL STUD. F. 107, 120-24 (1990).
75. Connick, 461 U.S. at 144-45.
76. Id. at 146.
77. The Connick majority implicitly meant to promote the interest of the courts by reduc-
ing judicial involvement in employee speech litigation. See Note, Connick v. Myers: Narrow-
ing the Free Speech Right of Public Employees, 33 CATH. U.L. REV. 429, 454 n.7 (1984). The
writer predicted, however, that because of its various uncertainties Connick would actually
increase such litigation. As will be seen, there has been no lack of post-Connick litigation in
the Fifth Circuit. But is it appropriate to sacrifice employee's first amendment rights in order
to reduce courts' case loads? See Massaro, supra note 46, at 68:
[I]t is no answer to say that the courts are too busy to hear the feared deluge of
free speech cases brought by disgruntled workers-any more than the courts
should claim they are too busy to hear securities cases, or any other category of
cases within their jurisdiction. If a baseless or frivolous suit is filed or pursued,
the federal court can impose sanctions on the litigant or the attorney.
See also Note, supra note 46, at 397: "Overload of the federal courts should be dealt with by
means other than discouraging the vindication of constitutional rights."
78. Nevertheless, later cases commonly state that Connick held that whether speech in
question dealt with matters of public concern was to be the threshold test in First Amendment
analysis. See Thompson v. City of Starkville, 901 F.2d 456, 466 n. 11 (5th Cir. 1990).
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matters of public concern, but instead as an employee upon matters
only of personal interest, absent the most unusual circumstances, a fed-
eral court is not the appropriate forum in which to review the wisdom
of a personnel decision taken by a public agency allegedly in reaction to
the employee's behavior. 79
This awkward, negatively phrased holding is strangely ambiguous and raises
more questions than it resolves.80
79. Connick, 461 U.S. at 147. Oddly, the Court refers to "the employee's behavior"
rather than to his or her speech. See infra notes 94, 96 and accompanying text, and supra note
44 and accompanying text, where the Court designates speech as "conduct."
80. The Court went on to say that while it had the duty "to ensure that citizens are not
deprived of fundamental rights by virtue of working for the government[,] this does not require
a grant of immunity for employee grievances not afforded by the First Amendment to those
who do not work for the State." Id. (emphasis added). Justice White's choice of words here
suggests that he viewed expression of "employee grievances," without more, as quasi-criminal
in nature. The quoted language clearly implies that in the majority's view, government em-
ployees should have no right to discuss job-related matters for the reason that private sector
employees enjoy no such right under the first amendment.
Commentators have sharply criticized the Court's reasoning and assumptions in this con-
nection. See Ingber, Rediscovering the Communal Worth of Individual Rights: The First
Amendment in Institutional Contexts, 69 TEX. L. REV. 1, 53-72 (1990); Lieberwitz, Freedom of
Speech in Public Sector Employment: The Deconstitutionalization of the Public Sector Work-
place, 19 U.C. DAViS L. REV. 597 (1988); Note, The Public Employee's Right of Free Speech: A
Proposal for a Fresh Start, 55 U. CIN. L. REV. 449 (1986); Developments in the Law-Public
Employment, 97 HARV. L. REV. 1611, 1756-71 (1984); Supreme Court, 1982, supra note 74, at
164-72.
These commentators make several important points. One is that the "state action doctrine"
rests upon the basic distinction "between actions taken by the state, which are subject to con-
stitutional scrutiny, and private conduct, against which the Constitution 'offers no shield.'"
Supreme Court, 1982, supra note 74, at 169-70. To say that public employees have no more
rights than private sector employees is simply to ignore the first amendment and first amend-
ment jurisprudence. See Lieberwitz, supra, at 668 ("The Court has effectively deconstitution-
alized or privatized the public sector workplace, leaving public employees with little more
constitutional speech protection than private sector employees."). Commentators also empha-
size the public's interest as investor in, and beneficiary of, public institutions receiving informa-
tion about the operations of these institutions from employees at all levels. In particular, these
commentators criticize the Connick majority's assumption that a hierarchical model of man-
agement is the only acceptable organizational scheme in modern public-and private-institu-
tional life.
Courts should recognize the managerial theories underlying asserted effi-
ciency interests and should examine the validity of those theories. Justice
White's opinion.., in Connick ... purported simply to defer to the employer's
judgment, but it actually was premised on a particular managerial theory-that
rigidly hierarchi[c]al management maximizes workplace efficiency. Such a the-
ory supports the presumption that, when an employee speaks in response to the
application of an office policy, her speech threatens "the authority of the em-
ployer" and thereby impedes efficiency.
Developments-Public Employment, supra, at 1767. On this theory expressions by lower-rank-
ing employees on agency operations are viewed as per se acts of insubordination or lese
majeste. The theory fails to recognize the crucial distinction between loyalty to an agency
superior and loyalty to the agency and the larger public interest it supposedly serves. Agency
efficiency and other public interests may better be served by less authoritarian magagement
models. "[Tihe Court's addition of a public concern test is a doctrinal innovation whose effect,
ironically, is reactionary. The test's likely impact on public employees is in part attributable to
the outdated assumptions on which Justice White's definition of public concerns relies."
Supreme Court, 1982, supra note 74, at 169. Critics suggest that the Connick majority was
more concerned to perpetuate a feudal economic model of organization once favored in the
private sector, than to encourage (or permit) the political model of public virtue and self-
government characteristic of American democracy. See Lieberwitz, supra, at 646 ("Instead of
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In the first place, the holding seems to contemplate two mutually exclu-
sive alternatives which purport to define the entire world of employee dis-
course. Either an employee speaks "as a citizen on matters of public
concern," or "as an employee upon matters only of personal interest." This
dichotomous doctrine presents obvious difficulties. What if an employee
speaks as an employee on matters of public concern? Or as a citizen on
matters of personal interest? Or as either a citizen or employee about mat-
ters of both personal interest and other matters? Are all subjects either
"matters of public concern" or "matters of only personal interest"? How
should speech relating to the efficiency of the agency's operations, or its poli-
cies, plans, and internal procedures be classified? Such subjects cannot aptly
be characterized as "matters only of personal interest." Yet in Connick it-
self, and in later Fifth Circuit decisions, we often find employee speech on
such matters so labeled. Unfortunately, Connick's holding does not address
these various questions. Oddly, much of the Court's analysis in Connick is
irrelevant under the standard the Court enunciated in this "holding." 8'
Moreover, the quoted holding leaves in doubt the status of speech on mat-
ters of only personal interest. According to this holding, a federal court may
review a public agency's personnel decisions in reaction to an employee's
speech upon matters of personal interest under unusual circumstances. The
Court provided no guidance as to what such circumstances might be. Later
cases usually cite Connick for the proposition that the first amendment pro-
tects public employee speech only if that speech relates to "matters of public
concern." That, however, is not Connick's stated holding.8 2
The Connick Court introduced a set of three new factors to ascertain
whether a public employee's speech relates to a matter of public concern:
"the content, form, and context of a given statement, as revealed by the
whole record."' 83 The Court cited no authority for its new "content, form,
and context" criteria; nor does it offer any rationale for these additional fac-
tors. Evidently the Court intended that the "matters of public concern" in-
quiry would apply these three factors. Such inquiry was to be a matter of
law, and thus subject to de novo review on appeal. 84 But this was not all.
The content of public interest speech was to be scrutinized as to its impor-
tance to or for the public.
measuring the utility of speech against the values of a democratic political system, the Court
measures the utility of public speech against the values underlying the economic system.")
81. See infra note 118.
82. Every commentator on Connick located in the course of this research concludes that it
was wrongly decided. Its defects are too many and too profound to explore thoroughly in this
article. Some of its features are examined further, infra note 118.
83. Connick, 461 U.S. at 147-48.
84. "The inquiry into the protected status of speech is one of law, not fact." Id. at 148
n.7; Kinsey v. Salado Indep. School Dist., 916 F.2d 273, 276-77 (5th Cir. 1990) (court of
appeals may review de novo the trial court's determination that the speech was not entitled to
first amendment protection); Kirkland v. Northside Indep. School Dist., 890 F.2d 794, 798
(5th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 110 5. Ct. 2620, 110 L. Ed. 2d 641 (1990); Moore v. City of
Kilgore, 877 F.2d 364, 369 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 562, 107 L. Ed. 2d 557 (1989);
Matherne v. Wilson, 851 F.2d 752, 760 (5th Cir. 1988). But see supra note 21, and compare
infra note 88.
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c. Degrees of Importance
Prior Supreme Court opinions had not attempted to measure the content
of speech on matters of public concern in terms of relative degrees of impor-
tance. In Connick the Court for the first time intimated that speech on mat-
ters of greater public concern is entitled to more protection than speech
regarding matters of lesser public concern. The Court suggested a kind of
sliding scale for balancing employee speech interest with governmental inter-
est in suppressing speech: "Pickering unmistakably states, and respondent
[Myers] agrees, that the State's burden in justifying a particular discharge
varies depending upon the nature of the employee's expression." 8 5 The
Court did not attempt to indicate where Pickering "unmistakably" so
states, 86 but instead, it cited Myers' brief and oral submission where she
conceded that the "degree of the importance" of her speech, or "whether it
affects a matter of great public concern or only a very narrow internal mat-
ter," is an appropriate consideration in Pickering balancing. 87 The Court
gave no rationale for distinguishing between speech about greater and lesser
matters of public concern. Nor did it suggest what normative standard
should be applied in measuring the "importance" of each matter of public
concern.
2. The Balancing Inquiry: New Factors and New Doctrine
In its balancing analysis, the Court focused on the nature of governmental
interests that could justify discharging an employee on account of her
speech. Connick's balancing standard remained ambiguous if not obscure.8
Curiously, the Court did not mention the standard of review articulated in
Pickering, which suggested some measure of deference to findings by the
trier of fact.89
85. Connick, 461 U.S. at 150. See also id. at 152 ("We caution that a stronger showing
may be necessary if the employee's speech more substantially involved matters of public
concern.").
86. See supra notes 15, 16 and accompanying text.
87. Connick, 461 U.S. at 150 n.9.
88. "[W]e are compelled to examine for ourselves the statements in issue and the circum-
stances under which they [are] made... [W]e cannot 'avoid making an independent constitu-
tional judgment on the facts of the case'." Id. at 150 n.10 (citations omitted). Fifth Circuit
panels have struggled to derive a workable standard of review from this language. See Mc-
Pherson v. Rankin, 786 F.2d 1233, 1237 (5th Cir. 1986), aff'd, 483 U.S. 378 (1987) ("The
precise fit of the clearly erroneous standard of review and our duty to make 'an independent
constitutional judgment on the facts of the case'... is not altogether clear."). The court went
on to suggest that when dispute centers on the content of speech, appellate review would in-
voke the clearly erroneous standard to determine what was said, and determine its constitu-
tional status by "independent review," but would be less deferential to trial court findings
when there is a factual dispute about the speech's context. Id. It is unclear whether these
somewhat amorphous standards were meant to apply to the balancing process, or only to
determining whether the employee's speech addressed a matter of public concern. See supra,
note 84. The Supreme Court's review of McPherson alluded only to the approach used in
determining "matters of public concern," and its import was far from transparent. McPher-
son, 483 U.S. at 385 n.8 ("[A]ny factual findings subsumed in the 'public concern' determina-
tion are subject to constitutional fact review"). The precise relation between fact and law
determinations remains to be clarified.
89. See supra note 21.
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a. Governmental Interests or Goals
Pickering, it will be recalled, identified the government's interest in re-
stricting employee speech as "promoting the efficiency of the public services
it performs through its employees."' 9 Invoking Pickering and a nineteenth
century decision, Connick added other governmental interests or goals to its
emerging balancing formula.
The Pickering balance requires full consideration of the government's
interest in the effective and efficient fulfillment of its responsibilities to
the public. One hundred years ago, the Court noted the government's
legitimate purpose in "promot[ing] efficiency and integrity in the dis-
charge of official duties, and [in] maintain[ing] proper discipline in the
public service." 91
In thiscontext, "effective" is probably only a synonym for "efficient." "In-
tegrity in the discharge of official duties" is an interest which, in balancing,
could either favor an employee whose speech calls into question the honesty
or fairness of agency operations, or justify sanctions against an employee
whose conduct was lacking in this respect. "Discipline" was already in-
cluded in Pickering's balancing analysis but only as a consideration inciden-
tal to the government interest "in promoting the efficiency of the public
service" the agency performs "through its employees."'92 In this quotation,
however, Connick, suggests that integrity and discipline, and perhaps effi-
ciency as well, are values in themselves, or values related only to office oper-
ations, independent of their effect on the delivery of public services.93
b. New Evils: The Disruptive Employee, Impairment of Office
Efficiency, and Undermining Office Relationships
Quoting with approval from a concurring opinion in an earlier decision,
the Connick majority wrote:
The Government, as an employer, must have wide discretion and con-
trol over the management of its personnel and internal affairs. This in-
cludes the prerogative to remove employees whose conduct hinders
efficient operation and to do so with dispatch. Prolonged retention of a
disruptive or otherwise unsatisfactory employee can adversely affect dis-
cipline and morale in the work place, foster disharmony, and ultimately
90. See supra note 11 and accompanying text.
91. Connick, 461 U.S. at 150-51, (citing Ex Parte Curtis, 106 U.S. 371, 373 (1882)).
92. Pickering v. Board of Educ., 391 U.S. 563, 568 (1968).
93. See Note, supra note 46, at 382:
Mr. Justice Douglas has questioned the uncritical use of the justification of
efficiency for limiting employees' rights. He suggests that many administrators
may be more concerned with such internal institutional values as a "pleasant
manner, promotion of staff harmony, servility to the cadre, and promptness,
civility, and submissiveness" than with efficient performance. [citation omitted.]
Though such institutional values might be justified as instrumental to the goal of
efficient service, they need not have that effect and may instead become ends in
themselves. Hence the very foundation on which the constitutional limitation of
public employees' rights rests may be infirm."
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impair the efficiency of an office or agency. 94
Here we see the emergence of new terms and factors: the "disruptive" em-
ployee, and concern for "morale in the work place." Possibly the Court had
in mind that ultimately, such disruption could adversely affect the govern-
ment's "effective and efficient fulfilment of its responsibilities to the pub-
lic."'95 In the statement quoted here, however, "disruption" (including, the
Court seems to suggest, speech) will justify sanctions if it merely affects "the
efficiency" of the office. It is strange that the Court simply applied earlier
language regarding disruptive conduct to the context of speech by public em-
ployees, as if the first amendment afforded no special protection for speech as
distinct from nonexpressive conduct. 96
In Pickering the Court suggested that in some situations the superior-
subordinate employee relationship could be so "personal and intimate" that
the subordinate's public criticism of the superior would seriously "under-
mine" the working relationship between them.97 Curiously, the Connick
Court made no effort to determine whether the relationship between Myers
and Connick was "personal and intimate." Instead, without explanation,
the Court extended the scope of "undermining" from effects on the superior-
subordinate relationship to also include effects on "office relationships" or
"relations" generally. 98 The Court thus abandoned Pickering's "personal
and intimate nature" requirement, and its limitation to relationships be-
tween superior and subordinate employees. In doing so, the Court widened
the range of employer justifications for retaliation against employee
expression.
c. Demonstrated or Merely Feared Potential Adverse Impact?
In concluding its balancing analysis, the Pickering Court found that Pick-
ering's statements had not impeded the performance of his own duties or
interfered with the schools' operation.99 Evidently the Pickering Court
meant that demonstrable harm must occur before a public employer could
justify discharging an employee on the basis of the latter's speech. In Con-
nick, the Court agreed with the district court's conclusion that there was no
evidence the questionnaire had impeded Myers' ability to perform her re-
sponsibilities; nor did the Court conclude that Myers' "speech" had inter-
fered with office operations. °°  Nevertheless, the Court overruled the
district court and the Fifth Circuit by inventing a new rule: a government
employer may immediately discharge an employee if, in the employer's judg-
ment, the employee's speech had the potential for undermining or destroying
94. Connick, 461 U.S. at 151 (quoting Arnett v. Kennedy, 416 U.S. 134, 168 (1974) (Pow-
ell, J., concurring)).
95. Id. at 150.
96. See supra note 79 and accompanying text where the Court oddly alludes to speech as
"behaviour." See also id. at 154 (where the Court labelled speech as "action").
97. See supra note 20 and accompanying text.
98. Connick, 461 U.S. at 152.
99. Pickering v. Board of Educ., 391 U.S. 563, 572-73 (1968). See supra note 24 and
accompanying text.
100. Connick, 461 U.S. at 151-53.
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office relationships. 101 Thus the governmental employer or superior official
need not show that the employee's speech actually "undermined office rela-
tionships," but only that the employer or officer reasonably feared that the
employee's speech might do so.102 Commentators have severely criticized
this "mere fear" standard. 10 3
d. Manner, Time, Place, and Context
In assessing whether such a superior officer had a reasonable basis for so
fearing, the Connick Court then introduced some additional factors: "the
manner, time, and place" of the employee's "message," and the "context in
which the dispute arose.'' 04
In Pickering the Court had expressed concern that in certain situations an
employee's public criticism of her administrative superior could "under-
mine" the effectiveness of their working relationship. 05 The Connick
Court's discussion of Myers' questionnaire and its impact on office relations
indicated that the Court thought the questionnaire was in the nature of pub-
lic criticism. 1°6 In Givhan, on the other hand, the Court stated that the
private expression of a government employee personally confronting an im-
mediate superior may threaten the agency's efficiency "by the manner, time,
and place in which it was delivered."' 0 7 The Connick Court quoted Givhan
on this point, but then, without any explanation for so doing where there
was no personal confrontation, proceeded to analyze Myers' speech in terms
of these elements in order to determine whether "Connick's fears that the
functioning of his office was endangered" were justified.108 In effect, Con-
nick extracted the "manner, time, and place" considerations from the lim-
ited, private context in Givhan, and added these considerations to the
growing number of factors that courts might consider in determining
whether public employers' interests override employees' speech rights in a
101. "[W]e do not see the necessity for an employer to allow events to unfold to the extent
that the disruption of the office and the destruction of working relationships is manifest before
taking action." Id. at 152. To explain adding this new factor to balancing analysis, the Court
cited earlier Supreme Court holdings to the effect that proof of future disruption was not
necessary to justify denying access to a nonpublic forum on the ground that such access might
"disrupt the property's intended function." Id. at 152 n. 12. By finding Connick justified in
discharging Myers immediately upon learning about the questionnaire, the Court also aban-
doned its earlier view that only prolonged retention of a disruptive employee could adversely
impact on governmental interests. See supra note 94 and accompanying text.
102. Id. at 152-54. See infra note 118.
103. See, e.g., Note, supra note 80, at 468-69. See infra note 455.
104. Connick, 461 U.S. at 152-53.
105. See supra note 20 and accompanying text.
106. Connick, 461 U.S. at 147-54. In fact, the questionnaire was circulated only among
other assistant district attorneys and consisted entirely of questions and an open-ended invita-
tion to "express comments or feelings." Id. at 155-56. The Court declared the district court's
finding on the latter point irrelevant: "Questions, no less than forcefully stated opinions and
facts, carry messages and it requires no unusual insight to conclude that the purpose, if not the
likely result, of the questionnaire is to seek to precipitate a vote of no confidence in Connick
and his supervisors." Id. at 152.
107. Givhan v. Western Line Consol. School Dist., 439 U.S. 410, 415 n.4 (1979) (emphasis
added).
108. Connick, 461 U.S. at 152-53.
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public setting. All that was needed to trigger application of these added
elements was the superior official's asserted fear that the employee's speech
might have adversely affected the functioning of the office.
Without explanation or citation to authority, the Connick Court addition-
ally declared that the context in which "the dispute arises" is also significant
in assessing a supervisor's fear that a lower ranking employee's speech
threatened his authority.1°9 It is curious that the Court referred here to the
context of "the dispute" rather than that of the speech. Perhaps the Court
did so because it was about to conclude that Myers' entire questionnaire was
merely a work dispute, "an employee grievance concerning internal office
policy."' 10 Thus, in Connick the speech's "context" was limited to a situa-
tion where, in the Court's view, the challenged speech clearly related to a
"dispute" between the employee and her supervisor. Later the Supreme
Court would treat the speech's context as a relevant factor in assessing the
impact of employee speech on governmental interests even where there was
no such "dispute.""'1
3. The Emerging Connick Balancing Test
Connick did not lay out a structured series of tests for determining the
circumstances in which the first amendment protected public employee
speech from retaliatory actions by higher officials. Nevertheless, Connick
represents a more systematic approach to the balancing of interests than did
Pickering. In developing its approach, the Connick Court added a number
of factors or elements, most of which make it easier for courts to find that
governmental interests outweigh employee first amendment speech rights.
Connick also suggests a certain order of proof to be followed by trial courts,
which is at the same time the order of analysis to be followed by appellate
courts.
Connick has commonly been read to say that a court must first determine
whether the speech in question addresses a matter of public concern or
merely one of only personal interest. This determination is a matter of law,
implicitly for de novo review by the appellate court. 11 2 In deciding this ques-
tion, the appellate court should consider the statement's content, form, and
context. If the speech concerned only personal matters, it will not ordinarily
be protected. Speech on matters of public concern may be protected. Some
speech on matters of public concern may be of greater importance than other
such speech. Presumably, the appellate court would decide at this point
which matters were more important than others. Speech on a matter of
greater public concern is entitled to more protection than speech on matters
of lesser public concern.
Second, Connick set out various considerations to be used in determining
109. Id. at 153. Concern for "context" seems redundant if "manner, time, and place" are
also to be considered.
I10. Id. at 154. See infra note 118.
111. See infra notes 147-50 and accompanying text.
112. See supra note 84.
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the nature and extent of the government employer's interests. Appropriate
governmental interests or goals include not only "the effective and efficient
fulfillment of its responsibilities to the public," but also "promoting ... in-
tegrity in the discharge of official duties," and "maintaining discipline in the
public service."11 3 The efficiency of an office could be impaired by pro-
longed retention of "disruptive" employees since doing so could adversely
affect "discipline and morale," and "foster disharmony."'1 4 The supervisor
need no longer wait until actual adverse harm has occurred; she can in-
stantly discharge employees if she fears their speech has the potential for
undermining office relations. In determining whether the supervisor's judg-
ment was justified, a court should examine the manner, time, and place in
which the employee's statement was made, and, if that statement was in
connection with a "dispute," the context in which the dispute arose.
The third step in Connick is the balancing itself. Under the Court's slid-
ing scale formula, the supervisor or government bears less of a burden to
justify a dismissal if the employee's speech addressed a matter of public con-
cern which the court viewed as of small importance. Conversely, the gov-
ernment shoulders a greater burden of justification if the speech addressed a
more important matter of public concern. 1 5
Applying this three-step analysis to the facts, the Court found that only
one of Myers' questionnaire items fell "under the rubric of matters of 'public
concern.' 116 That was the question whether other assistant district attor-
neys felt pressured to work in certain political campaigns.' 7 But this con-
cern was outweighed by Connick's concerns about the potential harm to the
office, his authority, and close working relationships that might result from
circulation of Myers' questionnaire as a whole. 18
113. Connick, 461 U.S. at 150-51.
114. Id. at 151. See supra note 94 and accompanying text.
115. Id. at 152.
116. Id. at 148.
117. Id. at 149.
118. Connick, 461 U.S. at 154. The Court offered the following rationale for its holding in
Connick: "Our holding today is grounded in our longstanding recognition that the First
Amendment's primary aim is the full protection of speech upon issues of public concern, as
well as the practical realities invoked in the administration of a government office." Id. Con-
nick makes no effort to indicate the constitutional source or status of the governmental inter-
ests that are to be weighed against employees' first amendment rights.
The Connick opinion presents several other peculiarities. One is that much of the analysis it
contains is irrelevant under the standard enunciated in its holding. According to that holding,
a federal court is not the place to review a public employer's personnel decision made in re-
sponse to an employee's speaking "upon matters only of personal interest." Id. at 147. Yet the
Court initially stated that the question before it was "whether the First and Fourteenth
Amendments prevent the discharge of a state employee for circulating a questionnaire con-
cerning internal office affairs." Id. at 140. It is not obvious that circulating such a question-
naire constitutes speech only upon matters of personal interest; indeed, the Court found that
one item in Myers' questionnaire did address a matter of public concern. Perhaps the Court
meant to say that a federal court is not the place to review a public employer's personnel
decision made in response to an employee's speech unless that speech had to do with matters of
public concern. But it did not say that. The Court's confusion over the appropriate threshold
standard may account for other tendencies manifested in the Connick opinion. For instance,
the opinion is laden with overstatements, reductionisms, and conclusory pronouncements.
Overstatements and exaggerations appear throughout the opinion. Pickering's emphasis on
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Connick did not address the matter of causation, though it did refer to Mt.
"matters of public concern," the Connick Court says reflects "the common-sense realization
that government offices could not function if every employment decision became a constitu-
tional matter." Id. at 143. None of the cases before the Court, of course, involved "every
employment decision," but only those where employees were fired because of their speech.
Other instances of hyperbole characterize the opinion. For example: "While as a matter of
good judgment, public offices should be receptive to constructive criticism offered by their
employees, the First Amendment does not require a public office to be run as a roundtable for
employee complaints over internal office affairs." Id. at 149. Obviously distributing a ques-
tionnaire on matters of office policy to fellow assistant district attorneys and requiring an office
to be run as a round table for employee complaints are significantly distinguishable undertak-
ings. The Court evidently deferred to Connick's judgment that by circulating the question-
naire, Myers had instigated a "mini-insurrection." Id. at 151-52. By flailing straw scenarios,
the majority avoided having to consider the actual facts before it.
A related tendency in Connick is to reduce all subjects that might be of possible public
concern to merely internal office affairs, personnel, or grievance questions. Having done so,
the Court further endeavored to reduce such questions to matters "of only personal concern."
The Court implies that only employee expressions relating to matters of "political, social, or
other concern to the community" should be protected by the first amendment. Id. at 146. The
Court then took a quite narrow view of the kinds of questions that interest "the community":
"[Q]uestions pertaining to the confidence and trust that Myers' co-workers possess in various
supervisors, the level of office morale, and the need for a grievance committee" were not ques-
tions "of public import in evaluating the performance of the District Attorney as an elected
official." Id. at 148. Yet on the same page, the Court acknowledged that employee speech
concerning "discipline and morale in the workplace" would relate to matters of public concern
inasmuch as it relates "to an agency's efficient performance of its duties." Id. (emphasis ad-
ded). See infra note 570 and accompanying text. The difference was that in the majority's
view, the "focus" of Myers' questionnaire was not to evaluate the performance of the office,
but only to pursue "controversy with her superiors." Id. The majority did not explain how it
knew that Myers would not use information derived from the questionnaire to evaluate the
agency's performance under Connick or that she was only interested in controversy for the
sake of controversy. Cf Comment, Freedom of Speech in the Public Workplace: A Comment
on the Public Concern Requirement, 76 CALIF. L. REV. 1109, 1118 (1988):
Myers' questionnaire should have met the Pickering public concern requirement
since it concerned the operation of a government office and arguably contained
information necessary for "informed decision-making" by the electorate. A
questionnaire revealing low office morale and disclosing that assistant district
attorneys do not have confidence in their supervisors would be helpful to the
public in deciding whether to reelect the district attorney. Specifically, the pub-
lic might vote against a district attorney who could not command employees'
trust and confidence.
Most of the questions Myers asked were, the Court asserted, "mere extensions of [her] dis-
pute over her transfer." Connick, 461 U.S. at 148. In a somewhat sweeping conclusory reduc-
tion, the Court speculated: "Indeed, the questionnaire, if released to the public, would convey
no information at all other than the fact that a single employee is upset with the status quo."
Id. (The Court had earlier observed that Connick had objected to the "question concerning
pressure to work in political campaigns which he felt would be damaging if disclosed by the
press," id. at 141, and went on to identify this question as a matter of public concern, id. at
149.) Finally, in a conclusory summation, the Court declared: "Myers' questionnaire touched
upon matters of public concern in only a most limited sense; her survey, in our view, is most
accurately characterized as an employee grievance concerning internal office policy." Id. at
154. See Note, Connick v. Myers: New Restrictions on the Free Speech Rights of Government
Employees, 60 IND. L.J. 339, 359 (1985) [hereinafter Note, New Restrictions]:
[T]he majority . . . [determined] that, even though one question on the survey
pertained to a matter of public interest, the survey, as a whole, was merely an
extension of Myers' personal grievance .... Connick apparently invites future
courts to blend speech of significant public interest with other, more "private"
expression when determining whether or not the speech focused on a matter of
general concern.
The Court never considered whether Myers' original contention that the proposed transfer
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Healthy's first stage of proof.' 19 Mt. Healthy remained in place, and was
supplemented by Connick's revision of Pickering's account of competing in-
terests and balancing. Thus, in the aftermath of Connick, Mt. Healthy's two-
part causation order of proof (or of analysis) would complete the analytical
model. Courts would now:
(1) determine whether the employee's speech had to do merely with a
matter of personal interest, or with a matter public concern, and if the latter,
evaluate its importance; (2) identify and appraise affected government inter-
ests, including supervisors' fears as to potential effects; (3) balance the em-
ployee's speech interest with the government interests affected by it, using
the sliding scale; (4) examine causation (a) to see whether the employee's
speech was a substantial or motivating factor in the supervisor's decision to
sanction the employee, and (b) if so, whether the government or supervisor
could nevertheless show that it, he, or she would have so sanctioned the
would involve her in a conflict of interest might have been a matter of public concern. See
supra note 64 and accompanying text. Numerous commentators have criticized Connick for
dramatically narrowing the range of issues deemed to relate to matters of public concern. See
id. at 354 ("Denying a discharged public employee an opportunity to demonstrate that his
speech affected neither his own performance nor the operations of the agency because his
expression is not of public concern, as the Connick decision does, is a drastic and dangerous
extension of the Pickering rationale"). See also Note, Public Employees and the First Amend-
ment." Connick v. Myers, 15 Loy. U. CHI. L.J. 292 (1984), and other studies cited infra note
455.
In its "balancing" analysis, the Court never even attempted to identify the nature or weight
of Myers' interest in her "speech" regarding possible pressure on staff attorneys to work for
certain political candidates. Instead, it devoted its balancing discussion entirely to contemplat-
ing adverse potentialities the questionnaire as a whole might have had (in Connick's judgment)
upon working relationships in the office. The Court was evidently willing to credit as "reason-
able" Connick's rather extreme characterizations of Myers' speech and his exaggerated fears as
to dire consequences that might have followed. Connick, 461 U.S. at 151-54, 151 n. 11.
One of the new doctrines articulated by the Connick Court was that when an employer
punishes an employee for exercising her speech right solely on the basis of the employer's fears
of possible disruption, "a stronger showing may be necessary if the employee's speech more
substantially involved matters of public concern." Id. at 152. Myers' question whether other
assistant district attorneys felt pressured to work in political campaigns on behalf of certain
candidates should have been treated as a matter of substantial public concern. "It is difficult to
think of a statement that more clearly presents a matter of public concern than this question,
which focuses on federal statutory policy." Lieberwitz, supra note 80, at 645. Yet the Court
never undertook to balance Myers' interest in speech on this matter of public concern against
Connick's interest in suppressing that speech. Nor did the Court suggest that Connick should
have been required to come forward with any showing that this speech threatened to under-
mine office relationships. Instead, it summarily characterized the entire questionnaire as
touching upon matters of public concern "in only a most limited sense," and in the final analy-
sis, as only "an employee grievance concerning internal office policy." Connick, 461 U.S. at
154. By exaggerating the adverse potential impact of the questionnaire on "office relation-
ships" and by minimizing the extent to which the questionnaire referred to matters of public
interest, the Court found it an easy matter to hold that the governmental interests trumped the
employee's first amendment speech rights.
Given its numerous linguistic and conceptual complications and uncertainties, it is not sur-
prising that lower courts experienced great difficulty in applying Connick in subsequent cases.
119. Connick, 461 U.S. at 153-54. The Connick majority obviously was interested in mak-
ing new law. The Court easily could have found that Connick had violated Myers' first
amendment speech interest on the question of pressure to work in political campaigns, and
then remanded for findings as to the Mt. Healthy "but for" causation question, that is, whether
Connick would have fired Myers anyway.
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employee anyway for permissible reasons. 120 A later Supreme Court deci-
sion added some further refinements to this model.
E. Rankin v. McPherson 12 1
Four years after Connick, the Supreme Court had occasion to apply the
emerging Pickering/Connick balancing test. In doing so, the Court gave
more definite structure to the earlier analytical guidelines, added some new
controlling principles or formulae, and posssibly trimmed back some of the
complexities that had sprouted since Pickering. Justice Marshall wrote the
opinion of the Court. 122
Ms. McPherson was a probationary employee in the Harris County,
Texas, constable's office. Mr. Rankin was the constable. She worked at a
computer terminal in a room removed from public access. Though ap-
pointed a "deputy," as were all office employees, she was not a commis-
sioned peace officer, and her duties were entirely clerical. A commissioned
deputy's responsibilities were primarily limited to serving process. McPher-
son is black, and at the time of the incident was nineteen years old. On
March 30, 1981, McPherson and a co-worker, Mr. Jackson, learned that
some one had tried to assassinate President Reagan. McPherson and Jack-
son engaged in a brief discussion in which McPherson observed that some of
the President's policies had impacted adversely on many blacks, and con-
cluded, "If they go for him again, I hope they get him." Another deputy,
whose presence McPherson had not noticed, overheard her statement. This
deputy reported McPherson's statement to Rankin, who then asked Mc-
Pherson if she had made it. She told him she had, but that she "didn't mean
anything by it." Rankin then fired her. 123 McPherson sued in federal dis-
trict court under section 1983,124 alleging a violation of her first amendment
right to speech. 125 The district court twice ruled in Rankin's favor; the Fifth
Circuit respectively vacated and reversed the district court's rulings. 126
120. See Kinsey v. Salado Indep. School Dist., 916 F.2d 273, 276 (5th Cir. 1990).
121. 483 U.S. 378 (1987).
122. The majority opinion was joined by Justices Brennan, Blackmun, Powell, and Stevens.
Justice Powell also wrote a brief concurring opinion. Justice Scalia wrote a dissenting opinion,
which was joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices White and O'Connor. Id. at 379.
123. Rankin, 483 U.S. at 380-82.
124. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1988).
125. In view of the "incorporation" of the first amendment into the fourteenth amendment,
public employee free speech complaints against state and local governmental employers are
filed under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1988). Many of these cases therefore turn on typical § 1983
issues such as eleventh amendment immunity of the governmental entities and qualified immu-
nity of the governmental officials involved. The eleventh amendment issue was addressed in
Mt. Healthy City School Dist. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274, 281-82 (1977); see also Frazier v. King,
873 F.2d 820, 827 (5th Cir.), cert. denied sum nom. Davoli v. Frazier, 110 S. Ct. 502, 107 L.
Ed. 2d 504 (1989). The qualified immunity issue figures in several Fifth Circuit cases. See
Thompson v. City of Starkville, 901 F.2d 456, 468-70 (5th Cir. 1990); Frazier, 873 F.2d at 827;
Brawner v. City of Richardson, 855 F.2d 187, 190-93 (5th Cir. 1988); Matherne v. Wilson, 851
F.2d 752, 755-59 (5th Cir. 1988).
126. Rankin, 483 U.S. at 382-83.
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1. Further Preliminary Principles
The Supreme Court initially observed that under Perry,t27 even though
McPherson was merely a probationary employee who could otherwise have
been discharged for any or no reason, she could not be discharged for exer-
cising her constitutional right of free expression.128 The Court thereby ex-
pressly extended this principle beyond the sphere of nontenured academic
employees. Before commencing its balancing analysis, the Court reiterated
an important governing principle applicable in reviewing public employee
free speech violation claims: "Vigilance is necessary to ensure that public
employers do not use authority over employees to silence discourse, not be-
cause it hampers public functions but simply because superiors disagree with
the content of employees' speech."1 29 Thus public employers could not cen-
sure employees or censor their ideas solely on the basis of the content of
their speech.
2. Matters of Public Concern
In Rankin, for the first time, the Court specifically characterized the ques-
tion whether an employee claimant's speech dealt with "a matter-of-public-
concern" as "the threshold question."' 130 The Court thus tacitly abandoned
Connick's, albeit ambiguous, holding to the effect that the first amendment
protects all speech except that relating to matters of only personal con-
cern.'3 In its review of the case, the Fifth Circuit had held that "the life
and death of the President are obviously matters of public concern." 32 The
Supreme Court evidently agreed, but emphasized that its finding was based
upon consideration of the context in which the statement was made. The
Court considered it significant that McPherson spoke "in the course of a
conversation addressing the policies of the President's administration," and
immediately following "a news bulletin regarding what is certainly a matter
of heightened public attention: an attempt on the life of the President."' 33
The Court enunciated another general principle in connection with "matter
of public concern" analysis: the statement's appropriateness or controver-
siality is "irrelevant" in determining whether it is a matter of public
concern. 134
The Court re-emphasized its holding in Givhan that private speech is
within the first amendment's protection: "The private nature of the state-
127. See supra note 28 and accompanying text.
128. Rankin, 483 U.S. at 383-84.
129. Id. at 384. See supra note 22 and accompanying text.
130. "The threshold question... is whether McPherson's speech may be 'fairly character-
ized as constituting speech on a matter of public concern'." Id. at 384 (citation omitted).
131. See supra notes 71, 72 and accompanying text. Nevertheless, the Court quoted Con-
nick to the effect that speech on other matters could, under "the most unusual circumstances,"
also be protected. Id. at 384 n.7.
132. Id. at 385 (quoting McPherson v. Rankin, 786 F.2d 1233 (5th Cir. 1986)). See infra
notes 208-212 and accompanying text.
133. Rankin, 483 U.S. at 386. The Court understood that this inquiry involved questions
of both fact and law, but did not delineate their boundaries. See supra note 88.
134. Id. at 387. Cf supra note 129 and accompanying text.
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ment does not.., vitiate the status of the statement as addressing a matter of
public concern." 135 In his concurring opinion, Justice Powell stated that it
would be an unusual case where an employer would be justified in punishing
such private speech.' 36 The majority agreed "that a purely private statement
on a matter of public concern will rarely, if ever, justify discharge of a public
employee."' 37 The Court suggests that its analysis would have ended here
but for Rankin's claim that McPherson's speech implicated the serious state
interest of her suitability as an employee of a law enforcement agency.' 38 To
assess that claim, the Court proceeded to the next stage of analysis.1
39
3. Balancing Governmental Interests with Employee Speech Rights
For the first time, Rankin expressly stated that in cases involving em-
ployee speech on matters of public concern, the government "bears [the]
burden of justifying [a] discharge on legitimate grounds."' 14 Unlike Con-
nick, where the Court had identified a series of loosely related governmental
interests or goals, 14 1 Rankin emphasized only the one basic state interest
articulated in Pickering: workplace efficiency.142 Referring to the various
related considerations or factors mentioned in Pickering,143 the Rankin
Court rephrased the central inquiry as to the government's interest: the im-
pact of the employee's speech "on the effective functioning of the employer's
enterprise."44 This phrasing does not specificially relate to the ultimate per-
formance of public services as did Pickering.14 5 On the other hand, by di-
recting analysis to the effective functioning of the governmental enterprise,
Rankin avoids the tendency in Connick to treat such matters as "discipline,"
"morale," "office relations," and "working relationships" as ends in
themselves. ' 46
In Givhan, the Court had held that "the manner, time, and place" in
which employee speech was made should be considered in determining its
effect on institutional efficiency only "when a government employee person-
135. Id. at 386-87 n.il.
136. Justice Powell wrote as follows:
If a statement is on a matter of public concern, as it was here, it will be be an
unusual case where the employer's legitimate interests will be so great as to
justify punishing an employee for this type of private speech that routinely takes
place at all levels in the workplace. The risk that a single, offhand comment
directed to only one other worker will lower morale, disrupt the work force, or
otherwise undermine the mission of the office borders on the fanciful.
Id. at 393 (Powell, J., concurring).
137. Id. at 388 n.13.
138. Id.
139. Rankin, 483 U.S. at 388.
140. Id. at 388. Cf Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 149-51 (1983).
141. See supra notes 88-111 and accompanying text.
142. Rankin, 483 U.S. at 388.
143. Id.
144. Id.
145. Pickering v. Board of Educ., 391 U.S. 563, 568-70 (1968). See supra notes 11-12 and
accompanying text.
146. See supra notes 93, 90-98, 114 and accompanying text.
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ally confronts his immediate superior."'147 In Connick, the Court abstracted
these factors from that context and held them applicable in determining
whether an employee's public statement had undermined or could poten-
tially undermine office relations even though there had been no personal
confrontation.1 48 Connick also had stated that the context which gave rise
to the dispute was significant. 49 Rankin went further and declared these
factors-manner, time, place, and context-relevant considerations in ap-
praising the impact of speech on governmental interests and in the general
balancing analysis generally. Consequently, these factors were now applied
even though there was no "undermining" of office relations and no "dis-
pute." °50 Proceeding to balancing, the Court noted that there was no record
evidence that McPherson's statement had interfered with the function of the
constable's office or that it had made her unfit to perform her work.' 5' The
only possible adverse impact the statement could have had was that it might
"somehow [have] undermine[d] the mission of the public employer."' 152 The
Court then addressed a new consideration: the employee's responsibilities
within the work place. 153 It then went on to create a new sliding scale in this
connection: "The burden of caution employees bear with respect to the
words they speak will vary with the extent of authority and public accounta-
bility the employee's role entails."' 54 This new formula possibly derives
from the manner, time, place, and context factors the Court had earlier
evoked. On the basis of this new formula, the Court concluded that Mc-
Pherson posed little danger to the office's functioning because her position
did not involve matters of confidentiality or public policy.' 55 The Court
then held that such a minimal threat to the agency's functioning did not
outweigh McPherson's rights under the First Amendment. 156
147. Givhan v. Western Line Consol. School Dist., 439 U.S. 410, 415 n.4 (1979). For a
case where the Fifth Circuit applied at least one of these criteria in such a situation, see Gonza-
lez v. Benavides, 774 F.2d 1295, 1303 (5th Cir. 1985).
148. Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 152-53 (1983). See supra notes 104-108 and accom-
panying text.
149. Id. at 153. See supra notes 109-10 and accompanying text.
150. Rankin, 483 U.S. at 388. One commentator suggested that Rankin's importance lies
in its extension of Pickering/Connick balancing/public concern analysis beyond the realm of
fact situations where the employee's speech had criticized her supervisor or ultimate employer.
Note, supra note 74, at 255.
151. Rankin, 483 U.S. at 388-89.
152. Id. at 390. Note the broadened scope of the "undermined" language here. See supra
notes 97-98 and accompanying text.
153. Id. at 390.
154. Id. at 390-91.
155. Id. One commentator objects that this new formula unnecessarily "opens the door for
protection of any speech made by an employee who is not involved in a confidential or poli-
cymaking role," thereby allowing "seemingly infinite protection of non-policymaking employ-
ees." Dennison, Constitutional Law-First Amendment Right to Freedom of Speech-
Infringement Upon Public Employees' Right to Speak on Matters of Public Concern, 55 TENN.
L. REV. 175, 200-01 (1987). The writer appears to assume that the new formula would protect
employee speech even if the supervisor could show that the speech had adversely affected
agency operations. Id.
156. Rankin, 483 U.S. at 391-92. Here the Court hints that a governmental employee
might have a first amendment speech right apart from any social utilitarian value such speech
might afford the community. Id. See also id. at 388 (where the Court refers, rather in passing,
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As will be noted, fact situations vary widely. Because of this variation, and
also because of the varied, if not amorphous, character of the Supreme
Court's several pronouncements in its decisions from Pickering to Rankin,
the lower federal courts have experienced serious difficulty in determining
when a public employee's speech is protected from retaliatory sanction by
government officials. 157 The Fifth Circuit's cases since Connick amply illus-
trate these difficulties. 158
III. PUBLIC EMPLOYEE FIRST AMENDMENT SPEECH RIGHTS IN FIFTH
CIRCUIT CASE LAW SINCE CONNICK
Most Fifth Circuit post-Connick employee speech cases have focused on
the first level of analysis, whether the speech in question had to do with
"matters of public concern" or only with "purely personal interests."' 159 In
the aggregate, these cases have found that certain kinds of matters were of
public concern, but that many were not, including a large number that pur-
portedly related only to employees' "personal" or "private" interests. In
reaching these findings, the court'6 applied, expanded upon, and added to
the several tests and factors articulated in Connick and the other Supreme
Court cases from Pickering to Rankin. These new tests and factors have
made it even more difficult for public employees to show that their speech
was entitled to first amendment protection. The Fifth Circuit's application
of the Connick/Rankin "matters-of-public-concern" threshold test, espe-
cially where such "matters" are narrowly conceived, clearly demonstrates
that this test is incompatible with first amendment policy articulated by the
Supreme Court itself' 6' for it has enabled agency supervisors to discharge
employees solely because the latter's speech embarassed, angered, or other-
wise displeased the supervisors, without any showing or even contention that
to "McPherson's interest in making her statement"). See infra notes 527-33 and accompany-
ing text.
157. See Allred, From Connick to Confusion: the Struggle to Define Speech on Matters of
Public Concern, 64 IND. L.J. 43 (1988). Allred did identify certain situations where lower
courts would be likely (though not certain) to hold post-Connick speech related to matters of
public concern: Where the speech addressed an issue already debated in the community;
where the speech alleged malfeasance or abuse of office; and where the speech dealt with public
safety and welfare, the quality of public education, or racial or gender based discrimination.
See also Note, supra note 74, at 257-62 (reviewing complex and confusing tests for defining
"matters of public concern" developed in various circuit courts of appeal).
158. "The cases demonstrate the difficulties involved in applying the Supreme Court's bal-
ancing test, which is unusually vague and complex even for a Supreme Court balancing test."
Rees, The First Amendment, 16 TEX. TECH L. REV. 187, 188 (1985).
159. Often these cases were presented in the posture of appeals from a grant or denial of
motion for summary judgment relative to the "matter of public concern" issue. See Thompson
v. City of Starkville, 901 F.2d 456, 457 (5th Cir. 1990); Brawner v. City of Richardson, 855
F.2d 187, 190 (5th Cir. 1988); Noyola v. Texas Dep't of Human Resources, 846 F.2d 1021 (5th
Cir. 1988); Page v. DeLaune, 837 F.2d 233 (5th Cir. 1988); Brown v. Texas A&M Univ., 804
F.2d 327 (5th Cir. 1986).
160. In this article, the U.S. Court of Appeals, Fifth Judicial Circuit, is referred to simply
as "the court" or, in the case of panel decisions, "the panel." The U.S. district court from
which a case is appealed is designated simply as "the district court" or "the trial court."
161. See supra notes 22, 129 and accompanying text.
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the "offending" speech interfered with the efficient performance of public
services.
Some Fifth Circuit cases have focused upon the nature and weight of the
government's interest in preventing (or punishing) employee speech on mat-
ters of public concern. Again, the court evoked a series of expanded and
new tests or factors for appraising government interests. Most of these tests
or factors give public employers additional opportunities to show that pur-
ported governmental interests outweigh employees' speech interests. A few
cases added new considerations to the third, balancing phase of the Connick
analysis. 162 Relatively few cases were decided on the basis of the fourth step
in Connick, the Mt. Healthy causation analysis.
At some point, the Supreme Court may take cognizance of the confusion
and other deleterious consequences deriving from its government employee
speech jurisprudence as this has played out in the lower courts. In the
meantime, the Fifth Circuit may wish to revisit the area of public employees'
first amendment speech rights so as to simplify and better structure the
proliferation of diverse criteria set out in its many panels' decisions. The
court may also wish to consider whether some of these criteria unnecessarily
encroach upon employees' own first amendment rights as well as upon re-
lated societal interests in "the marketplace testing of ideas and
information." 163
A. Matters of Public Concern, Purely Personal Interest, or Tertium Quid?
The Fifth Circuit has found that certain subjects may constitute matters of
public concern, but that others fall short on this "threshold" test.' 64 Possi-
bly because Connick had said that, ordinarily, only speech on matters of
purely personal interest was unprotected by the first amendment, 65 the
court sometimes strained to so characterize whatever speech fell outside the
realm of "matters of public concern." In other cases, the court was content
to say that the speech in question did not address a matter of public concern.
In these cases the Fifth Circuit read Connick to mean that all other speech
was unprotected, even if it went beyond matters of purely personal interest.
Connick left in limbo the status of public employee speech on tertium quid
matters that fit neither the public concern nor the private interest category.
The Fifth Circuit has tended to resolve doubt by denying first amendment
protection.
1. Subjects Qualifying as Matters of Public Concern
Although the court refrained from setting down a list of matters that
162. In particular, the doctrine emerged that the greater the matter of public concern, the
greater the disruptive effect of the speech must be in order for the government's interest to
outweigh the employee's first amendment rights. See Frazier v. King, 873 F.2d 820, 826 (5th
Cir.), cert. denied sub nom. Davoli v. Frazier, 110 S. Ct. 502, 107 L. Ed. 2d 504 (1989).
163. See supra note 1.
164. See supra notes 71-72, 130 and accompanying text.
165. See supra note 79 and accompanying text.
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would always be "matters-of-public-concern," it did find certain types of
speech to generally so qualify. 1 66 The Court held that one type of employee
speech, in view of its context, was "inherently" a matter of public concern:
testimony "before an official government adjudicatory or fact finding
body." 167 The court expressed concern that the threat of retaliation would
chill an employee's willingness to give true and voluntary testimony, and
thereby "compromise the integrity of the judicial process."' 68
Another Fifth Circuit panel found that "[t]he quality of nursing care
given to any group of people, including inmates, is a matter of public con-
cern."' 169 In addition, the cases have uniformly held that employee
whistleblower speech relates to matters of public concern, at least if the em-
ployee sought to bring wrongdoing on the part of public officials to the atten-
tion of either the media or appropriate officials outside the governmental
agency where he or she worked. But some panels have taken a restrictive
view of the types of wrongdoing that may be of concern to the public.
a. Whistleblower Speech: Public and Private
In every case where the court has found employee speech properly charac-
terized as whistleblowing, it has concluded that such speech addressed a
matter of public concern. This has been true both in a pre-Connick case
decided under Pickering,170 and in later cases based on Connick.17Y Like-
wise, the court has found that employee speech exposing an agency's or
agency official's wrongdoing to persons outside the agency qualifies under
the "matters of public concern" test even where the employee's conduct was
not designated "whistleblowing."' 72 These several cases encompass a wide
range of concerns. A state mental health worker informed state police and
the F.B.I. about drug-pushing at the facility where he worked.173 A regis-
tered nurse working at a state correctional center reported violations of med-
ical and nursing care standards to state officials and the state board of
nursing.' 74 A justice of the peace wrote an open letter to county officials
complaining that the district attorney and the county court had been revers-
166. See Kinsey v. Salado Indep. School Dist., 916 F.2d 273, 277 n.3 (5th Cir. 1990) (re-
viewing Fifth Circuit cases finding speech on matters of public concern).
167. Johnston v. Harris County Flood Control Dist., 869 F.2d 1565, 1578 (5th Cir. 1989),
cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 718, 107 L. Ed. 2d 738 (1990). See also Neubauer v. City of McAllen,
766 F.2d 1567, 1572-73 n.5 (5th Cir. 1985).
168. Johnston, 869 F.2d at 1578.
169. Frazier v. King, 873 F.2d 820, 825 (5th Cir.), cert. denied sum nom. Davoli v. Frazier,
110 S. Ct. 502, 107 L. Ed. 2d 504 (1989). See also Price v. Brittain, 874 F.2d 252, 258 (5th Cir.
1989) ("Without doubt, the welfare of the patients [at a state mental health] facility and the
protection of their civil rights are matters of serious public concern.").
170. Porter v. Califano, 592 F.2d 770 (5th Cir. 1979).
171. Price, 874 F.2d at 256; Frazier, 873 F.2d at 826; Brown v. Texas A&M Univ., 804
F.2d 327, 336 (5th Cir. 1986).
172. See Scott v. Flowers, 910 F.2d 201, 203-04, 211 (5th Cir. 1990). See also Brawner v.
City of Richardson, 855 F.2d 187, 191 (5th Cir. 1988); United Carolina Bank v. Board of
Regents, 665 F.2d 553 (5th Cir. 1982).
173. Price, 874 F.2d at 254-55, 257-58.
174. Frazier v. King, 873 F.2d 820, 822 (5th Cir.), cert. denied sum nom. Davoli v. Frazier,
110 S. Ct. 502, 107 L. Ed. 2d 504 (1989).
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ing traffic convictions and discounting fines for those "in the know."' 75 A
police officer's attorney wrote a letter to the city manager with copies to
elected city officials and newspaper reporters charging the police department
with keeping secret investigative files on non-criminal activities by citizens,
including candidates for office.176 A police officer publicly complained that
the police department was giving special, favorable treatment to a particular
city subdivision and its private security force.' 77 A university research di-
rector publicly criticized his institution's misuse or misallocation of research
funds. 178 A federal agency employee wrote and distributed copies of a letter
charging that certain agency officials had engaged in private business on gov-
ernment time and showed favoritism to those employees who took part in
this business. 179 In each case, these public employees succeeded in bringing
official wrongdoing to public attention.
On the other hand, public employees who attempted to correct what they
perceived as wrongdoing on the part of other agency employees by going
through internal channels were not always found to have addressed matters
of public concern. One panel, faithful to the Supreme Court's decision in
Givhan,'80 insisted that employees concerned about internal wrongdoing
need not voice their concerns outside of the workplace in order for their
speech to come within the shelter of the first amendment. In that case a
university accountant informed his administrative superiors that a faculty
member had possibly engaged in self-dealing with university funds.' 8 ' The
court declared that underlying first amendment policy concerns protect pub-
lic employee speech whether such speech was published openly or spoken in
private:
If whistleblowing were not within the protective bosom of the First
Amendment, our government would be shorn of many of the instru-
ments of investigation, which effectively have led to the elimination of a
few bad apples among the barrels of very efficient, effective, honorable
and honest public servants. Public employees are uniquely qualified to
reveal unseemly machinations by their fellow employees because they
observe them on a daily basis. A paramount priority of the First
Amendment is to protect expression relating to "the manner in which
government is operated or should be operated."' 82 The need for First
Amendment protection of expression which seeks to expose, and hope-
fully to alleviate, scurrilous governmental conduct has gained renewed
emphasis by the tragic events of Watergate. The fact that the speech
was delivered privately to Brown's superiors, rather than to Bob Wood-
ward and Carl Bernstein, does not necessarily render the speech any
less protected.
175. Scott, 910 F.2d at 203-04.
176. Brawner, 855 F.2d at 189-90.
177. Thomas v. Harris County, 784 F.2d 648, 653 (5th Cir. 1986).
178. United Carolina Bank v. Board of Regents, 665 F.2d 553, 562 (5th Cir. 1982).
179. Porter v. Califano, 592 F.2d 770, 771, 774-75 (5th Cir. 1979).
180. See supra notes 51-59 and accompanying text.
181. Brown v. Texas A&M Univ., 804 F.2d 327 (5th Cir. 1986).
182. Mills v. Alabama, 384 U.S. 214 (1966).
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It cannot be gainsaid that in our society, pervaded with the ubiqui-
tous and sickening spectre of governmental irregularity and mendacity,
an expression relating to possible financial improprieties by a fellow
public servant is a "matter of public concern." 1 3
Some other Fifth Circuit panels, however, have been less willing to accord
whistleblower status to public employees who criticize or oppose unseemly
machinations by fellow-employees or administrative superiors. In so finding,
these panels have applied various new standards or tests, in addition to the
Connick factors, for identifying whether privately communicated speech
about wrongdoing constitutes speech on "matters of public concern."
One such case involved four employees of a state-sponsored day care
center who had complained in a private communication concerning another
employee who brought a gun to work and about another incident that was
contrary to the center's rules. 184 The panel found the complaint to be only a
"personal grievance," and not of public concern. 185 Several other Fifth Cir-
cuit cases have reached the same conclusion. A county appraiser advised the
county appraisal board members that they had exceeded their legal authority
by asking him to review certain types of property valuations.1 8 6 The court
concluded that the appraiser thereby addressed only "a personal dispute
with his employers."' 8 7
In another case, Davis v. West Community Hosptial,'8 8 a surgeon wrote
confidential letters to hospital supervisors alleging ineffective patient treat-
ment by another physician, that hospital officials were condoning or over-
looking that other physician's ineffective care, and that certain hospital
board members had engaged in nepotism. 189 The Fifth Circuit held that the
surgeon's complaints "concerned individual personnel disputes and did not
address matters of public concern." 90
Thus, notwithstanding Givhan, some Fifth Circuit panels have found pri-
vately communicated charges of wrongdoing less clearly protected under the
first amendment than whistleblower speech addressed to persons outside the
government agency.' 9' The policy consequence is to punish employees who
go through agency channels, and to provide incentives for "going public"
instead. Of course, in these and other cases, there may be only a blurry line
between "wrongdoing" by fellow employees or officers and merely arbitrary,
unfair, counter-productive or inefficient practices. The court generally has
been reluctant to find speech about such latter subjects within the sphere of
183. Brown, 804 F.2d at 337. Citations and footnotes omitted.
184. Moore v. Mississippi Valley State Univ., 871 F.2d 545, 548 (5th Cir. 1989) [hereinaf-
ter Moore v. MVSU]. See infra notes 266-76 and accompanying text.
185. Id. at 551.
186. McAdams v. Matagorda County Appraisal Dist., 798 F.2d 842, 844 (5th Cir. 1986).
187. Id. at 846.
188. 755 F.2d 455 (5th Cir. 1985).
189. Id. at 459-60.
190. Id. at 462.
191. More recent decisions have reemphasized the Givhan decision. See Thompson v. City
of Starkville, 901 F.2d 456, 466-67 (5th Cir. 1990); Kirkland v. Northside Indep. School Dist.,
890 F.2d 794, 800 (5th Cir. 1989).
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"matters of public concern." 1 92 As will be seen, the Fifth Circuit has some-
times taken a restrictive view as to what kinds of matters are or might be "of
public concern."
b. Political Speech and Speech on Matters of Public Policy
In two pre-Connick cases, Elrod v. Burns1 9 3 and Branti v. Finkel,'94 the
Supreme Court addressed the then-current practice of patronage dismis-
sals. 195 In Elrod, the Court held that a "nonpolicymaking, nonconfidential
government employee" could not "be discharged or threatened with dis-
charge from a job that he is satisfactorily performing upon the sole ground of
his political beliefs."' 196 Later, in Branti, the Court extended Elrod to bar
dismissal based on political party affiliation.197 The Fifth Circuit soon had
occasion to apply these decisions in situations involving public employee
political expression.
Shortly after Branti, a Fifth Circuit panel upheld the firing of a public
employee who had supported the opposition mayoral candidate. 198 The
panel reasoned that Elrod applied only to political beliefs, that Branti ap-
plied only to political affiliation, and that neither had held political activity
protected under the first amendment. 199 Later the en banc court endorsed
these positions.
Once Connick was decided, the Fifth Circuit had to determine whether its
tests and factors governed Elrod and Branti analysis. In McBee v. Jim Hogg
County,2°° the court's most recent en banc decision on first amendment
rights of public employees, a divided Fifth Circuit held that Connick does so
control.201 Having been elected pursuant to a one-party primary, the new
sheriff made space for his own political supporters by declining to rehire
several former deputies who had campaigned for his predecessor. He also
terminated the employment of another deputy, Ms. McBee, who had com-
plained to county authorities about the new sheriff's unfair treatment of the
others. 202 Although the court was mainly concerned with the weight to be
192. See infra notes 267-73, 296-97, 301-06 and accompanying text.
193. 427 U.S. 347 (1976).
194. 445 U.S. 507 (1980).
195. Elrod, 427 U.S. at 356-57; Branti, 445 U.S. at 513-17.
196. Elrod, 427 U.S. at 375 (Stewart, J., concurring).
197. "[I]t is manifest that continued employment of an assistant public defender cannot
properly be conditioned upon his allegiance to the political party in control of the county
government." Brand, 445 U.S. at 519. The Supreme Court recently extended Elrod and
Brand to protect governmental employees from adverse hiring, promotion, transfer, and recall
decisions based on their political affiliation or activity. See generally The Supreme Court, 1989
Term-Leading Cases, 104 HARV. L. REV. 129, 227-30 (1990) (containing discussion of
caselaw dealing with freedom of speech, press, and association).
198. McCormick v. Edwards, 646 F.2d 173, 175, 179 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1017
(1981).
199. Id. at 178; Matherne v. Wilson, 851 F.2d 752, 757-58 (5th Cir. 1988).
200. 730 F.2d 1009 (5th Cir. 1984) (en banc).
201. Id. at 1013-17.
202. The McBee court held that Elrod was inapplicable because it only protected employ-
ees from patronage dismissals based on their unexpressed personal political beliefs, and that
Bran ti applied only to dismissals based on party affiliation. Id. at 1011-13. The dissent vigor-
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accorded various competing balancing factors, it held, sub silentio, that polit-
ical activity on behalf of a candidate for public office constituted speech on a
matter of public interest. 20 3
More recently, the Fifth Circuit considered a case in which a sheriff fired
one of his deputies for being present at a meeting of the rival candidate's
campaign workers. 204 Here the panel specifically identified the threshold
question as "whether an employee's speech addresses a matter of 'public
concern,' " and found that the deputy's "speech" did So. 20 5 In another case,
a divided panel held that a school superintendent's support of opposition
school board members addressed a matter of public concern.2° 6 These post-
Connick political speech cases suggest that the Fifth Circuit will probably
find such speech to address "matters of public concern" and, thus, to pass
the "threshold" test. Whether it will also be found to outweigh the affected
government interests, of course, is another question.20 7
Only one Fifth Circuit public employee speech case has involved matters
of possible national concern. This was McPherson v. Rankin.208 Here a dep-
uty constable had overheard part of a private conversation prompted by the
attempted assassination of President Reagan. In this conversation, Ms. Mc-
Pherson, a clerical worker, had said to another constable's office employee,
"[I]f they go for him again, I hope they get him. ''2°9 The Fifth Circuit found
that this statement, without more, addressed "matters of public concern,"
namely, "the life and death of the President. ' 210 It also noted that the state-
ment may have been "an hyperbolic expression of unhappiness with the
President's policies," which also would have related to serious matters of
public concern.21' Either way, the court insisted, the first amendment pro-
tects speech on matters of public concern, "however loathsome" the content
ously opposed the majority's narrow construction of Elrod and Branti on these points. Id. at
1017-23 (Rubin, J., dissenting, joined by Randall [King] and Higginbotham, JJ.). Commenta-
tors have critized Mcbee. See Martin, A Decade of Branti Decisions A Government Official's
Guide to Patronage Dismissals 39 AM. U.L. REV. 11, 33-35 (1989); Note, McBee v. Jim Hogg
County: On Balance A Risky Business, 45 LA. L. REV. 1094, (1988)(suggesting that the court
should have applied Elrod/Branti rather than Connick analysis). See also Note, Politics and
the non-Civil Service Public Employee: A Categorical Approach to First Amendment Protection,
85 COLUM. L. REV. 558 (1985).
203. The closest the majority came to so stating explictly was in its discussion of Connick
analysis: "On the one hand, the court should consider to what degree the deputies' participa-
tion in the election campaign or Ms. McBee's actions involve 'public concerns.' " McBee, 730
F.2d at 1016. Since the court then proceeded with its Connick balancing analysis, it may
reasonably be inferred that it found the employees' "participation" and "actions" to be speech
relating to "matters of public concern." Id. at 1016-17.
204. Matherne v. Wilson, 851 F.2d 752, 754-55 (5th Cir. 1988).
205. Id. at 760, 761 n.53. Although the report gives no indication that the deputy had
taken part in the meeting, the court evidently concluded that the sheriff had fired him for
doing so, and that this activity, which may or may not have involved "speaking," was expres-
sion within the meaning of the first amendment.
206. Kinsey v. Salado Indep. School Dist., 916 F.2d 273, 277-79 (5th Cir. 1990).
207. See infra notes 389-80, 407-16 and accompanying text.
208. 786 F.2d 1233 (5th Cir. 1986), aff'd, 483 U.S. 378 (1987). See supra notes 121-56 and
accompanying text.
209. McPherson, 786 F.2d at 1234.
210. Id. at 1236.
211. Id. at 1238.
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might be.212 Presumably statements on state and local governmental policy
would also constitute speech on matters of public concern.213 The court has
held that the "political context" in which speech occurs is an important fac-
tor weighing in favor of finding that the speech relates to matters of public
concern, especially where elected officials are involved.214 We shall see,
however, that the Fifth Circuit has been reluctant to so categorize public
employee speech concerning policies and practices of the government agency
where the employee works.
The cases examined to this point yield two categories of public employee
speech that the Fifth Circuit has held to relate to "matters of public con-
cern": whistleblower speech, and speech on behalf of political candidates or
public policies. The Fifth Circuit has also found a few other instances of
public employee speech to relate to matters of public concern.
c. Social or Other Concern to the Community
Connick suggested that employee expression "relating to any matter of
political, social, or other concern to the community" might be considered
speech on a matter of public concern. 215 Arguably, "or other" could em-
brace a wide range of community interests. A few Fifth Circuit post-Con-
nick cases involving public employee speech on matters of their agency's or
agency official's policies or practices appear to fall within the "social" or
"other concern" category.
Speech by public school personnel on matters of educational policy has
been found within the realm of matters of public concern in two cases. One
such case is Wells v. Hico Independent School District.216 A group of teach-
ers, including Ms. Wells and Ms. Braune, appeared before the school board
to advocate continuation of a "Right to Read" program in which they
taught. Braune expressed concern about lack of administrative and teacher
support for the program and about "discriminatorily" low evaluations re-
ceived by its teachers. 217 The board subsequently did not renew Wells' and
Braune's contracts. The district court held that the board had violated the
teachers' first amendment rights, and the Fifth Circuit affirmed. The latter
212. Id.
213. Matters of public concern may include "any matter of political, social, or other con-
cern to the community." Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 146 (1983).
214. Brinkmeyer v. Thrall Indep. School Dist., 786 F.2d 1291, 1295 (5th Cir. 1986). Ms.
Brinkmeyer, a teacher's aid, was asked by a school board member whether the superintendent
had made a particular remark criticizing his position before the faculty. She confirmed that
the superintendant had made the remark. Thereafter, her contract was terminated. The Fifth
Circuit panel noted that the remark was made in the context of "a hotly contested dispute
among elected officals and the superintendent," and found that Brinkmeyer's speech did ad-
dress a matter of public concern. Id. at 1292-95. Had it not so found, Brinkmeyer evidently
would have been dismissed solely because she had truthfully answered an inquiry by an admin-
istrative superior. The case nicely illustrates the irrelevancy of the "public concern" threshold
test and the likelihood that, as applied, it may serve merely to enable supervisors to punish
lower level employees for innocent speech they happen to find embarassing or threatening to
their abnormally tender egos.
215. Connick, 461 U.S. at 146 (emphasis added).
216. 736 F.2d 243 (5th Cir. 1984), cert. dismissed, 473 U.S. 901 (1985).
217. Id. at 247.
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was impressed by the fact that in addressing the board, Braune had stated
her understanding of the school district's commitment to the program, her
concern that the program was not receiving adequate support, and her per-
ception that the program's basic concept, individualized instruction, "was
the key to improving education. '2 18 Evidently the panel considered each of
these features of Braune's speech related to matters of public concern. 21 9
Two years later, in Jett v. Dallas Independent School District,220 another
panel found a school employee's speech on educational policies within the
first amendment. Mr. Jett, a white, was athletic director and head football
coach at a school that had become predominantly black. The principal, Mr.
Todd, a black, had criticized Jett's speech and actions on various occasions.
Then a newspaper quoted Jett as having said that only two of the school's
athletes were qualified to meet proposed NCAA academic eligibility require-
ments. Todd then took action culminating in Jett's removal from the school.
The jury found that Jett was removed because of his protected speech,22 '
and a Fifth Circuit panel alfirmed. The panel did not analyze the quoted
statement, but simply concluded, "This remark, which concerns the aca-
demic development of public high school football players and their potential
eligibility for playing college football, certainly addresses matters of concern
to the community. ' 222 Recently, another panel held that a college profes-
sor's assertions that some of his colleagues "showed favoritism in grading
toward athletes and pre-med students and exchanged grades for sex" also
involved matters of public concern and not merely a personal dispute or
grievance.223
In Gonzalez v. Benavides224 the court found speech relating to administra-
tion of federally funded anti-poverty programs likewise within the first
amendment. This case involved a dispute between Mr. Gonzalez, director of
a county Community Action Agency (CAA), and the County Commission-
ers' Court. Gonzalez had discharged the deputy director, Mr. Chavez. The
commissioners thereupon reinstated Chavez, publicly reprimanded Gonza-
lez for exceeding his authority, and initiated an investigation into his job
performance. Gonzalez publicly told the commissioners that the CAA's reg-
ulations authorized him to dismiss Chavez, and that their investigation of his
job performance constituted a CAA violation that could result in loss of
federal funding. The commissioners ordered Gonzalez to acknowledge their
authority to evaluate his performance. Upon his refusal to do so, they fired
him.
218. Id. at 249.
219. See id.
220. 798 F.2d 748 (5th Cir. 1986), aff'd in part, 491 U.S. 701 (1989). (The Supreme Court
held that a municipality may not be vicariously liable for its employees' violations of 42 U.S.C.
§ 1981 (1988)).
221. Id. at 752.
222. Id. at 758.
223. Coats v. Pierre, 890 F.2d 728, 732 (5th Cir. 1989).
224. 774 F.2d 1295 (5th Cir. 1985). This opinion written by Judge Wisdom presents a
useful review of relevant Supreme Court decisions regarding public employee speech rights
from Keyeshian to Connick. Id. at 1299-1300.
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The Fifth Circuit found that Gonzalez's speech was important to him as
an employee. It expressly held, however, that a private matter can also in-
volve issues of public concern. 225 Where the employee speech related to
"mixed" issues of public and private concern, the court would so recognize
and proceed with further analysis. 226 Several other panels, however, have
taken the position that if a public employee's speech in any way involved a
"personnel dispute" or "grievance," it would be treated as a matter of only
personal interest, and, thus, excluded from the realm of protected speech
even if the speech also related to matters of public concern.
227
The court identified three features of Gonzalez's statements that dealt
with matters of public concern. First, he had suggested that the commis-
sioners' violations could lead to loss of federal funding for the program. Had
that occurred, needy county residents would have lost federal assistance in
excess of a million dollars a year. This possible, though unlikely, catastro-
phe "raised the issue to a matter of significant public concern. '228 Second,
the court concluded that whether the commissioners' court had complied
with the CAA regulations also raised a question of significant public con-
cern.229 Finally, the court found that uncertainty as to distribution of au-
thority and responsibility among the commissioners' court, the director, and
other entities was a matter of public concern because it had "generated fric-
tion and reduced the efficiency of the agency."'230 Thus Gonzalez's speech
regarding this uncertainty also came within the first amendment.
In Moore v. City of Kilgore231 the court found that a fireman's remarks to
the press regarding possible understaffing in the city's fire department related
to matters of public concern. In October, 1985, the city had laid off fifteen
firefighters. Controversy ensued in the media. Moore, who was president of
the local firefighters' union, publicly opposed the lay-offs. In December,
while fighting a house fire, a fireman died and another was seriously injured.
The next day, following a press conference called by the city, media repre-
sentatives asked Moore for comments. Moore stated in response that the
incident showed the department lacked sufficient manpower, and, alluding
to his October contentions regarding the lay-offs, added "I just want to say 'I
told you so.' "232 The city manager imposed various sanctions, including a
30-day suspension without pay and demotion. The city manager also or-
dered Moore to refrain from making further public statements regarding the
policies or actions taken by the city. 233
225. Id. at 1300-01.
226. Id. at 1301. See also Thompson v. City of Starkville, 901 F.2d 456, 463-64 (5th Cir.
1990); Brawner v. City of Richardson, 855 F.2d 187, 192 (5th Cir. 1988).
227. See infra notes 271-317 and accompanying text.
228. Gonzalez, 774 F.2d at 1301.
229. Id.
230. Id. Here the court recognized that employee speech might address the efficiency of
agency operations. The Pickering formula had implied that only "the state" was interested in
efficiency. See supra note 11 and accompanying text. Compare infra note 249 and accompany-
ing text.
231. 877 F.2d 364 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 562, 107 L. Ed. 2d 557 (1989).
232. Id. at 366-67.
233. Id. at 368.
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The Fifth Circuit panel found that the content of Moore's speech regard-
ing a possible shortage of firefighters addressed a matter of public concern
stating that "the public, naturally, cares deeply about the ability of its Fire
Department to respond quickly and effectively to a fire. If staffing shortages
potentially threaten the ability of the Fire Department to perform its duties,
people in the community want to receive such information. '234 The panel
emphasized that the first amendment freedom of speech clause protects not
only a speaker's interest but also that of listeners, a point not developed in
previous post-Connick Fifth Circuit public employee speech cases.235 The
panel noted that in Pickering the Supreme Court had observed that teachers,
as a class, were likely to have informed and definite opinions regarding the
allotment of funds for school operations. The court then applied the under-
lying principle to firefighters: "Moore's comments and insights constituted
powerful knowledge concerning the effectiveness of the public entity, the
Fire Department," and were therefore "likely to help produce a fire depart-
ment that is increasingly responsive to the needs of the citizenry." 236
In Thompson v. City ofStarkville237 the court likewise found that a public
employee's speech about matters touching on public safety dealt with a mat-
ter of public concern.238 Like Brawner, 239 Thompson was a police officer
who had attempted to correct other officers' misconduct by going through
channels. As in Gonzalez,24° the court held that an employee's private con-
cerns may also address issues of public concern. 241 It found that Thomp-
son's allegations went far beyond recognized internal grievances about
working conditions such as "the length of time on the job, the number of
breaks employees received and so forth. '242 It emphasized that several
items in Thompson's complaint showed that he "stood to gain little person-
ally through his grievance."'243 Here the court narrowed the scope of "per-
sonal" or "private concern" and, by implication, broadened the range of
matters of public concern.2" Not all panels, as we shall see, were so con-
cerned with benefits the community could derive from employees' comments
and insights concerning their agencies' performance. 245
The categories of speech found to refer to matters of public concern im-
perceptibly shade into one another. In Wells and Gonzalez, public employ-
ees charged their respective superiors with wrongdoing, specifically, with
failing to meet their commitments to adequately support a program and
234. Id. at 370.
235. The court cited in this connection a line of five Supreme Court decisions upholding
citizens' first amendment right to hear or receive information. Id. at 370.
236. Moore, 877 F.2d at 372.
237. 901 F.2d 456 (5th Cir. 1990).
238. Id. at 467.
239. Brawner v. City of Richardson, 855 F.2d 187 (5th Cir. 1988).
240. See supra notes 224-30 and accompanying text.
241. Thompson, 901 F.2d at 464.
242. Id. at 467 (quoting Piver v. Board of Educ., 835 F.2d 1076, 1079 (4th Cir. 1987), cert.
denied, 487 U.S. 1206 (1988)).
243. Thompson, 901 F.2d at 465. See also id. at 466.
244. Compare cases cited infra notes 266-317 and accompanying text.
245. See infra notes 301-17 and accompanying text.
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with violating agency regulations. In these respects, Wells, Gonzalez, and
Thompson could be seen as "whistleblower" cases similar to those consid-
ered above. 246 Yet, as will be observed below, the court has sometimes
found public employees' criticisms of agency officials' conduct outside the
realm of matters of public concern. 247 Wells and Gonzalez might also be
regarded as political speech cases because in both cases employees publicly
addressed elected officials regarding their policies or actions. Likewise, in
Moore a public employee commented through the media on a city manager's
decision regarding the allocation of public funds.248 Of course, to be a mat-
ter of public concern, an employee's speech need not fall neatly into one of
these categories, but it appears that if speech can be categorized as
whistleblowing or as speech relating to political issues, it is likely to be found
within the circle of matters of public concern. Otherwise, public employees
may find that a casual comment, or even an expression of concern with re-
spect to such matters as agency efficiency, may cost them their jobs. 249
Under Connick, all public employee speech seemingly is divided into two
parts, speech relating to matters of public concern, and speech relating to
matters of only personal interest. 250 A great deal of public employee speech
does not fit this procrustean scheme, and there is at least a tertium quid.
Before turning to cases illustrative of this point, this Article reviews some of
the topics or concerns that the Fifth Circuit has held represent matters of
only, or "purely", personal interest.
2. Matters of Only Personal Interest
Connick held that the sole category of public employee speech ordinarily
unprotected by the first amendment is that relating to "matters of only per-
sonal interest. '' 251 It is understandable that the Fifth Circuit has frequently
focused at the first stage of its Connick analysis on whether the speech in
question should be so characterized. The court has often found that em-
ployee speech did relate to personal concerns, though seldom to "only" per-
sonal or private interests. 252 Occasionally the court has had to strain in
order to reduce speech on matters of conceivably greater interest to fit into
this box.
246. See supra notes 172-79 and accompanying text.
247. See infra notes 266-73, 310-14 and accompanying text. In these cases, the employees'
speech had not yet been made publicly.
248. See supra notes 231-36 and accompanying text. The Moore panel specifically ad-
dressed the nature of Moore's speech interest: "A speaker hopes that his or her speech will set
afire the political conscience of the community" and, in the long term, result in the agency's
becoming "increasingly responsive to the needs of the citizenry." Moore v. City of Kilgore,
877 F.2d 364, 372 (5th Cir.) cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 562, 107 L. Ed. 2d 557 (1989).
249. See infra notes 282-306 and accompanying text.
250. See supra notes 79-81 and accompanying text.
251. See supra note 79 and accompanying text.
252. See generally Kinsey v. Salado Indep. School Dist., 916 F.2d 273, 277-78 n.3 (5th Cir.
1990) (reviewing cases where the Fifth Circuit had found speech addresses private or personal
matters). The court's most recent such case is Ayoub v. Texas A&M Univ., 927 F.2d 834 (5th
Cir. 1991).
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a. Only Personal Interest
The first post-Connick case in which the Fifth Circuit found that a public
employee's speech related only to matters of personal interest was Davis v.
West Community Hospital.253 Davis was a surgeon whose staff privileges
were suspended in response to letters he had written to hospital officials con-
taining various criticisms.254 The court found that most of the points ad-
dressed in these letters were only of personal interest, namely, "his demand
of apologies from a nurse and an anesthetist," and his complaint that he had
been deprived of his usual parking space.255 The panel cited a Ninth Circuit
decision to support its conclusion that personnel disputes and grievances
against other staff members constitute matters of purely personal interest 256
and stated that "[s]peech by public employees may be characterized as not of
'public concern' when it is clear that such speech deals with individual per-
sonnel disputes and grievances and that the information would be of no rele-
vance to the public's evaluation of the performance of governmental
agencies.1257 The Ninth Circuit did not say that personnel disputes and
grievances were, ipso facto, not of public concern; nor did it say that person-
nel disputes and grievances were only matters of personal interest. Rather,
the Ninth Circuit held that such speech would not qualify as relating to
matters of public concern unless it would be relevant to the public's evalua-
tion of a governmental agency's performance.258 Nevertheless, some later
Fifth Circuit cases follow Davis in equating "personnel" matters and "griev-
ances" with "matters of purely personal interest." These cases typically ig-
nore the additional requirement in the Ninth Circuit formula that the
information involved "be of no relevance to the public's evaluation of the
performance of governmental agencies. '259
A few months later, in Day v. South Park Independent School District 260
another panel addressed the denial of an employee's continuing employment
because she filed a grievance. Dissatisfied with her annual teaching evalua-
tion, Ms. Day invoked the district's formal grievance procedure. Under dis-
253. 755 F.2d 455, 461 (5th Cir. 1985). See supra note 188 and accompanying text. Some
more recent cases refer to matters of private rather than personal concern. Thompson v. City
of Starkville, 901 F.2d 456, 460 (5th Cir. 1990); Kirkland v. Northside Indep. School Dist.,
890 F.2d 794, 795, 797-800 (5th Cir. 1989).
254. Davis, 755 F.2d at 459.
255. Id. at 461. Other aspects of Davis are discussed infra notes 296-97, 353-61 and accom-
panying text.
256. Id.
257. Id. (emphasis added) (citing McKinley v. City of Eloy, 705 F.2d 1110, 1114 (9th Cir.
1983)). Here the employee's speech related to such matters as how management's relations
with city employees affected discipline, morale, efficiency, and diversity of viewpoints within
the agency. On McKinley, see Handler, First Amendment II, 1984-85 SURV. AM. L. 291, 319-
20. See also Note, New Restrictions, supra note 118, at 339, 355-56 ("Employee criticism, even
that relating to personal grievances, may bring to light deficiencies in office management
which, if corrected, could increase the public agency's efficiency and effectiveness.").
258. Davis, 755 F.2d at 461.
259. See infra notes 266-97 and accompanying text.
260. 768 F.2d 696 (5th Cir. 1985). See generally Allred, supra note 158, at 72.75 (review-
ing lower federal court decisions where speech was found related to "matters of purely per-
sonal interest") and Massaro, supra note 46, at 20-21 n.95.
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trict policy, however, the evaluation was not grievable, 261 and Day's
contract was not renewed. The trial court found that the nonrenewal was
based on her having filed the grievance, but that it pertained to "a purely
private matter. ' 262 The particular issue before the panel on appeal was
"whether a public employee's complaint to her superior about her teacher
evaluation is protected by the petition clause of the first amendment.1263
Because the Supreme Court previously held that the petition clause is not
implicated absent violation of some other first amendment right, such as as-
sembly or speech, 264 the court had to determine whether Day's first amend-
ment speech right had been violated. The court applied the Ninth Circuit
formula, including the "relevance to public evaluation" test, and affirmed
the district court's finding that Day's complaint was "purely a personal mat-
ter" and therefore not within the first amendment. 265 It seemed that the
Davis and Day panels had adopted the full Ninth Circuit test. Subsequent
Fifth Circuit cases, however, appear to have ignored or forgotten it.
In Moore v. Mississippi Valley State University2 6 6 the court held that writ-
ten complaints concerning alleged favoritism by a day care agency director
constituted "a personal grievance. ' 267 Here, the employees had complained
about uncompensated overtime and their director's behavior and treatment
of employees. 268 The court did not inquire whether this information would
be relevant "to the public's evaluation of the performance of governmental
agencies. ' 269 Conceivably, the public would have found it relevant whether
the agency required employees to work overtime without compensation or
otherwise treated employees in ways that would adversely affect staff morale
and efficiency. Other items in their complaint might have been of even
greater possible interest to the public in evaluating the agency's
performance.
b. "Only Personal Interest?"
The employees in Moore v. MVSU also complained that another em-
ployee, a Ms. Davis, once brought a gun with her to the day care center and
that Davis also had paddled a child, contrary to center rules. 270 The court
did not consider whether this information "would be of relevance to the
public's evaluation" of the agency's performance. Instead, it concluded that
the complaints were "written in terms of showing 'favoritism' to Davis by
permitting such activity, not that this was a matter of public concern and
ought to be stopped. '271 Thus, even though the court recognized that "some
261. Day, 768 F.2d at 698.
262. Id. at 699.
263. Id.
264. Id. at 701-02.
265. Id. at 700 n. 11. See supra notes 256-57 and accompanying text.
266. 871 F.2d 545 (5th Cir. 1989).
267. Id. at 551.
268. Id. at 547-48 n.3.
269. See supra note 257 and accompanying text.
270. Moore v. MVSU, 871 F.2d at 547-48 n.3.
271. Id. at 551.
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of the events complained of might be of interest to the public," it did not
hold them to be of public concern. 272 Consequently, the court found that
the complaint only charged favoritism, making it a mere personal griev-
ance. 273 The court hinted that at least part of the complaint might have
been protected speech had it been framed in terms of whistleblowing on a
fellow-employee's hazardous or unlawful activity. Interestingly, the court
did not find that the complaint was a matter of only or purely personal con-
cern. Given the confusingly bifurcated standard set out in Connick, the
panel may have thought it insufficient to find that the complaint was not a
matter of public concern. The panel seemed to think it important to charac-
terize it as a "personal" grievance. It is unclear why the Moore v. MVSU
panel expended judicial attention upon the first step in Connick analysis
when the case could have been decided on the basis of a separate, dispositive
consideration. The trial court had found that "the four employees made no
showing that the grievances were ever presented to the MVSU board or that
the MVSU board acted in retaliation because of these grievances. ' 274 The
court could easily have held that it need not decide the "public con-
cern"/"private interest" issue because the trial court's finding as to causa-
tion275 was not clearly erroneous. 276 Similarly, in McAdams v. Matagorda
Appraisal District,277 another panel engaged in extensive Pickering/Connick
analysis even though it eventually agreed with the district court that the
employee had not been fired because of his speech.27 8
In earlier cases, the court also found speech on various matters outside the
realm of matters of public concern and so fit only to be dropped into the
basket labeled "personal interest," if not "only personal interest. '279 In
some of these cases, the panels reached particularly strange results. 280 New
criteria or factors used by the panels in reaching these conclusions are re-
272. Id.
273. Id. See also Thompson v. City of Starkville, 901 F.2d 456, 465-66 n.9 (5th Cir. 1990)
(commenting on Moore v. MVSU).
274. Moore v. MVSU, 871 F.2d at 550.
275. See supra notes 35-38 and accompanying text.
276. Moore v. MVSU, 871 F.2d at 549. See Kelleher v. Flawn, 761 F.2d 1079, 1084 (5th
Cir. 1985) (causation is a question of fact to be reviewed under the clearly erroneous standard
of FED. R. Ov. P. 52(a)). Compare Farias v. Bexar County Bd. of Trustees, 925 F.2d 866, 876
(5th Cir. 1991) (since the employer's decision was not made in response to the employee's
speech, the court decided it was unnecessary to reach the "public concern" question); Coats v.
Pierre, 890 F.2d 728 (5th Cir. 1989) (after determining that the employee's speech touched on
a matter of public concern, the court disposed of the case based on the absence of the requisite
Mt. Healthy causation showing), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 70, 112 L. Ed. 2d 44 (1990). See also
Hillis v. Stephen F. Austin State Univ., 665 F.2d 547, 550 (5th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 457
U.S. 1106 (1982) (record showed no evidence of causation but showed that plaintiff's employ-
ment would have been terminated anyway).
277. 798 F.2d 842 (5th Cir. 1986).
278. Id. at 846. Here the court evidently felt that the earlier stages of Connick analysis
were necessary in order to determine whether an express or implied refusal to perform a task
requested by one's employer is considered speech within the first amendment. Id. at 847. The
court held that it was not. Id. at 847 (citing Berry v. Bailey, 726 F.2d 670 (1 1th Cir. 1984),
cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1101 (1985)).
279. See infra notes 184-87, 282-85 and accompanying text.




i Gomez v. Texas Department of Mental Health 282
Mr. Gomez was a probationary employee at a state center for treatment of
mentally ill and retarded persons. His work involved counseling patients
and arranging for patient transfers to the nearby county center, which pro-
vided outpatient services. A state center administrator issued a memoran-
dum captioned "Preparation for Briefer Client Lengths of Stay" that advised
state center staff of the need to adjust treatment planning and modalities in
order to prepare for reduced length of patient stay at the state center. 28 3
Nothing in the report suggested that the memorandum specified that its con-
tents were confidential or that its proposals were merely a possibility pend-
ing finalization. Shortly afterwards in the course of a routine meeting Gomez
mentioned to Mr. Gonzales, an employee of the county center, that state
center employees had been instructed to prepare patients for shorter stays.
Gonzales expressed surprise and asked if Gomez had anything in writing
about the coming change, whereupon Gomez gave Gonzales a copy of the
memorandum. 284 The memorandum later came to the attention of the di-
rector of the county center, who called the director of the state center. Con-
troversy between the two directors ensued, and as a result, Gomez was fired.
Because the court found that Gomez's speech did not address a matter of
public concern, it noted that it did not need to balance competing First
Amendment and government interests. 285 The Gomez court intimated that
Gomez's speech really concerned only a personal matter:
Plainly, Gomez' purpose in relating the information was to advise the
employee of expected reductions in the length of time patients would
remain at the State Center and to warn of the additional burden the
change would place on Gomez' interlocutor and on the County Center
generally... [T]he employees of the agencies involved.., quite natu-
rally were interested in any job-related changes they might personally
experience under the proposed policy. 28 6
As in Moore v. MVSU, the Gomez court did not go so far as to say that
Gomez's speech concerned only a personal interest. That aspect of Con-
nick's holding seemed to have been forgotten. 287 Nor did the court contend
that Gomez's speech concerned a matter that was of purely personal interest
to him, though it did say that the proposed change would be of interest both
to state and county center employees. Again, Connick's ambiguous holding
seems to have prompted the court to try to fit an employee's speech into the
281. See infra notes 319-76 and accompanying text.
282. 794 F.2d 1018 (5th Cir. 1986).
283. Id. at 1019.
284. Id. at 1019-21.
285. Id. at 1021.
286. Id. The court evidently imputed exclusively self-serving motivations to "the employ-
ees" entirely on the basis of its own speculation as to employee concerns generally.
287. See supra note 79 and accompanying text.
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"personal interest" box, lest it not be enough, under Connick, that the
speech was deemed outside the scope of matters of public concern.
i Page v. DeLaune28
Ms. Page supervised an ex-offender program operating under state and
federal auspices. Ms. DeLaune was Page's immediate supervisor. There had
been some question as to the adequacy of Page's work. Ms. Turner, De-
Laune's immediate supervisor, addressing a staff meeting attended by Page
and other employees, announced an "open door" policy, and invited obser-
vations or complaints about the ex-offender program.289 In a later telephone
conversation with another staff member, Page and the other employee ex-
pressed interest in speaking with Turner. DeLaune overheard the conversa-
tion and fired both employees. The district court granted DeLaune's motion
for summary judgment on the ground that Page's statement that she in-
tended to contact Turner did not address a matter of public concern. The
Fifth Circuit quoted Connick's holding that courts "will not interfere with
personnel decisions 'when a public employee speaks not as a citizen upon
matters of public concern, but instead as an employee upon matters of only
personal interest,' -290 and held that Page's "decision to bypass normal com-
munication channels is clearly a personnel matter internal to the program,
not a matter of public concern." '29 '
The court did not explicitly state that Page's speech was of purely per-
sonal interest, but did find it to be only a personnel matter. In effect, the
panel seemed to read "personnel" to mean the same thing as "personal."
The court here had moved some distance from the Ninth Circuit test it
seemingly embraced in Davis and Day.292 Curiously, the panel did not con-
sider the content of Page's speech at all, let alone inquire whether it related
only to individual disputes and grievances. 293 Instead, the panel considered
only her "decision to bypass normal communication channels. ' 294 Actually,
Page had not yet "bypassed" such channels. The court apparently did not
consider it relevant that even had she done so she merely would have been
acting in response to her superior's explicit invitation. The Page opinion
also makes no mention of the second prong of the Davis-Day inquiry: here,
for example, whether the public would find it relevant, in evaluating the
program's performance, to know that employees could respond to a higher
official's invitation for comments and complaints about the program only at
peril of losing their jobs. Characterizing Page's speech, or "decision," as a
"personnel matter" rather than one "of public concern" avoided the task of
engaging in a balancing analysis.29" It seems unlikely that such balancing
288. 837 F.2d 233 (5th Cir. 1988).
289. Id. at 235.
290. Id. at 237.
291. Id. at 238.
292. See supra notes 256-65 and accompanying text.
293. See supra note 249 and accompanying text.
294. Page, 837 F.2d at 238 (emphasis added).
295. "Only if the employee crosses this initial hurdle need the court address other ques-
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would have shown that the two employees' private speech had adversely af-
fected the agency's efficiency in providing public services.
Similarly, in Davis the court insisted that a surgeon's expression of con-
cern regarding the adequacy of another physician's patient care and the pos-
sible conflicts of interest on the part of certain hospital board members were
only matters of a personal concern. 296 Curiously, the Davis panel did not
apply the second part of the Ninth Circuit test, which it seemingly had en-
dorsed only a few sentences earlier. Under the second part of the test the
critical inquiry would have been whether it was relevant to the public's eval-
uation of the hospital's performance to know if one of its physicians was
providing inadequate patient care, or if its board members were engaging in
self-dealing or nepotism. 297
3. Neither Personal Interest nor Public Concern: The Anomalous Status
of Tertium Quid Speech
Connick, it will be recalled, identified only two types of public employee
speech: one dealing with matters of public concern, the other dealing with
matters of only personal interest. Moreover, Connick hel that speech
would be protected unless it fell into the latter category, and even then, it
might in some circumstances still be protected. 298 In the cases reviewed so
far, the Fifth Circuit has, on several occasions, tried to categorize employee
speech as pertaining to (if not only to) matters of personal interest. But
often the speech for which employees were punished fell into neither cate-
gory. Typically, such speech dealt with questions of agency policy or proce-
dures, including matters relating to the agency's efficiency in delivering
services. Nevertheless, the court frequently held that such speech failed to
qualify299 under the Connick-Rankin "threshold test."' 3°° Whether it failed
tions, such as whether the speech was a substantial factor in the employer's decision, or
whether certain interests of the employer counterbalanced the employee's free-speech inter-
est." Id. at 237 (emphasis added). Page is considered further infra notes 307-08, 333-36 and
accompanying text.
296. Davis v. West Community Hosp. 755 F.2d 455, 461-62 (5th Cir. 1985). Compare
Frazier v. King, 873 F.2d 820, 825 (5th Cir.), cert. denied sub nom. Davoli v. Frazier, 110 S.
Ct. 502, 107 L. Ed. 2d 504 (1989) (court stated that the "quality of nursing care given to any
group of people ... is a matter of public concern.").
297. See Davis, 755 F.2d at 460. Davis is considered further, infra notes 353-61 and accom-
panying text.
298. See supra note 79-81 and accompanying text.
299. See infra note 301-18 and accompanying text. Compare cases described supra notes
170-83, 216-19, 224-49 and accompanying text.
300. The Supreme Court first characterized inquiry whether speech related to matters of
public concern or only to those of personal interest as "the threshold question" in Rankin. See
supra notes 130-31 and accompanying text. There it evidently followed the Fifth Circuit's
doctrine enunciated in the same case: "Only when a government employee engages in expres-
sion addressed to 'matters of public concern' does the first amendment protect him from termi-
nation for such expression." 786 F.2d at 1235. The Rankin Court tacitly abandoned
Connick's holding that the first amendment protected all speech other than that dealing with
"matters only of personal interest." A few Fifth Circuit panels nevertheless continued to think
it important to characterize public employees' speech as relating to only "personal" matters,
thereby crediting them with only self-serving motivation or intent. See supra notes 266-86 and
accompanying text.
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because it related only to matters of personal interest, or because it did not
address matters of public concern was not always clear. When applying the
latter standard, the court tended to take a rather narrow view as to the kinds
of questions it believed the public would find of interest.
L Noyola v. Texas Department of Human Resources301
Mr. Noyola was a state welfare worker who was fired for daring to suggest
changes in case-load assignments, including his own, in order to assure im-
proved delivery of services to clients. His evidence before the district court
in response to defendants' motion for summary judgment, was as follows:
Plaintiff Noyola made suggestions to Defendant Elizondo regarding effi-
cient and customary procedure for handling a caseload. . . Every
worker in the Lower Valley Unit had one case load. I had two case
loads .... I suggested to Mrs. Elizondo that to better deliver services
on [sic] a more timely and efficient manner to our clients, that perhaps
the case load could be distributed on a more equitable basis. Her sar-
castic reply was, "What's the matter? I thought you were supposed to
be Super Worker?" At this time, she again retaliated and imposed an
area which composed [sic] of approximately 250 cases on me. I was
now to work the largest case load in a three-county geographic area
which involved 13 different communities. 30 2
The district court denied defendants' motion for summary judgment. The
Fifth Circuit panel reversed on the ground that nothing in Noyola's evidence
suggested that his speech was more than an internal grievance with his su-
pervisor. 303 As such, the panel concluded, Noyola's speech raised no first
amendment issue. 3°' Perhaps the panel meant that a "grievance" was neces-
sarily a matter of only personal interest, but it did not so characterize it.a0 5
Neither did the panel conclude that Noyola's speech failed to address a mat-
ter of public concern.306 Instead, it was something else, a tertium quid.
Page is another tertium quid case. Here the panel held that Ms. Page's
"decision to bypass normal communication channels" was a "personnel"
question, not a matter of public concern. 30 7 But the panel did not explicitly
hold that it was a matter of only personal interest either. Likewise, in
Gomez, the court found that the plaintiff's informing another agency's em-
ployee of the prospective change in residential patient stays was not a matter
301. 846 F.2d 1021 (5th Cir. 1988). See also infra notes 337-39 and accompanying text.
302. Id. at 1023.
303. Id. at 1024.
304. Id.
305. Nor did the panel proceed to the next prong of Davis-Day analysis and inquire
whether the information involved "would be of no relevance to the public's evaluation of gov-
ernmental agencies." See supra note 257 and accompanying text.
306. Noyola is in the line of 5th Circuit cases that turn on a peculiar reading of Connick. In
these cases, the court gives little attention to whether the speech in question dealt with "mat-
ters of public concern," but rather focuses on the "role" in which the employee spoke: whether
as citizen or employee. See infra notes 319-52, 490-95 and accompanying text. The panel
found the record to indicate "that Noyola was speaking to his supervisor primarily as an em-
ployee rather than in his role as a citizen." Noyola, 846 F.2d at 1024.
307. See supra notes 288-97 and accompanying text.
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of public concern; neither was it exactly a matter of "personal" concern. 30 8
Rather, it was only a "matter of inter-agency debate. ' '3°9
iL Terrell v. University of Texas System Police310
The director of University police called on Chief Price to correct some
management problems in the department. The problems included alleged
harassment and favoritism practiced by various supervisors, including Cap-
tain Terrell, in relation to some lower echelon employees. Price assigned
Terrell the job of revising the department policy and procedures manual.
Subsequently, someone anonymously sent Price photocopies of pages from a
small notebook or diary in Terrell's handwriting, many of which "reflected
unfavorably on Price."' 311 Price fired Terrell. The trial judge instructed the
jury that three matters recorded in the notepad were of public concern. The
matters were "Chief Price's policy of mandatory overtime; the need for su-
pervisory training; and the need to conduct exit interviews with employees
who resigned."' 312 The Fifth Circuit, however, observing that Terrell had
not attempted to communicate these matters to the public, held that they
"were a wholly intra-governmental concern," not "matters of public con-
cern.,, 313 But the court did not characterize the notes as a matter of per-
sonal interest, either. Again, we see that the court has been reluctant to hold
that employee expression concerning the manner in which government is or
should be operated is protected under the first amendment. 314
The results in these cases derive from a peculiarly narrow view of the
kinds of matters that may be considered of public concern. In effect, these
panels have taken the position that public employee speech relating to the
operations, procedures, or actions of their agency or other agency employ-
308. See supra notes 282-87 and accompanying text.
309. Gomez v. Texas Dep't of Mental Health, 794 F.2d 1018, 1021 (5th Cir. 1986). Elabo-
rating on hyperbolic language in Connick, the Gomez panel went on to conclude that even if, as
Gomez argued, his statement to the county center employee concerned "the proper treatment
of the mentally ill in El Paso, Texas," it still would not qualify as a matter of public concern.
Almost anything Gomez might say about the internal office procedures or poli-
cies of the State Center could have some bearing on the Center's treatment of
the mentally ill. If all such statements were treated as addressing 'matters of
public concern,' government employees could with impunity express any job-
related criticisms they might choose, in contravention of Connick's admonition
that the Constitution 'does not require a grant of immunity for employee griev-
ances not afforded by the First Amendment to those who do not work for the
State.'
Id. at 1022. But see Price v. Brittain, 874 F.2d 252, 258 (5th Cir. 1989). The panel did not
explain why it found it appropriate to apply Connick's concern about employee grievances to
Gomez's speech which clearly was neither a "job-related criticism" nor a "grievance." The
terms "impunity" and "immunity" suggest that the panel subscribed to the theory that job-
related criticisms were per se contrary to governmental interests (if not quasi-criminal acts)
and punishable as such. See supra note 80.
310. 792 F.2d 1360 (5th Cir. 1986), cert, denied, 479 U.S. 1064 (1987). Also see infra notes
322-28 and accompanying text.
311. Id. at 1361.
312. Id.
313. Id. at 1362-63.
314. But see Mills v. Alabama, 384 U.S. 214, 218 (1966), quoted supra note 183 and accom-
panying text.
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ees, especially superiors, is only a personnel or grievance matter. This
speech is not of public interest, even when it concerns effective or efficient
delivery of services to the public. 315 The court has generally ignored the
Ninth Circuit's test, under which "personnel disputes" and "grievances" are
protected speech if the information involved would be relevant "to the pub-
lic's evaluation of the performance" of the governmental agency. 31 6 Like-
wise, several panels seem to have disregarded the holding in Gonzalez that
"an issue of private concern to the employee may also be an issue of public
concern. ' 31 7 Instead, various Fifth Circuit panels have proceeded to de-
velop additional doctrines and tests that have made it more difficult for pub-
lic employee speech concerning agency operations to qualify for first
amendment protection.
As a result, it no longer appears to be true that the first amendment gives
strong protection to a junior public employee's criticism of a more senior
official's words or acts.318 As the cases just noted indicate, a public em-
ployee may be fired even if she merely suggests that agency efficiency would
be improved by more equitable allocation of case loads; talks with another
employee on the telephone about meeting with a higher level supervisor who
has announced an "open door" policy; mentions a pending change in institu-
tional policy to an employee of another agency that would be affected by it;
or keeps a secret notebook containing comments regarding needed changes
and procedures which criticize a superior. These strange results derive from
new tests and criteria developed by Fifth Circuit panels since Connick.
4. New Fifth Circuit Criteria for Determining Whether Public Employee
Speech Passes "the Threshold Test"
Connick's holding failed to provide clear guidelines for lower courts as to
whether public employee speech deserves protection under the first amend-
ment. In particular, Connick failed to say whether speech that was not con-
cerned only with matters of personal interest was protected. One way the
Fifth Circuit tried to make sense of Connick was to focus on the speaker's
role rather than on the content of his or her speech. Under this test, even
speech relating to matters of public concern might fail the threshold test
attributed to Connick.31 9
a. The "Role" in Which the Employee Spoke
The "role" theory was first adumbrated in Davis, which emphasized the
phrases "as a citizen" and "as an employee" in quoting Connick's hold-
ing.320 The panel found that Davis's requests were all "personal" because
315. See also discussion of Gomez and Noyola supra notes 309, 282-86, 301-06 and accom-
panying text.
316. See supra notes 256-65 and accompanying text
317. See supra notes 225-26 and accompanying text.
318. See supra note 1 and accompanying text.
319. See infra notes 320-44 and accompanying text.
320. Davis v. West Community Hosp., 755 F.2d 455, 461 (5th Cir. 1985). See supra note
79 and accompanying text.
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they arose in a context in which his own patient records were subject to
investigation. 321 The panel's decision did not turn explicitly on the question
whether Davis had spoken "as a citizen" or "as an employee." In some later
cases, however, that distinction was critical. These cases held that if the
employee spoke "as an employee," she would not be protected by the first
amendment, no matter what the speech concerned.
In Terrell322 another panel likewise emphasized the "as a citizen" and "as
an employee" language from Connick.323 The court expressly shifted atten-
tion from the content of the speech to the role of the speaker. By doing so, it
was able to avoid having to determine whether the speech dealt only with a
matter of personal interest or referred to matters of public concern. 324 The
panel was concerned that the latter category become so broad as to allow too
much protection for public employee speech:
Because almost anything that occurs within a public agency could be of
concern to the public, we do not focus on the inherent interest or impor-
tance of the matters discussed by the employee. Rather, our task is to
decide whether the speech at issue in a particular case was made pri-
marily in the plaintiff's role as citizen or primarily in his role as em-
ployee. In making this determination, the mere fact that the topic of
the employee's speech was one in which the public might or would have
had a great interest is of little moment. 325
Under this test, even if the employee spoke in both "roles," her speech might
still be outside the first amendment if spoken "primarily" as an employee.
This reading of Connick conflicts with other Fifth Circuit holdings that pub-
lic employee speech about both matters of public concern and other matters,
in short, a mixed bag of concerns, would be protected. 326 The Terrell panel
concluded that, regardless of the content of Terrell's "speech" in the secret
diary, 327 he "was not terminated for speaking as a citizen upon matters of
public concern" because he was speaking only as an employee.328
Jett,329 decided almost two months after Terrell, made no mention of
321. Id. at 459. See supra notes 188-90, 253-57, 296-97 and accompanying text.
322. 792 F.2d 1360 (5th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1064 (1987). See supra notes
310-314 and accompanying text.
323. Id. at 1362. Terrell did not, however, cite Davis
324. Only a few months earlier, in Rankin, another panel (which included two of the same
judges who served on the Terrell panel) had held that only speech relating to matters of public
concern came within the first amendment. See supra note 300. Rankin and Terrell mark the
beginning of two divergent Fifth Circuit "threshold" tests, both purportedly deriving from
Connick.
325. Terrell, 792 F.2d at 1362. The court here evidently was building on hyperbolic or
overbroad language in Connick. See supra note 118. Neither Terrell nor Connick had to do
with "anything that occurs within a public office." Both concerned, more narrowly, public
employee speech. Whereas in Connick the Court tried to classify the content of that speech in
terms of "public concern/only personal interest" analysis, the Terrell panel focused primarily,
if not exclusively, on the "role" in which the employee spoke. The tacit assumption appears to
have been that as employees citizens have no first amendment speech rights.
326. See supra notes 225-26 and accompanying text.
327. See supra note 312 and accompanying text.
328. Terrell, 792 F.2d at 1363.
329. Jett v. Dallas Indep. School Dist., 798 F.2d 748 (5th Cir. 1986), aff'd in part, 491 U.S.
701 (1989). See supra notes 220-22 and accompanying text.
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either Terrell or of Davis' distinction between the "citizen" and "employee"
roles. Nevertheless, the Jett panel considered it relevant that Jett's state-
ments as to the eligibility of school athletes under proposed NCAA stan-
dards "were not made as part of Jett's performance of his official duties or as
part of [the school district's] business. ' 330 The panel did not identify the
factual basis for its conclusion that Jett's quoted remarks were not made in
his official capacity. Jett could be seen as another of the "whistleblower"
cases where the public employee is protected so long as he goes public. 331
The language quoted here implies that had Jett expressed his concern over
the academic qualifications of the school's athletes in his role as an employee,
for instance, in the principal's office or at a faculty meeting, his speech would
not have been protected. The policy consequence of this "role" theory juris-
prudence is to encourage public employees to run to the media with their
concerns, rather than risk going through channels. 332
The Page panel quoted Connick's holding without emphasis333 but then
went on to identify cases where the court had (purportedly) held that the
"public employees spoke as citizens" 334 and, on the other hand, cases where
such employees were held to have spoken "as employees, not citizens. '335
Here, too, the panel paid no attention to the content of the employee's
speech. Since the court found that Page's "decision to bypass normal com-
munications channels" was a personnel matter,336 it evidently concluded
that she spoke only as an employee. Likewise, the Noyola panel, having de-
termined that the employee's speech suggesting that services could be deliv-
ered more efficiently if case-loads were more equitably allocated 337 was
nothing "other than the airing of an internal grievance," concluded that he
had spoken primarily in his role as an employee, not as a citizen. 338 As
such, the court found Noyola's speech outside the first amendment. By us-
ing a "role" theory, the panel did not reach the question whether Noyola's
speech addressed a matter of public concern. 339 Connick, it will be recalled,
left unprotected only speech on "matters only of personal interest. ' '34°
Rankin, construing Connick, held that only speech relating to matters of
public concern would be protected. 341 To these "role" theory panels, how-
ever, it did not matter whether the speech related to one kind of concern or
330. Id. at 758.
331. See supra notes 162-91 and accompanying text.
332. See supra notes 180-91 and accompanying text. This implication also appears to run
counter to Givhan and Brown. See supra notes 51-61, 180-183 and accompanying text.
333. Page v. DeLaune, 837 F.2d 233, 237 (5th Cir. 1988).
334. Id. (citing Thomas, 784 F.2d at 653); Wells v. Hico Indep. School Dist., 736 F.2d 243,
253 (5th Cir. 1984), cert. dismissed, 473 U.S. 901 (1985).
335. Page, 837 F.2d at 238 (citing Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 148-49 (1983); Terrell
v. Univ. of Texas Sys. Police, 792 F.2d 1360, 1362-63 (5th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 479 U.S.
1064 (1987); Day, 768 F.2d at 100-01; Davis v. West Community Hosp., 755 F.2d 455, 460-61
(5th Cir. 1985)).
336. Page, 837 F.2d at 238. See supra notes 288-95, 307 and accompanying text.
337. See supra notes 301-06 and accompanying text.
338. Noyola v. Texas Dep't of Human Resources, 846 F.2d 1021, 1024 (5th Cir. 1988).
339. Id.
340. See supra note 79 and accompanying text (emphasis added).
341. Rankin v. McPherson, 483 U.S. 378, 384 (1987).
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the other. For them, it was enough to divine the primary role in which the
employee spoke. Their underlying presumption seems to have been that em-
ployees as such should be seen but not heard from.3 42
The tendency toward the "role" theory came to full expression in Moore
v. MVSU, where the panel reformulated the threshold test entirely in terms
of this new theory without even mentioning matters of public concern. The
panel even attributed this "role" test directly to the Supreme Court:
The Supreme Court has stated that when a public employee speaks in
her role as an employee, and not as a citizen, "a federal court is not the
appropriate forum in which to review the wisdom of a personnel deci-
sion taken by a public agency allegedly in reaction to the employee's
behaviour. '3 43
It may be significant that most of the panels relying on the "role" test held
the employee speech unprotected. 344
Not all panels, however, have used the "role" version of the threshold test.
In more recent cases, including Kinsey,345 Scott,346 Moore,347 Frazier,348
Johnston,349 and Brawner,350 the court has specifically inquired whether the
speech "addressed a matter of public concern." In each of these cases, the
panels found that the employees' speech did address matters of public con-
cern, and was therefore protected under the first amendment. The "role"
test raises a higher threshold hurdle for public employees seeking to vindi-
cate their first amendment rights than does the test set out by the Supreme
Court in Connick and Rankin. According to Rankin, the question simply is
whether or not the speech addressed a matter of public concern.35' Argua-
bly the Fifth Circuit has receded from using "role" analysis. The court spe-
cifically criticized the "role" approach in Moore:
We have not.., used the labels "employee" and "citizen" because as an
analytical matter, these labels can be misleading. Confusion in analysis
can result because such an inquiry may cause us to lose sight of the
inherent public-natured content of speech which in the context may ap-
pear to relate to an on-going employee matter. 352
342. See supra note 80.
343. Moore Y. MSVU, 871 F.2d 545, 551 (5th Cir. 1989).
344. Employees' speech was held unprotected in Davis, Terrell, Page, Noyola, Moore v.
MVSU, and Kirkland. It was held protected in Thompson and Jett. See supra notes 84, 237-
44, 266-73, 288-97, 301-14, 320-43 and accompanying text.
345. Kinsey v. Salado Indep. School Dist., 916 F.2d 273, 276-79 (5th Cir. 1990).
346. Scott v. Flowers, 910 F.2d 201, 210-11 (5th Cir. 1990).
347. Moore v. City of Kilgore, 877 F.2d 364, 369-72 (5th Cir.) cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 562,
107 L. Ed. 2d 557 (1989). See supra notes 231-36 and accompanying text.
348. Frazier v. King, 873 F.2d 820, 825 (5th Cir.), cert. denied sub nom. Davoli v. Frazier,
110 S. Ct. 502, 107 L. Ed. 2d 504 (1989). See supra note 174 and accompanying text, and infra
notes 386, 427.
349. Johnston v. Harris County Flood Control Dist., 869 F.2d 1565, 1577 (5th Cir. 1989),
cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 718, 107 L. Ed. 2d 738 (1990).
350. Brawner v. City of Richardson, 855 F.2d 187, 191-92 (5th Cir. 1988).
351. Rankin v. McPherson, 483 U.S. 378, 384-88 (1987); Johnston, 869 F.2d at 1577.
352. Moore v. City of Kilgore, 877 F.2d 364, 371 n.3 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 562,
107 L. Ed. 2d 557 (1989).
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b. "Isolated Acts by Specific Individuals"
Davis had to do with a surgeon's allegations that another physician's pa-
tient care was "ineffective," that this ineffective care was condoned by hospi-
tal officials, and that certain hospital board members had engaged in
activities involving conflict of interest. 353 The panel had to determine
whether these allegations addressed matters of public concern or only per-
sonal interests.354 In finding that these allegations fell entirely into the latter
category, the panel thought it significant that they "did not involve any pol-
icy or practice of the hospital" and that they were "related only to isolated,
unsubstantiated acts by specific individuals. ' 355 The panel suggested, first,
that complaints involving governmental agency policies or practices might
qualify as matters of public concern.356 Panels in some later cases, however,
where employees' speech involved agency "policy or practice" did not find it
protected on that account. 357 Davis' other suggestion, that speech "related
only to isolated, unsubstantiated acts by specific individuals" fell outside the
scope of matters of public concern, was also dropped in later cases. As to
"unsubstantiated" charges, the court elsewhere recognized that the Supreme
Court had established that even false speech is protected so long as it is not
knowingly or recklessly false. 358 Other panels have found that speech con-
cerning conduct by specific individuals in isolated instances did relate to
matters of public concern.359
c. "Inhouse Context" vs. "Going Public"
Davis also invoked a test or consideration picked up in some later Fifth
Circuit cases: namely, that even though statements or queries might poten-
tially be matters of public concern, so long as they remain "in their inhouse
context," they have "not yet achieved that status.' ' 36° The Davis panel cited
Connick's reference to "context" as a limitation on the Court's holding in
Givhan that private communications are protected under the first amend-
353. Davis v. West Community Hosp., 755 F.2d 455, 460 (5th Cir. 1985).
354. See supra notes 253-57, 296-97 and accompanying text.
355. Davis, 755 F.2d at 461. The panel did not explain its conclusion that Davis's com-
plaint that hospital administrators condoned ineffective patient care did not involve hospital
policy or practice.
356. See supra notes 253-57, 296-97 and accompanying text.
357. See supra notes 282-95, 301-15 and accompanying text. Where the employees' speech
concerning agency policies and practices was made publicly or to the media, however, the
court has sometimes found it protected. See supra notes 216-49 and accompanying text. Pick-
ering, Mt. Healthy, and Givhan all found public employee speech regarding agency policies and
practices protected under the First Amendment. See supra notes 6-9, 27-33, 51-54 and accom-
panying text.
358. Pickering v. Board of Educ., 391 U.S. 563, 574 (1968); Moore v. City of Kilgore, 877
F.2d 364, 376 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 562, 107 L. Ed. 2d 557 (1989); Jett v. Dallas
Indep. School Dist., 798 F.2d 748, 758 (5th Cir. 1986), aff'd in part, 491 U.S. 701 (1989). But
see supra note 23 as to Neubauer v. City of McAllen, 766 F.2d 1567 (5th Cir, 1985) and Megill
v. Board of Regents, 541 F.2d 1073 (5th Cir. 1976). In both of those cases the court hinted
(but did not expressly find) that the speech in question had been knowingly or recklessly false.
359. See supra notes 214, 178-81, 224-36 and accompanying text.
360. Davis v. West Community Hosp., 755 F.2d 455, 462 (5th Cir. 1985).
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ment.361 Following Davis, some panels took the position that to qualify as a
matter of public concern, the topic either must already be under discussion
in the community, or, if the topic was only of potential interest, the
"speaker" must have been trying to "go public."
In Brinkmeyer v. Thrall Independent School District the court emphasized
that the school board's split into contending factions had been discussed in
the community.362 The Gomez panel found that the length of patient stay
had been discussed between the state and county mental health agencies, but
not publicly debated in the larger community.3 63 If a topic is demonstrably
a matter of public debate or became such, as possibly evidenced by media
attention, it would appear ipso facto a matter of public concern. 364 The
court has been less than clear in defining the circumstances under which
issues not yet discussed by the community at large might also qualify as
matters of public concern.
We have seen that "whistleblower" speech is more likely to be found pro-
tected if the "whistleblower" in fact succeeded in going public.365 Several
panels have have held that speech by public employees was unprotected be-
cause, among other reasons, the employees had not yet attempted to com-
municate their complaints to the general public. 366 These panels evidently
considered whether the "speaker" had tried to communicate to the public an
indicator as to whether the speech addressed a matter of public concern or,
in the "role" theory cases, whether the employee was speaking "as em-
ployee" or "as citizen."'367 It is unclear, however, how this factor contrib-
utes to the threshold analysis. In Givhan, the Supreme Court made it clear
that private speech may also be protected by the first amendment. 368 The
fact that an employee attempted to go through channels to resolve problems
relating to agency policies or practices, 369 or communicated privately with
personnel of other agencies to advise as to pending policy changes, 370 says
nothing about potential public interest in these matters. Likewise, the fact
361. Id. at 460-61.
362. 786 F.2d 1292, 1295 (5th Cir. 1986). See supra note 214.
363. Gomez v. Texas Dep't of Mental Health, 794 F.2d 1018, 1019, 1021 (5th Cir. 1986).
364. The court so concluded on the basis of other considerations as well, e.g., in Moore,
where the court viewed media interest as a key feature of the context indicating that the em-
ployee's speech involved a matter of public concern. Moore v. City of Kilgore, 877 F.2d 364,
371 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 562, 107 L. Ed. 2d 557 (1989). See also Scott v. Flowers,
910 F.2d 201, 211 (5th Cir. 1990) ("Scott raised his criticisms ... in a manner calculated to
attract the attention of the public .... The public indeed was interested in Scott's views, as
evidenced by the attention given his letter by the local media").
365. See supra notes 170-83 and accompanying text.
366. See Ayoub v. Texas A&M Univ., 927 F.2d 834, 837 (5th Cir. 1991); Moore v. MVSU,
871 F.2d 545, 551 (5th Cir. 1989); McAdams v. Matagorda County Appraisal Dist., 798 F.2d
842, 846 (5th Cir. 1986); Gomez, 794 F.2d at 1022; Terrell v. Univ. of Texas Sys. Police, 792
F.2d 1360, 1362-63 (5th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1064 (1987). The Noyola panel
implicitly used this factor; it thought it significant that no one (other than Noyola's supervisor)
was "even alleged to have heard the speech." Noyola v. Texas Dep't of Human Resources,
846 F.2d 1021, 1024 (5th Cir. 1988).
367. See supra notes 320-44 and accompanying text.
368. See supra notes 51-62 and accompanying text.
369. See Noyola, 846 F.2d at 1021; Page v. DeLaune, 837 F.2d 233 (5th Cir. 1988).
370. Gomez v. Texas Dep't of Mental Health, 794 F.2d 1018 (5th Cir. 1986).
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that a public employee made notes in a private diary371 but had not yet
presented the matters contained in those notes to public view tells nothing as
to possible public concern about them.
Not all Fifth Circuit panels have insisted that the first amendment pro-
tects public employee speech on agency policies or practices only if the em-
ployee' attempts to "go public."'3 72 A more appropriate test is the Ninth
Circuit formula seemingly accepted by the Davis and Day panels. 373 Under
this test, it makes no difference whether the employee had tried to contact
Woodward and Bernstein 374 or other conduits to the general public. Rather,
the dispositive question is whether the employee speech dealt with "informa-
tion that would be of... relevance to the public's evaluation of the govern-
mental agencies."' 375 This test is both directly relevant and readily
applicable in determining whether an employee's speech related to a matter
of public concern. It contrasts favorably in these respects with judicial spec-
ulation as to the "role" in which an employee may have spoken,376 and with
the easily applied, but extraneous, inquiry as to whether the employee at-
tempted to "go public."
Public employee plaintiffs who survive the threshold test, and thus are
found to have had a first amendment interest in their speech, do not neces-
sarily succeed in vindicating that interest. Under Pickering/Connick, gov-
ernmental interests are to be weighed and then balanced against the
employee's and the public's first amendment interest in her speech.3 77 The
Fifth Circuit has developed some additional tests of its own for weighing and
balancing. Some of these tests make it more difficult for public employees to
prevail in such cases. Others attach greater weight to the value of protecting
free speech.
B. Weighing Governmental Interests Against Public Employees' First
Amendment Speech Rights
Under Connick, as construed in Rankin, once a court has determined that
an employee's speech related to a matter of public concern, the court must
undertake to weigh and balance the employee's free speech interests against
the government's interests in suppressing such speech. Connick established
a variable scale, depending on the importance of the interests on either side
of the balance. The Fifth Circuit added a special "sliding scale" to be used
in certain circumstances. In addition, the Fifth Circuit identified certain fac-
tors that were to be considered in assessing the importance of the speech
371. Terrell v. Univ. of Texas Sys. Police, 792 F.2d 1360 (5th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 479
U.S. 1064 (1987).
372. See Brinkmeyer v. Thrall Indep. School Dist., 786 F.2d 1291 (5th Cir. 1986); Gonza-
lez v. Benavides, 774 F.2d 1295, 1302 (5th Cir. 1985).
373. See supra notes 256-65 and accompanying text.
374. See supra note 183 and accompanying text.
375. Davis v. West Community Hosp., 755 F.2d 455, 461 (5th Cir. 1985) (quoting McKin-
ley v. City of Eloy, 705 F.2d 1110, 1114 (9th Cir. 1983)); see Day, 768 F.2d at 700.
376. See supra notes 320-52 and accompanying text.
377. See supra notes 6-26, 63-118 and accompanying text. Rankin also contributed further
considerations to the balancing analysis. See supra notes 140-56 and accompanying text.
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interests, and a number of criteria applicable in appraising governmental in-
terests. We turn first to the balancing theories.
1. Balancing with Sliding Scales
According to Connick, "[t]he state's burden in justifying a particular dis-
charge varies depending upon the nature of the employee's expression. '378
The Court did not explain what it meant by the "nature" of an employee's
expression. It did, however, add a second sliding scale for those situations
where an employer believes that an employee's speech could potentially dis-
rupt the office and destroy working relationships. 379 There, the employer
could take steps before such disruption or destruction actually occurred;
however, the Court cautioned, "a stronger showing may be necessary if the
employee's speech more substantially involved matters of public con-
cern." 380 Rankin added yet another sliding scale, depending on the em-
ployee's responsibilities within the agency38 1 by virtue of its statement that
"The burden of caution employees bear with respect to the words they speak
will vary with the extent of authority and public accountability the em-
ployee's role entails."'382
Certain Fifth Circuit panels have introduced minor variations on these
balancing formulas. Gonzalez repeated the first of the Connick formulas,
and modified the second only slightly by adding "of disruption" after "show-
ing." 38 3 Matherne added two more significant variations. In the first, it de-
tached the second Connick formula from the context in which it was applied:
an employer's curtailment or punishment of employee speech because of the
employer's belief it was likely to disrupt office operations. 384 The panel then
set out the Connick formula as applicable in all situations: "[In] Gonzalez v.
Benavides, we explained that the balancing test is not all-or-nothing but
rather a sliding scale in which 'public concern' is weighed against disruption:
'[A] stronger showing of disruption may be necessary if the employee's
speech more substantially involves matters of public concern.' "385 It is to
be noted that "disruption" here is also removed from its context in Connick,
where it was a question of "disruption of the office."'386 Under Matherne, it
would seem, "disruption" might refer to anything.
The Matherne panel's second variation on Gonzalez' sliding scale related
to the extent of the state's burden of proof:
Occasionally, the state's burden to justify its actions may be as light
378. Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 150 (1983).
379. Id. at 152.
380. Id.
381. Rankin v. McPherson, 483 U.S. 378, 390 (1987).
382. Id.
383. See infra note 385 and accompanying text.
384. Compare Connick, 461 U.S. at 151-52; Gonzalez v. Benavides, 774 F.2d 1295, 1302
(5th Cir. 1985).
385. Matherne v. Wilson, 851 F.2d 752, 761 (5th Cir. 1988).
386. Another panel subsequently construed Matherne to have held "that the greater the
public concern, the greater the disruption must be to give rise to qualified immunity." Frazier,
873 F.2d at 826.
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as merely proving that the employer "reasonably believed the em-
ployee's speech was likely to disrupt its operations." However, where,
as here "the employee's speech more substantially involves matters of
public concern," the burden increases to require objective evidence of
disruption .387
Gonzalez had not specified that objective evidence would be required when an
employee's speech "more substantially involves matters of public concern."
In effect, the Matherne panel called for a heightened level of scrutiny where
employee speech addresses more substantial, significant, or important mat-
ters of public concern. This second variation on the Gonzalez formula ap-
pears to have been intended to apply to all balancing, not just to balancing in
situations where an agency superior anticipates potential disruption of office
operations.
Using one or another of these "sliding scales," Fifth Circuit panels have
proceeded to "balance" the employee speech interests against various pur-
ported governmental interests. Several new factors or emphases emerged in
the course of these decisions. We turn first to those on the side of the speech
interests.
2. Weighing the Importance of Public Employee Speech Interests
Connick's balancing formula referred to "the nature" of employee speech
and the extent to which such speech substantially addressed matters of pub-
lic concern. It may be inferred that by "nature," the Court meant to indi-
cate the importance of the employee's speech, that is, "whether it affects a
matter of great public concern" or one of lesser consequence. 388 Surpris-
ingly, few post-Connick Fifth Circuit cases attempt to measure the impor-
tance or weight of the free speech interests. Attention to this consideration
appears only in recent decisions.
In McBee, the en banc court noted that under Connick the district court,
on remand, should consider the degree to which the deputies' activities in-
volved public concerns and the gravity of these concerns.38 9 The court,
however, then proceeded to identify only factors that related to possible neg-
ative effects of the empoyees' speech on the sheriff's office's performance of
its responsibilities. 390 The Gonzalez panel was the first to identify issues
presented by public employee speech as matters of "significant" or "substan-
tial" public concern. 391 As such, the panel concluded, they outweighed the
relatively slight ways Gonzales' speech might have adversely affected gov-
ernmental operations. 392 The Rankin panel, using slightly different nomen-
clature, found that McPherson's comment in connection with the
assassination attempt on President Reagan "was evoked by and addressed
387. Matherne, 851 F.2d at 761 n.53 (emphasis added) (citations omitted).
388. Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 150 n.9 (1983).
389. McBee v. Jim Hogg County, 730 F.2d 1009, 1013, 1016 (5th Cir. 1984).
390. Id. at 1016-17.
391. Gonzalez v. Benavides, 774 F.2d 1295, 1302 (5th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 475 U.S.
1140 (1986). See supra notes 228-29 and accompanying text.
392. Id. at 1302-03.
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serious matters of public concern," and therefore outweighed its negligible
effects on the government's interest in maintaining an efficient office. 393 Pre-
sumably the court of appeals would adjudge whether matters of public con-
cern were sufficiently significant, substantial, or serious. But none of the
cases indicate the criteria to be applied in making such a judgment. 394
Later, another panel referred to the "weight" of a public employee's speech,
but found it outweighed by the affected governmental interests.395 The
court's most thorough inquiry to date as to the nature and importance of
speech interests is set out in Moore.3 96
The Moore panel found that both firefighter Moore and the public or local
citizenry had a "strong" or "extremely significant" interest in his speech. 397
The panel identified the nature of Moore's interest as speaker, specifically,
the ability to disseminate information on the effectiveness of the fire depart-
ment throughout the community, without fear of reprisal, in order to
awaken the political conscience of the community so as to bring about
needed change.3 98 Thus, Moore had a significant interest in his speech on
that issue. 399 As rationale, the court stated "The First Amendment accords
all of us, as participants in a democratic process, room to speak about public
issues. "'4 Some earlier decisions had also emphasized the public's interest
in hearing public employee speech in order to make informed judgments as
to the performance of governmental functions. Connick itself had urged that
"[t]he First Amendment 'was fashioned to assure unfettered interchange of
ideas for the bringing about of political and social changes desired by the
people' "; " 'speech concerning public affairs is more than self-expression; it
is the essence of self-government.' "41 The Fifth Circuit has insisted that
the first amendment especially protects speech on the manner of government
operations. 4° 2 One panel also emphasized the societal interest in protecting
the integrity of the judicial system from damage that would result if the
government were permitted to retaliate against employees who provided
393. Rankin v. McPherson, 483 U.S. 378, 390 (1987) (emphasis added). See supra notes
208-12 and accompanying text.
394. Panels have also said that to merit protection, speech must relate to matters of "legiti-
mate public concern." Coats v. Pierre, 890 F.2d 728, 732 (5th Cir. 1989); Day v. South Park
Indep. School Dist., 768 F.2d 696, 700 (5th Cir. 1985) (emphasis added). The court has not
said how it would distinguish between matters of "legitimate" public concern and other such
matters. Compare Pickering v. Board of Educ., 391 U.S. 563, 571 (1968), which refers to "a
matter of legitimate public concern," but does not limit first amendment protection to such
speech.
395. Price v. Brittain, 874 F.2d 252, 258-59 (5th Cir. 1989). See supra note 169.
396. Moore v. City of Kilgore, 877 F.2d 364 (5th Cir.) cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 562, 107 L.
Ed. 2d 557 (1989). See supra notes 231-36 and accompanying text.
397. Id. at 372-73, 376.
398. Id. at 372.
399. Id.
400. Id. at 371.
401. Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 145 (1983) (citations omitted).
402. Brown v. Texas A&M Univ., 804 F.2d 327, 337 (5th Cir. 1986) (citations omitted).
See also Gonzalez v. Benavides, 774 F.2d 1295, 1299 (5th Cir. 1985). See also the Ninth
Circuit test approved, though not utilized, in Davis, which refers to information relevant to the
public's evaluation of a governmental agency's performance. See supra notes 256-59 and ac-
companying text.
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damaging testimony against their employers before official adjudicatory or
fact-finding bodies.40 3 The Moore court urged that the first amendment pro-
tects the public's interest as "a willing listener." 4°4 That court concluded,
"[t]he public, naturally, cares deeply about the ability of its Fire Department
to respond quickly and effectively to a fire. If staffing shortages potentially
threaten the ability of the Fire Department to perform its duties, people in
the community want to receive such information." 4 5 To some extent, the
speaker's and the public's interest coalesce. The Moore court's recognition
of separate interests, however, clarifies the interests at stake, and should pro-
vide helpful quidelines for reflection by other panels on the nature and
weight of the employee's speech interests. Moore's analysis provides for
greater precision than can be achieved if the court thinks only of the em-
ployee's first amendment speech "right." This right is a somewhat vague or
evasive value when contemplated apart from the employee's practical inter-
est in its free exercise. The community also has an interest in matters related
to delivery of services affecting public safety or welfare.
3. Factors Relating to the Nature and Weight of Governmental Interests
Through its major decisions from Pickering to Rankin, the Supreme Court
set out and refined considerations for appraising the nature and extent of
governmental interests to weigh against the public employees' speech. 4° 6 In
view of the many and diverse statements as to governmental interests and
related criteria enunciated by the Court, it is not surprising that Fifth Circuit
case law presents a variegated picture.
a. "Close Working Relationships": McBee Factors
The court's first discussion of governmental interests following Connick
was in its en banc opinion in McBee.4°7 The court summarized Connick's
statements as to governmental interests in two different ways. The first was,
"the government's legitimate interest in maintaining proper discipline in the
public service, to the end that its duties may be discharged with efficiency
and integrity." 4° 8 Second, in reviewing the McBee facts, the court proposed
to focus on the question "whether 'close working relationships are essential
to fulfilling [the deputies'] public responsibilities.' "409
The en banc court added certain other factors to be considered in assess-
ing the impact of employee speech on these interests. As to appraising the
governmental interest in maintaining proper discipline, the court added the
403. Johnston v. Harris County Flood Control Dist., 869 F.2d 1565, 1578 (5th Cir. 1989),
cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 718, 107 L. Ed. 2d 738 (1990).
404. Moore v. City of Kilgore, 877 F.2d 364, 370 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 562,
107 L. Ed. 2d 557 (1989).
405. Id.
406. See supra notes 10-12, 19-26, 61-62, 88-118, 140-56 and accompanying text.
407. McBee v. Jim Hogg County, 730 F.2d 1009 (5th Cir. 1985). See sipra notes 200-03
and accompanying text.
408. Id. at 1013. Cf Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 150-51 (1983).
409. McBee, 730 F.2d at 1016. Cf Connick, 461 U.S. at 151-52 (when such relationships
are essential, "a wide degree of deference to the employer's judgment is appropriate.").
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factor of the employee's motive in engaging in the speech at issue. 4 10 This
factor was not articulated in Connick, which had identified manner, time,
place, and context as relevant considerations in determining the validity of a
supervisor's fear that the employee's speech had the potential for undermin-
ing office relationships. 4 11 Expanding on the second Connick inquiry,
whether "close working relationships are essential to fulfill [the agency's]
public responsibilities," the McBee court first added that "the closeness of a
working relationship as it affects job performance is not to be gauged merely
by the size of the office or the number of employees. Rather, it is a function
of the particular 'public responsibility' being carried out."' 4 12 The court then
noted several other considerations that might bear on the question whether
the employee's speech would significantly disrupt the office's ongoing opera-
tion,4 13 such as whether the employee's speech was "sufficiently hostile, abu-
sive or insubordinate" as to have that effect. 414 For instance, even where an
intimate working relationship is not implicated, "an appointive senior offi-
cial's public disavowal of the authority of his superiors may constitute such
disruption as to outweigh his First Amendment right in that speech. '41 5
Previous derogatory speech about one's superior also might be outweighed.
Following a political campaign, the successful candidate need not have
"forced on [his] organization an individual who has blackguarded [his] hon-
esty and ability up and down the county. ' 416 Later panel decisions picked
up some of these new factors and also added some others.
b. "Make or Break" Authority and Manner of Relating to Officials:
Gonzalez Considerations
The Gonzalez panel explicitly identified another new factor limiting the
employee's freedom to speak.41 7 In order to safeguard the political process,
the court said, the rights of "senior government employees to exercise broad
discretionary authority [who thereby] may be able to 'make or break' the
programs and policies of elected officials" might have to be curtailed.418 In
addition, Gonzalez noted some considerations that would be relevant in ap-
praising whether such an employee's speech posed any threat to the elected
officials' political program. The panel noted that Gonzalez had not refused
to carry out the elected officials' directions that were not inconsistent with
the agency's regulations; that he offered to cooperate with the officials in all
410. McBee, 730 F.2d at 1013 (emphasis added). Recently the court has cautioned against
focusing on employee motivation to the exclusion of other relevant factors. Thompson v. City
of Starkville, 901 F.2d 456, 465 n.7, 466 (5th Cir. 1990) (citing Kurtz v. Vickrey, 855 F.2d 723,
727 (11th Cir. 1988)).
411. Connick, 461 U.S. at 152-53. See supra notes 101-11 and accompanying text. The
Connick majority had, in conclusory fashion, attributed to Myers only self-serving intent. See
supra note 118.
412. McBee, 730 F.2d at 1016. Cf supra note 382 and accompanying text.




417. Gonzalez v. Benavides, 774 F.2d 1295, 1300 (5th Cir. 1985).
418. Id.
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other ways; and that he did not attempt to obstruct their investigation.
Rather, Gonzales merely objected to the commissioners' violation of agency
regulations. 4 19 In Givhan, the Supreme Court had set out manner, time, and
place as the criteria to be applied in determining whether institutional effi-
ciency is threatened420 by a government employee's personal confrontation
of his immediate superior. 42 1 The Gonzalez panel pointed out that Gonzalez
was polite throughout his various encounters, did not engage in personal
attacks on the officials, and had often offered to cooperate in resolving the
problems.422 These considerations all appear to relate to the employee's
manner of speech. Conversely, in McAdams, another panel found that an
appointed discretionary employee was probably terminated because he re-
fused to cooperate with elected officials, and because he communicated with
the officials in a "rude and hostile manner. '423 This panel found "extensive
evidence that McAdams' refusal to cooperate with the Board disrupted the
effective functioning of the [agency]." '424
c. Disruption, Discipline, Insubordination, and Efficiency
Two lines of cases incorporate further developments in the Fifth Circuit.
In one, the court has emphasized that "disruption" of governmental effi-
ciency is to be given little weight when the employee's speech serves to ex-
pose wrongdoing by government officials.425 As early as Porter, a post-
Pickering, but pre-Connick case, the court held:
The First Amendment balancing test can hardly be controlled by a find-
ing that disruption did occur. An employee who accurately exposes
rampant corruption in her office no doubt may disrupt and demoralize
much of the office. But it would be absurd to hold that the First
Amendment generally authorizes corrupt officials to punish subordi-
nates who blow the whistle simply because the speech somewhat dis-
rupted the office. 4 2 6
Several post-Connick Fifth Circuit cases have likewise so held. 427
Another series of cases focuses on the importance of discipline and the
419. Id. at 1302.
420. Givhan v. Western Line Consol. School Dist., 439 U.S. 410, 415 n.4 (1979). See supra
note 61 and accompanying text.
421. Id.
422. Gonzalez v. Benavides, 774 F.2d 1295, 1303 (5th Cir. 1985).
423. McAdams v. Matagorda County Appraisal Dist., 798 F.2d 842, 846, 848 (5th Cir.
1986). The report does not describe the specific conduct the panel characterized as rude and
hostile.
424. Id. at 847.
425. See infra note 427 and accompanying text.
426. Porter v. Califano, 592 F.2d 770, 773-74 (5th Cir. 1979) (emphasis in original).
427. See Frazier v. King, 873 F.2d 820, 826 (5th Cir.), cert. denied sub nom. Davoli v.
Frazier, 110 S. Ct. 502, 107 L. Ed. 2d 504 (1989) ("Although Frazier's 'whistle blowing' obvi-
ously created tension and difficulties at Wade [the facility], when weighed against the exposure
of unethical medical practices affecting hundreds of inmates, the disruption is a minimal inter-
est.") See also Brawner v. City of Richardson, 855 F.2d 187, 192 (5th Cir. 1988) ("Even
assuming that the department maintained an interest in a confidential investigation, such an




peril of insubordination. Connick had used language suggesting that disci-
pline of public employees is, as such, an important governmental interest. 428
In McBee, the court stated that it was appropriate to inquire whether an
employee's activity had been so "insubordinate" as to cause a significant dis-
ruption in the office's continued operation. 429 Here insubordination is not
regarded as a bad thing in itself; the critical question is whether it had signif-
icantly disrupted the office's operation. In some later cases, as well, the
court was careful to point out that insubordination, without more, was not
an important governmental concern.430 The Fifth Circuit has generally held
that "loyalty" and "discipline" are not to be taken as abstract governmental
interests per se, but rather are to be seen in relation to their effect on a par-
ticular agency's operations. 431
The Moore court held that even efficiency is not, itself, an absolute value.
Creating room for free speech in a hierarchical organization necessarily
involves inconveniencing the employer to some degree. Speech con-
cerning public affairs usually creates attendant inefficiencies in the run-
ning of the public entity. But efficiency is not an end-all and be-all goal
of a democracy. Speech among the people helps to maintain the vitality
of self-government. 432
Applying the Pickering test for governmental interests, reiterated in
Rankin,433 the Moore court insisted that the critical question was whether
the government's interest in promoting the efficiency of the public services
its employees perform "outweighs [the employee's] and the public's interest
in his speech that addresses a matter of public concern. '434 The court found
that Moore's insubordinate speech had little or no impact on the effective-
ness or efficiency of the City's operations or other interests, and that the
public's and Moore's interest in his speech was of substantially greater
weight.435 The Moore court's careful description of the various affected in-
terests involved, and its close attention to the actual extent of any impact
Moore's speech may have had upon them, provide an exemplary model for
courts to follow when undertaking to identify, weigh, and balance competing
first amendment and governmental interests.
428. See supra notes 91-94 and accompanying text.
429. McBee v. Jim Hogg County, 730 F.2d 1009, 1017 (5th Cir. 1984).
430. Moore v. City of Kilgore, 877 F.2d 364, 374-76 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 562,
107 L. Ed. 2d 557 (1989); Brawner, 855 F.2d at 192.
431. See Moore, 877 F.2d at 374; Gonzalez v. Benavides, 774 F.2d 1295, 1302 (5th Cir.
1985). In some other cases, however, the court's determination that the speech in question did
not relate to matters of public concern appears to have been colored by an implicit assumption
that speech on matters of personal interest is somehow inherently insubordinate or disruptive.
See supra note 80 and notes 266-317 and accompanying text.
432. Moore, 877 F.2d at 364.
433. See supra notes 11, 142 and accompanying text.
434. Moore, 877 F.2d at 372.
435. Id. For further consideration of the court's analysis in Moore, see Hiers, supra note
74, at 118-19. Cf Hobbs v. Thompson, 448 F.2d 456 (5th Cir. 1971) (firemen's political speech
held unrelated to performance of their duties and therefore protected).
[Vol. 45
FIRST AMENDMENT SPEECH RIGHTS
IV. CONCLUSIONS
As has been seen, it can no longer confidently be said that "[t]he First
Amendment ensures that under most circumstances even the most junior
clerk typist can criticize the speech and acts of the top officials, in her office
as freely as any citizen can."'4 36 Both Supreme Court and Fifth Circuit deci-
sions have contributed to the erosion of first amendment protection for gov-
ernment employee speech.
A. The Supreme Court Decisions
The seeds of many later difficulties were already contained in Pickering.
437
There the Court hinted, though it did not so specify, that public employee
speech might be entitled to first amendment protection only if it related to
"matters of public concern. ' 438 Later, the Supreme Court would declare
that ascertaining whether the employee's speech addressed a matter of public
concern was the sole test for determining whether such speech was within
the first amendment at all. 439 Pickering gave little guidance as to what kinds
of questions might be considered matters of public concern. Moreover, by
proposing that an employee's speech interest should be balanced against the
State's interest in the efficiency of its public services,440 the Court tacitly
assumed that employee speech of any sort is likely to intrude on "the effi-
ciency" of governmental operations. A number of subsequent Supreme
Court and the Fifth Circuit decisions likewise appear to reflect this assump-
tion. It probably underlies the Court's later determination that only public
speech relating to matters of public concern should be accorded first amend-
ment protection, as if employee speech on other matters necessarily would be
adverse to governmental interests in efficiency. 441 The Pickering formula
seemed to presume that only "the government" had a legitimate interest in
promoting the efficiency of an agency's performance of its public responsibil-
ities, and that employees were incapable of such concern or that their in-
sights and suggestions as to such matters were inherently subversive.
The Supreme Court's unanimous 1977 decision in Mt. Healthy44 2 estab-
lished that in order to prevail in first amendment speech actions, government
employee plaintiffs must show that they were punished because they had
exercised their speech rights. This causation requirement had already been
implicit in Pickering. What was new was that the Court now went on to
provide that even though protected speech played a "substantial part" in the
governmental decision to punish an employee, such punishment would not
necessarily constitute a constitutional violation worthy of remedial action. 4
3
After Mt. Healthy, the defendant employer or supervisor could escape liabil-
436. See supra note I and accompanying text.
437. See supra notes 6-26 and accompanying text.
438. See supra note I I and accompanying text.
439. See supra note 130 and accompanying text.
440. See supra note I I and accompanying text.
441. See supra note 80.
442. See supra notes 27-50 and accompanying text.
443. Mt. Healthy City School Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274, 285 (1977).
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ity entirely if it could persuade the court that it would have punished the
employee anyway.
Did this mean that governmental employees who served "at pleasure" or
without tenure, and thus could be dismissed without cause, would be left
without any first amendment protection? Or did it mean that if protected
speech played a substantial part in the decision to dismiss such employees,
the governmental employer or supervisor defendant would have to come for-
ward with reasons to justify its actions, reasons that otherwise would not
have been required? And would district courts then scrutinize such reasons
to make sure that they were not merely a pretext? In the latter instance, the
courts would have the added task of speculating what employers or supervi-
sors would have done had they not violated employees' speech rights.
Mt. Healthy implicitly invited governmental employers or supervisors to
penalize employees for exercising their first amendment rights, and then in-
vent post hoc pretexts to justify their actions. 4" Instead, the Court could
have made clear that when governmental employees' first amendment rights
had been violated, they could recover, at a minimum, monetary damages
whether or not their employers or supervisors would have dismissed or other-
wise sanctioned them on other grounds." 5
Two years later, in Givhan, the Court strengthened public employees'
speech rights. Specifically, the Court held that public employees need not
make their expressions public in order to bring them within first amendment
protection. Speech in the form of private communication with an employer
or supervisor would also be protected, provided the content, manner, time,
and place of such speech did not threaten the agency's institutional effi-
ciency. Neither Mt. Healthy nor Givhan considered whether, or determined
that, the respective employees' speeches had addressed a "matter of public
concern." Connick itself was curiously vague on this point as well.
In Connick, a divided Court, using strangely contorted language, held that
a public employee's speech on matters of only personal interest would not be
protected.446 The majority did not explain why speech on such matters was
to be denied first amendment protection. In view of the Court's extreme
concern that governmental employers need not tolerate disruptive or in-
subordinate conduct by employees, 447 it can be inferred that the Court sim-
444. See supra notes 35-49 and accompanying text.
445. See supra notes 40-50 and accompanying text. It need not follow that in such circum-
stances the court must order both damages and reinstatement. In Kinsey v. Salado Indep.
School Dist., 916 F.2d 273 (5th Cir. 1990), the Fifth Circuit upheld an award of damages; the
decision does not indicate that the discharged employee was or would be reinstated. Various
types of remedies are described in Gonzalez v. Benavides, 774 F.2d 1295, 1298 and n.7 (5th
Cir. 1985); Kingsville Indep. School Dist. v. Cooper, 611 F.2d 1109, 1113-14 (5th Cir. 1980).
Possibly the plaintiff-employee in Mt. Healthy failed to request alternative relief.
446. See supra notes 63-81 and accompanying text.
447. See supra notes 80, 149. "[C]ourts confronting free speech claims of public employees
are notably solicitous toward public employers and correspondingly unwilling to treat employ-
ees' interests in expression seriously." Ingber, supra note 80, at 55. Ingber observes that defer-
ence to employer supervisors does not necessarily promote efficiency. "[T]he risk is constant
that the efficiency goal relied upon to limit employee free speech is but the prejudices, insecuri-
ties, and authoritarian nature of speech regulators." Id. at 63. Such deference reflects not only
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ply assumed that employee speech on personal matters would impinge on
governmental interests.448 Perhaps the Court also presumed that speech on
"personal" matters would have little or no social value. 449 It appears likely
that the Court's determination that employee speech on merely personal
matters was to be outside the first amendment's protection was based on its
subliminal pre-judgment that governmental interests would generally out-
weigh the value of such speech. The Connick Court attempted to categorize
all speech on matters of office policy as merely personal, and therefore not of
public concern. Evidently it was unwilling to credit either employees or the
public with an interest in such matters as office morale and efficiency. 450
Connick did not explicitly hold that only speech relating to matters of
public concern would be protected. Nevertheless, it identified three factors
to be considered in determining whether an employee's speech addressed a
matter of public concern, specifically, "content, form, and context . . .as
revealed by the whole record."'451 The Court did not say what kind of
speech might be deemed related to matters of public concern. Afterwards,
appellate courts, attempting to apply Connick experienced considerable diffi-
culty defining what constitutes a matter of public concern. 4 52
judicial commitment to an outmoded theory of management which presumes that efficiency
depends upon hierarchical authority. Supreme Court, 1982, supra note 74, at 169 n.49. This
might be called the keep-on-picking-cotton-and-keep-your-mouth-shut theory of desired em-
ployee conduct. It also reflects a naive equation of the government's interest with the interest
of agency superiors, as if the latter were somehow exempt from tendencies to protect turf, play
power games, and otherwise act on the basis of their own self-serving interests. "[In Connick]
the Court was deferential to the dictating hand of the public employer and was oblivious of the
public benefits that could ensue from such employee complaints." Note, supra note 80, at 474-
75. See also supra note 214.
448. One recent commentator has argued persuasively that the threshold question should
be whether the employee's speech clearly interfered with the agency's ability to function,
rather than the nature of the speech. Absent a showing of interference, the speech should be
protected. Comment, supra note 118, at 1136-38. See also Estlund, Speech on Matters of Pub-
lic Concern: The Perils of an Emerging First Amendment Category, 59 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1
(1990). Estlund concludes that the "public concern" test "inevitably leads to the suppression
and the deterrence of speech that is important to public debate." Id. at 55. She urges that the
public concern test no longer be treated as the threshold test; instead, inquiry should proceed,
as in Pickering, by weighing the employee's interest in speaking against the government's inter-
est in effective performance of its functions. Id. at 52-53. See also Masarro, supra note 46, at
67-68 (proposal of balancing approach).
449. The "personal interest"/"public concern" dichotomy ignores inherent connections be-
tween the two.
The Connick formula systematically denigrates the importance of the particular
grievance in generating public concern over an issue. As such, it deprives each
individual self-interested speaker of the very legal protections she may need in
order to discover and join with those who may share her concerns. Such a con-
ception of matters of public concern enforces a truncated vision of public debate
and cuts off the roots from the branch of public discourse and democratic
governance.
Estlund, supra note 448, at 38.
450. "The bizzare result of the Connick majority's holding is that statements about the
operational efficiency of public employers are apparently not deserving of first amendment
protection, while statements about teacher dress codes are deserving of such protection."
Note, supra note 80, at 466-67.
451. See supra note 83 and accompanying text.
452. Fifth Circuit panels have remarked upon the problem. Thompson v. City of
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Moreover, Connick was entirely silent as to the constitutional status of
employee speech that related neither to "matters of only personal interest"
nor to matters of public concern. The Court seemed to assume that these
two categories constituted the entire universe of employee speech. That
would be true only if the realm of speech concerning matters of public con-
cern included all speech that was not related to matters of only personal
interest. Subsequently, various Fifth Circuit panels, unwilling to view the
realm of "matters of public concern" so broadly, evidently felt constrained
by Connick to categorize speech on neutral or tertium quid matters as "per-
sonal" and therefore unprotected.
Connick also restricted governmental employee speech rights at another
level of analysis. Pickering required employers or supervisors to show that
protected speech actually had interfered with office operations or impeded
the employee's performance of his duties.453 Connick allowed governmental
superiors to penalize employee's speech if the superior merely feared that
such speech might disrupt the office or destroy "working relationships. 45 4
The Connick court, according the employer's beliefs a large measure of def-
erence, found such fears reasonable.455 After Connick courts not only had to
determine whether governmental employees' protected speech had actually
impacted adversely on agency operations; they also had to speculate whether
supervisors had reasonably feared that lower-ranking employees' speech
might have such effect. Clearly Connick tilted towards limiting protection
for governmental employees' speech rights.
In Rankin, the Court unambiguously declared that whether a public em-
Starkville, Miss., 901 F.2d at 456, 461 (5th Cir. 1990); Kirkland v. Northside Indep. School
Dist., 890 F.2d 794, 798 (5th Cir. 1990). See Comment, supra note 118, at 1110.
453. Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 166-67 (1983) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
454. See supra notes 100-02 and accompanying text.
455. Connick, 461 U.S. at 151-52, 154. Numerous commentators have criticized this fea-
ture of Connick for its chilling effect on employee speech and attendant adverse policy conse-
quences. Comment, Constitutional Law--First Amendment-Freedom of Speech-Public
Employees-Connick v. Myers, 30 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 417, 438-42 (1985):
Faced with .. .losing their jobs, government employees are likely to adapt a
cautious approach.., and withhold both public and private opinions critical of
their employers. As a consequence, the general public may be deprived of inside
information about the manner in which the government discharges its public
services. This removal of access to the invaluable repository of information pos-
sessed by public employees may severely undermine the role of the citizenry in
self-governance.
Id. at 442. See Handler, supra note 257, at 317-18; Note, Constitutional Law-Supreme Court
Restricts First Amendment Rights of Public Employees-Connick v. Myers, 58 TUL. L. REV.
831 (1984); Note, Constitutional Law-First Amendment-Dismissal of State Employee for
Distributing Questionnaire Upheld Where Speech Tangentially Affected Public Concern And
Questionnaire Had Potential to Disrupt Office, Undermine Supervisory Authority, and Destroy
Close Working Relationships. Connick v. Myers, 13 U. BALT. L. REV. 365 (1984). See also
Ingber, supra note 80, at 58-59:
(The] worker can be removed when an employer merely anticipates that [em-
ployee questioning] might get too disruptive. Hence, the employer can prevent a
grievance from spreading and capturing the public's interest .... The Court's
language is reminiscent of that found in the very first free speech cases decided
around 1920 and of those during the Communist scare of the 1950s.
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ployee's speech related to matters of public policy was the "threshold ques-
tion" for first amendment analysis. 456 Lower courts would thereafter know
where to begin analysis in such cases. Unfortunately, Rankin added little
guidance as to what kinds of matters might be of public concern for purposes
of the first amendment.
The Court made a serious mistake when it erected this threshold test.4 57
This test in effect denied that public employees have any constitutionally
protected interest or right of their own in their speech, whether in the work-
place or elsewhere. Instead, their speech is sheltered by the first amendment
only if and to the extent that it contributes to public debate or provides the
public with needed information.458 It is conceptually erroneous and confus-
ing to treat the public's interest or benefit as a factor, much less as the sine
qua non, in determining whether the employee speaker has a protected inter-
est in his speech. Such treatment ignores the speaker's own interests, which
may not be entirely identical with the public's. 459 Before Rankin, lower
courts could have attempted to limited Connick's potential for undermining
public employee speech rights by denying first amendment protection only
to speech clearly arising out of personal grievances. Since Rankin's explicit
holding that only speech on matters of public concern will be considered for
such protection, harmless expressions on personal and tertium quid matters
may cost employees their job if the speech somehow happens to displease
agency superiors. Absent the Court's revisiting and eliminating this "thresh-
old question," lower federal courts can afford first amendment protection to
public employee speech only by finding it within a broader spectrum of mat-
ters of public concern. Whether or not a court will do so may depend more
on the individual judge's values than on the content and nature of the em-
ployee's speech.46°
As to balancing interests, Rankin defined the nature of the relevant gov-
ernmental interests more narrowly and precisely than Pickering and Con-
nick. These earlier cases had referred, variously, to the importance of
456. See supra notes 130-35 and accompanying text.
457. See supra notes 448-49.
458. See infra notes 529-35 and accompanying text.
459. On this important distinction, see Developments, supra note 80, at 1769-70:
The Court's consistent failure to identify and elaborate public employees' inter-
ests in expression has resulted in a body of case law that belittles those interests
by ignoring them.
Among such interests are the right of public employees not to share the
majoritarian views of their employers [citing, inter alia., Abbott v. Thetford, 534
F.2d 1101 (5th Cir. 1976)(en banc) (per curium), and characterizing it as "a case
demonstrating particular insensitivity to this problem"] and the interest of em-
ployees in speaking their professional or vocational conscience on work place
affairs without fear of reprisal. In particular, public employees have legitimate
interests in the efficiency and fairness of their work environments: a harshly
managed or poorly run work place can breed disharmony and inefficiency, and
thus the efforts of employees to address these concerns may merit strong judicial
protection.
Id. See also supra notes 398-400 and accompanying text.
460. See supra notes 80, 118.
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maintaining discipline by immediate superiors, "harmony among co-work-
ers,"' 461 and preventing adverse effects on workplace morale and office rela-
tionships generally.462 Such considerations or "interests" might or might
not actually be related to the efficiency or effectiveness and quality of serv-
ices delivered to the public. For example, an agency office might be marked
by either strict discipline or harmonious office relationships, but nevertheless
fail to serve the needs of the public or public clients. To the extent that
considerations such as "discipline," "morale," "loyalty," and office harmony
or relationships are viewed as ends in themselves, punishing employees'
speech perceived as contrary to such ends would not necessarily improve the
agency's delivery of public services.463 Rankin refocused attention on the
underlying govermental interest in "promoting the efficiency of the public
services it provides through its employees." 4"6 Considerations such as those
just noted "make apparent that the state interest element of the test focuses
on the effective functioning of the public enterprise." 46 Employee speech
was not to be silenced merely because superiors disagreed with its content.466
Rankin may also have affected the causation phase of analysis. As has
been noted, Mt. Healthy seemed to free governmental superiors to punish
employees for exercising "protected" speech rights so long as the former
could persuade the court that they would have punished the employees any-
way.467 When punishment took the form of discharge or firing, and the em-
ployee lacked tenure or "served at pleasure," it was unclear whether Mt.
Healthy required the defendant-superior to come forward with any reasons
for the dismissal. According to Rankin, however, the government bears the
burden of justifying the discharge "on legitimate grounds.' 468 This language
occurs in the Court's discussion of balancing; but it also necessarily applies
to causation analysis. Courts do not ordinarily require, much less scrutinize,
a government employer's reasons (or lack of reasons) for firing an employee
who served at pleasure. But since Rankin, if the firing had been even partly
in retaliation for the employee's speaking on matters of public concern, the
lower courts should scrutinize the government's other reasons for discharg-
ing the employee in order to determine that such reasons were not merely
pretextual.
B. Patterns and Problems in Fifth Circuit Jurisprudence
In most of its post-Connick government employee speech cases, the Fifth
Circuit has given the greater part of its attention to determining whether the
speech addressed a matter of public concern. Considerable attention also
461. See supra notes 19-20 and accompanying text.
462. Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 151-52 (1983); Pickering v. Board of Educ., 391 U.S.
563, 570 (1968). See supra notes 94, 98 and accompanying text.
463. See supra notes 426-35 and accompanying text.
464. See supra notes 142-46 and accompanying text.
465. Rankin v. McPherson, 483 U.S. 378, 388 (1987).
466. See supra note 129 and accompanying text.
467. See supra notes 442-44 and accompanying text.
468. See supra note 140 and accompanying text.
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has been devoted to weighing the speech interests and balancing these
against purported governmental interests in suppression. Because relatively
few cases have been decided on the basis of Mt. Healthy causation standards,
this article omits a discussion of Fifth Circuit causation analysis.469 We re-
view first, and most extensively, the court's approach to determining
whether employee speech addressed matters of public concern.
1. The Problem of Defining Matters of Public Concern
Like the other courts of appeal, the Fifth Circuit has found it difficult to
establish definite criteria for determining whether an employee's speech re-
lated to matters of public concern. 470 The panels have agreed that a good
many topics can be so categorized. Speech regarding misconduct by public
officials, including fellow police officers, whether or not specifically labelled
"whistleblowing," has generally been found within the scope of matters of
public concern. 471 Political speech and speech concerning public policy like-
wise qualify. 472 That the content of such speech may be "loathsome" does
not prevent its relating to matters of public concern. 473 Public employee
speech concerning matters affecting community safety also generally meets
the test,474 as does speech by school personnel on matters regarding aca-
demic programs, policies and practices.475
What is uncertain is where the court should draw the line between em-
ployee speech on other matters of public concern and speech on matters of
"only personal" or "private" interest. Largely because the the Supreme
Court seemed to decree that all speech is divided into only these two
parts, 476 Fifth Circuit panels have sometimes resolved doubt by categorizing
employee speech on mixed or tertium quid topics as relating merely to their
"personal" concerns.477  In doing so, various panels have developed a
number of tests, doctrines and dicta that unnecessarily restrict government
469. A few cases were decided solely on the basis of the employee's failure to show that his
speech was a substantial or motivating causation factor. See, Robinson v. Boyer, 825 F.2d 64,
68 (5th Cir. 1987); Montgomery v. Trinity Indep. Sch. Dist., 809 F.2d 1058, 1061 (5th Cir.
1987). Also see supra notes 276, 274 and accompanying text. Recently the court has some-
what confined the pro-employer effect of Mt. Healthy's second or "but for" causation test. See
supra notes 36-50 and accompanying text. It did so by limiting this test to situations where the
relief an employee seeks would "put him in a better position than he would have occupied but
for the ... protected conduct." Scott v. Flowers, 910 F.2d 201, 209-10 n.15 (5th Cir. 1990).
Arguably this limitation means that employees who would have been disciplined on other
grounds should be entitled to relief for violation of their first amendment speech rights. See
supra notes 46-50 and accompanying text.
470. See supra notes 157-58.
471. See supra notes 171-83, 224-30, 237-43 and accompanying text. See generally Thomp-
son v. City of Starkville, 901 F.2d 456, 462-63 (5th Cir. 1990).
472. See supra notes 200-14 and accompanying text.
473. See supra note 212 and accompanying text.
474. See supra notes 234-38 and accompanying text. See also Moore v. MVSU, 871 F.2d
545, 551 (5th Cir. 1989).
475. See supra notes 216-23 and accompanying text. See also Pickering, Mt. Healthy, and
Givhan, discussed supra notes 6-62 and accompanying text. See generally Piver v. Board of
Educ., 835 F.2d 1076, 1077-80 (4th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 487 U.S. 1206 (1988).
476. See supra notes 71-81, 446-50 and accompanying text.
477. See supra notes 253-344 and accompanying text.
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employee speech and adversely affect public interests. Yet not all panels
have agreed to such restrictions, some of which appear contrary to Supreme
Court holdings.
a. Failure to "Go Public"
When the Supreme Court decided Givhan, it had not yet established an
inquiry as to personal/public concern as the threshold question in first
amendment public employee speech analysis. But it clearly held that such
employees would not lose their freedom of speech just because they arranged
to communicate privately with their employers rather than spread their
views before the public.478 Notwithstanding Givhan, Fifth Circuit panels oc-
casionally have considered the fact that a public employee spoke or wrote
privately instead of trying to "go public" as an indicator that the speech in
question related to a matter of personal, rather than public concern.479 Re-
cently, however, the court has backed away from emphasizing this indicator,
though retaining it as "simply another factor. '' 480  In view of Givhan, it is
unclear why it should be a factor at all. As the court stated in Brown, "[t]he
fact that the speech was delivered privately to [the employee's] supervisors,
rather than to Bob Woodward and Carl Bernstein, does not necessarily
render the speech any less protected." 48 '1 The court's recent decision in
Thompson articulated an important policy consideration that should weigh
in favor of demoting if not abandoning the "going public" factor. The Court
stated that "[a] holding to the contrary would mean that loyal employees
seeking to rectify problems would lose constitutional protection for attempt-
ing to correct problems in house."' 482 But some panels have, at least implic-
itly, endorsed a closely related test or factor.
b. The Speech Did Not Pose the Issue as One for Public Debate
Connick did not say whether speech qualifies as relating to a matter of
public concern only if its topic is already one discussed in the community, or
whether it might also qualify if the topic was one that would, in the court's
view should, be of interest to the community.483 Connick did say that in
determining whether the "speech" in question addressed a matter of public
concern, courts should consider its "context, form and context. '484 The
"context" factor has led some Fifth Circuit panels to regard issues raised
pursuant to intra-, or even inter-, agency controversies as matters of only
personal interest to the employee even when the speech's content clearly re-
lated to matters about which a reasonable, prudent public would be
478. See supra note 59 and accompanying text.
479. See supra notes 313, 360-71, 364, 366 and accompanying text.
480. Thompson v. City of Starkville, 901 F.2d 456, 466-67 (5th Cir. 1990). See also Kinsey
v. Salado Indep. School Dist., 916 F.2d 273, 277-78 (5th Cir. 1990).
481. Brown v. Texas A&M Univ., 804 F.2d 327 (5th Cir. 1986). See supra note 183 and
accompanying text.
482. Thompson, 901 F.2d at 467.
483. See supra notes 76-77 and accompanying text.
484. See supra note 83 and accompanying text.
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concerned. 485
In the case where day care workers complained that another employee
had brought a gun to work and otherwise violated the center's rules, the
court concluded that these complaints really were motivated by concerns of
favoritism, not by a desire to draw attention to matters of public concern
that should be stopped. Their speech thus constituted only a personal griev-
ance, even though the court recognized that some of the contents of the
complaint might have been of interest to the public.486 In another case, a
panel found that although the subject matter of the employee's speech was
"an issue of some discussion between state agencies," it was never "a matter
of public debate" in the larger community, and therefore, was only a per-
sonal grievance. 487
In two cases, however, the court implicitly adopted a Ninth Circuit stan-
dard that could be instructive in this connection. Under this test, speech
dealing with individual personnel disputes and grievances might nevertheless
relate to matters of public concern if "the information would be of ... rele-
vance to the public's evaluation of the performance of [the] governmental
agenc[y]. ' '4 8 No Fifth Circuit cases mention this standard. Several, how-
ever, insist that a public employee's speech can relate both to individual or
personal grievances and to matters of public concern.48 9 Two additional re-
strictive tests are to be considered first.
c. The "Role" in Which the Employee Spoke
In an effort to derive a practical, applicable standard from the Supreme
Court's stated holding in Connick,49° a number of Fifth Circuit panels fo-
cused on the phrases "as a citizen" and "as an employee." These panels
concluded that inquiry should focus upon the "role" in which the employee
spoke.491 Some panels even went so far as to consider the employee's "role"
to the exclusion of the content of her speech, bypassing entirely the question
whether the speech addressed a matter of public concern. 492 These panels
neglected the language, albeit obscurely phrased, in Connick's holding that
refers to the content of employee speech "upon matters of public concern,"
or "upon matters only of personal interest." One recent decision, however,
expressly eschewed the use of role analysis precisely for that reason;493 an-
other decision made clear that it would not consider the employee's "role"
apart from the content of his speech. 494 More recent cases appear to have
485. See supra notes 266-73, 301-06, 310-14, 337-44, 353-63 and accompanying text.
486. See supra notes 271-273 and accompanying text. The court evidently did not consider
the question whether a public agency practiced favoritism a matter of public concern.
487. See supra notes 282-87, 363 and accompanying text.
488. See supra notes 257-65, 373-76 and accompanying text.
489. See infra notes 494-514 and accompanying text.
490. Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 147 (1983).
491. See supra notes 320-44 and accompanying text.
492. See supra notes 322-28, 333-44 and accompanying text.
493. See supra note 352 and accompanying text.
494. Thompson v. City of Starkville, 901 F.2d 456, 465 (5th Cir. 1990). Cf Kirkland v.
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receded entirely from the "role" theory.49 5
d. "Personnel" Therefore "Personal"
Occasionally, Fifth Circuit panels have taken the position that any matter
involving an agency's personnel procedures is, necessarily, only a matter of
"personal" concern to the employee, and so, by definition, not a matter of
public concern. 496 This tendency possibly arises out of ambiguities in Con-
nick,497 or, perhaps, out of the similarity of the words "personnel" and "per-
sonal." Recently, in Thompson the court set out a number of points that
could guide inquiry more precisely as to what might constitute "matters of
only personal interest.
498
The court noted that Thompson would derive little personal gain from
filing his grievance,4 9 9 that, for example, he "did not seek back pay or pro-
motion,' ' 50° nor was his grievance concerned with working conditions. 50 1
Instead, he had helped others file similar complaints, complaints that
"clearly did not redound to his own benefit." He had also alleged wide-
spread misconduct which, moreover, implicated public safety concerns. 50 2
In short, Thompson's speech was by no means merely self-serving. Noting
that other circuits had developed certain criteria for determining whether
internal complaints about working conditions were only matters of personal
interest, the court cited the Fourth Circuit case of Piver v. Board of Educa-
tion .503 Piver observed that previous Fourth Circuit cases had focused on
the question of whether the speech concerned "'matters bounded by [the
employee's] immediate self-interest,' "504 or, in slightly different terms,
whether "the aggrieved employee himself ha[d] spoken out about his own
employment situation when that employee's situation holds little or no inter-
est for the public at large."' 50 5
The Fourth Circuit observed that other circuits had found that speech
regarding grievances or internal agency policies sometimes raised issues of
public concern. For example, a teacher's grievance against a principal, a
policeman's speech concerning compensation of the city's police officers, and
a policeman's written criticism of the behaviour of an immediate superior
could raise issues of public concern. 50 6 Summarizing its own "public con-
Northside Indep. School Dist., 890 F.2d 794, 798-800 (5th Cir. 1990), which is less definite as
to this point.
495. Ayoub v. Texas A&M Univ., 927 F.2d 834 (5th Cir. 1991); Kinsey v. Salado Indep.
School Dist., 916 F.2d 273 (5th Cir. 1990); Scott v. Flowers, 910 F.2d 201 (5th Cir. 1990);
Thompson, 901 F.2d 456.
496. See supra notes 271-73, 282-97, 333-44 and accompanying text.
497. See supra note 118 and supra notes 68-82 and accompanying text.
498. Thompson, 901 F.2d at 456.
499. Id. at 465.
500. Id. at 466.
501. Id. at 467.
502. Id. at 466, 467.
503. 835 F.2d 1076, 1079 (4th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 487 U.S. 1206 (1988).
504. Id.
505. Id. at 1080.
506. Id. at 1079, citations omitted.
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cern" jurisprudence, the Fourth Circuit concluded:
Pickering, its antecedents, and its progeny-particularly Connick-
make it plain that the "public concern" or "community interest" in-
quiry is better designed-and more concerned-to identify a narrow
spectrum of employee speech that is not entitled even to qualified pro-
tection than it is to set outer limits on all that is. The principle that
emerges is that all public employee speech that by content is within the
general protection of the first amendment is entitled to at least qualified
protection against public employer chilling action except that which,
realistically viewed, is of purely "personal" concern "to the employee-
most typically, a private personnel grievance. '50 7
In contrast, a number of Fifth Circuit decisions seem to presume that all
employee speech on personnel matters, especially all such speech that can be
characterized as "grievances," should be treated as matters of merely per-
sonal interest, even if those grievances or personnel matters involved issues
about which the public or community might reasonably be concerned.508
Perhaps this tendency in Fifth Circuit jurisprudence derives from the fact
that Connick appeared to divide the world of speech into only two parts5° 9
and failed to contemplate the possibility that a given instance of speech
might well involve both the speaker's personal interests and matters of public
concern.
e. Personal Interest and Public Concern: Necessarily Mutually
Exclusive?
Several Fifth Circuit decisions appear to assume that if an employee's
speech deals with a matter of personal interest, it could not also relate to any
issues of public concern. 510 This assumption may derive from Connick's
seemingly dichotomizing language. In other decisions, however, the court
has stated explictly that a government employee's speech may relate both to
matters of "personal" interest and to those of public concern, and that in
such cases courts should consider the speech protected and proceed to bal-
ancing.511 Recently, in Thompson the court addressed this issue directly and
stated: "The existence of an element of personal interest on the part of an
employee in his or her speech does not ... dictate a finding that the em-
ployee's speech does not communicate a matter of public concern. '512 The
court reviewed not only its own previous decisions and those of other cir-
507. Id. at 1079.
508. See supra notes 266-74, 282-87, 301-09, 337-44, 353-55 and accompanying text.
509. See supra notes 78-82 and accompanying text.
510. See supra note 508.
511. Kinsey v. Salado Indep. School Dist., 916 F.2d 273, 279 (5th Cir. 1990); Brawner v.
City of Richardson, 855 F.2d 187, 191-92 (5th Cir. 1988); Gonzalez v. Benavides, 774 F.2d
1295, 1300-01 (5th Cir. 1985); Wells v. Hico Indep. School Dist., 736 F.2d 243, 249 (5th Cir.
1984), cert. dismissed, 473 U.S. 901 (1985).
512. Thompson v. City of Starkville, 901 F.2d 456, 463, 466 (5th Cir. 1990). Thompson
tacitly criticized the Terrell court's emphasis on employee motivation as an indicator for speech
on matters of personal/public concern. Id. at 465 n.7, 466. See also Kinsey, 916 F.2d at 278-
79 ("motive is not the controlling issue").
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cuits,5 1 3 but also pointed out that the Supreme Court itself, in Connick,
found that the employee's speech had contained "a mixture of public and
personal concerns," and so went on to balance her interest with the
government's. 514
f Comments and Recommendations
Pickering and Connick left open the possibility that employee speech on
all matters other than those of purely personal interest might be protected
under the first amendment. But then in Rankin, the Court closed the door
to all speech unrelated to matters of public concern. Although several Fifth
Circuit decisions have tended to view employee grievances or speech on
questions of agency policy as ipso facto matters of merely personal interest,
the court has recently analyzed the personal/private disjunction more
closely.515 Finding that the employee himself "stood to gain little through
his grievance," it rejected the characterization of his grievance as merely
personal where it also aimed at bringing to light misconduct by others within
the agency.516 Likewise, the Fourth Circuit has found speech concerning
matters beyond those "bounded by [one's] immediate self-interest" entitled
to protection.51 7 This "beyond-matters-bounded-by-the-employee's-self-in-
terest" test is both an applicable standard, and one that is true to Connick's
holding that protection ordinarily would be denied only to speech on matters
of purely personal interest.5 18
Likewise, it is well-established in the Fifth and other circuits that a given
instance of employee speech may relate to matters of both personal and pub-
lic concern. In its own terms, Connick denied protection to employee speech
that addresses only matters of personal interest. If employee speech relates
to both such matters and to matters of public concern, the court should
proceed to the balancing phase of analysis.
The critical question, of course, is whether the employee's speech does at
least touch on some matter or matters of public concern. A number of Fifth
Circuit decisions seem to assume that the public has no interest in such mat-
ters as whether employees were required to work overtime, with or without
compensation;5 19 the treatment of the mentally ill in public facilities;520 the
adequacy of patient care by physicians in public hospitals and possible con-
flicts of interest on the part of hospital board members;521 or the efficiency
513. Thompson, 901 F.2d at 464. In addition to Brawner and Gonzalez, the court cited
Hall v. Ford, 856 F.2d 255, 260 (D.C. Cir. 1988), and Rode v. Dellarciprete, 845 F.2d 1195,
1202 (3d Cir. 1988).
514. Thompson, 901 F.2d at 464.
515. Id. at 466-67.
516. Id. at 465-66.
517. Piver v. Board of Educ., 835 F.2d 1076, 1079 (4th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 487 U.S.
1206 (1988).
518. Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 147 (1983) (emphasis added). See supra note 490
and accompanying text.
519. See supra notes 266-69, 310-13 and accompanying text.
520. See supra notes 282-86, 309 and accompanying text; but see supra note 169.
521. See supra notes 296-97 and accompanying text.
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and effectiveness of a government agency's operations in delivering public
services.5 22 Other circuits, however, have been willing to credit the public
with a greater measure of interest in agency operations and performance.
The Ninth Circuit's standard, evidently endorsed in Davis and Day, would
qualify employee speech as "of public concern" even if it deals with individ-
ual personnel disputes and grievances provided "the information would be of
... relevance to the public's evaluation of the performance of [the] govern-
mental agencies."'5 23 The Fourth Circuit has also factored attention to po-
tential public concern into its threshold question as reflected in its statement
that "[t]he focus is... upon whether the 'public' or the 'community' is likely
to be concerned with or interested in the particular expression, or whether it
is more properly viewed as essentially a 'private' matter between employer
and employee."'524
The Fifth Circuit should de-emphasize such indicators as whether the em-
ployee attempted to "go public" and whether the employee intended the sub-
ject of her speech to become a matter for public debate, and give greater
attention to the actual content of the "speech" itself. Though the "role" in
which the employee spoke may be a factor in considering the context, it
should remain only a factor; attention to it should not preempt consideration
of the speech's content. Courts should recognize that a grievance or speech
on personnel matters is not necessarily concerned only with matters of per-
sonal interest. Speech on matters of both personal and public concern is
entitled to protection. As in Thompson and a series of Fourth Circuit cases,
the court should limit the category of employee speech on "only personal"
matters to speech clearly relating to the employee's own self-interest, such as
wages, hours, and working conditions. In recent cases, the court implicitly
has done so. 5 25 Where such speech also relates to concerns beyond the em-
ployee's own immediate self-interest the court should be open to the possibil-
ity that it may also deal with matters of public concern. In this connection,
the court should credit the public with being interested in such matters as
agency staff morale, the openness of supervisors to routine communications
and suggestions by employees, and even critical statements that reflect con-
cern to improve the effectiveness of the agency's performance. The court
need not be overly zealous to protect agency superiors from embarassment at
the threshold question level of analysis. If an employee's speech in fact im-
pinged upon the efficiency of the agency's performance of its assigned public
522. See supra notes 301-06 and accompanying text. The public, of course, is not present
as a party in litigation on these matters. Yet by virtue of their role in administering the Picker-
ing/Connick/Rankin threshold and balancing tests, the courts have been assigned responsibil-
ity for representing the public's interests-a responsibility also grounded more generally in
their role as the judicial branch of government.
523. See supra notes 257-65 and accompanying text.
524. Piver v. Board of Educ., 835 F.2d 1076, 1079-80 (4th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 487 U.S.
1206 (1988) (quoting Berger v. Battaglia, 779 F.2d 992, 998-99 (4th Cir. 1985)).
525. See Ayoub v. Texas A&M Univ., 927 F.2d 834, 836-38 (5th Cir. 1991) (employee's
complaint concerned only his own salary); Kinsey v. Salado Indep. School Dist., 916 F.2d 273,
277 (5th Cir. 1990) ("dispute over an employee's job performance" said to involve "purely
private speech"); Scott v. Flowers, 910 F.2d 201, 211 (5th Cir. 1990) ("Scott's criticisms had
nothing to do with his own conditions of employment").
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services, the extent of that impingement can be weighed against the impor-
tance of the employee's speech in the balancing phase of inquiry. Whenever
the court can discern any interest that a reasonable, prudent public would
have in the subject matter of employee speech, it should regard that speech
as at least worthy of being weighed against any legitimate interests the gov-
ernment might have in suppressing that speech.
2. Balancing in the Fifth Circuit
Currently, balancing occurs only if the court has determined that an em-
ployees' speech addressed a matter of public concern and was, therefore,
deserving of first amendment protection. Conceptually, three steps are in-
volved in balancing public employee speech interests with governmental in-
terests. The first is to identify and weigh the importance of the employee's
speech interest. The second is to identify and weigh the government's inter-
est in suppressing such speech (or in punishing the speaker). The third step
is the actual balancing, determining which interest or set of interests is more
important. The court has not always attended carefully to each step.
a. Weighing the Employee's Speech Interests
Fifth Circuit panels have seldom paused to identify and assess employees'
interests in their speech. The Supreme Court has also given little guidance
on this matter. One might suppose that this is so because the courts have
assumed that an employee's right to free speech or self-expression is an in-
herent or self-evident right, one guaranteed by the first amendment, and thus
constitutionally recognized as precious to each individual speaker. The
cases, however, do not so indicate. At best, the cases mention the right to
self-expression only obliquely. 526 Instead, the courts have tended to assign
value to employee free speech only to the extent that such speech serves or is
instrumental to some societal good.
In Pickering the Court referred only to "the interests of the teacher, as a
citizen, in commenting upon matters of public concern. ' 527 The Court did
not explain why an employee's interest should be so limited. The Court re-
peated this same language in Mt. Healthy and Givhan,528 but did not attempt
to identify or assess the importance of either employee's speech. Likewise, in
Connick the Court made no effort to weigh the importance of Myers' interest
in asking whether other staff members felt pressured to work in certain polit-
ical campaigns.529 Instead, the Connick Court merely stated that this ques-
tion was "a matter of interest to the community upon which it is essential
that public employees be able to speak without fear of retaliatory dis-
charge. ' 530 Again, implicitly, the employee's speech right was accorded
526. See supra note 459 and accompanying text.
527. Pickering v. Board of Educ., 391 U.S. 563, 568 (1968).
528. Givhan v. Western Line Consol. School Dist., 439 U.S. 410, 414 (1979); Mt. Healthy
City School Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274, 284 (1977).
529. See supra note 118.
530. Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 149 (1983).
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value only to the degree that it had some possible social utility. Although
the Connick Court indicated that some employee speech might be especially
important, it proposed to assess that importance only in terms of its impor-
tance to the public.5 31 It did not, however, undertake to weigh the impor-
tance of Myers' speech on this standard. In Rankin the Court mentioned
the employee's interest in her right to freedom of speech twice, though with-
out elaboration. 532 The Court implicitly denied that this interest had consti-
tutional value, declaring that it could be protected only if her speech
addressed a matter of public concern. Had it not met that touchstone test,
she would have had no such right.
533
These cases suggest that the Court generally has considered a public em-
ployee's speech to have value only in terms of its social utility. Absent such
utility, the speaker's own interests in either her right to freedom of expres-
sion or in the content of her speech had no value deemed worthy of first
amendment protection. Implicitly, the Court seems to have assumed that
public employee speech of any kind is inherently adverse or detrimental to
the operation of governmental agencies.5 34 The only kind of speech that
should be accorded constitutional protection was speech relating to matters
of public concern, and only because of its possible social utility. Thus, even
before employee speech could be "balanced" with identifiable governmental
interests, all speech other than that relating to "matters of public concern"
was presumed to be outweighed by assumed governmental interests in sup-
pressing such speech. 535 The Court may not have intended this result. It
may have simply evolved from the somewhat fragmented series of considera-
tions set out in Pickering and Connick which culminated in Rankin's rather
casual declaration that the threshold question was whether employee speech
addressed "matters of public concern."
In this context, it is not surprising that very few Fifth Circuit cases credit
public employees with any interest in their speech rights or in the content of
their speech. Nevertheless, some panel decisions hint that the employee's
own interests might merit constitutional weight. Several cases specifically
describe the value of employees' speech to the public or community which
could benefit from hearing it.
i The Employee's Own Interest
A number of Fifth Circuit panels construing Pickering, Connick, and
Rankin have held that it is proper for agency superiors to punish employees
531. Id. at 147-49. See supra note 118.
532. See supra note 156.
533. See supra notes 121-39 and accompanying text.
534. See supra note 80.
535. See Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 149 (1983): "To presume that all matters which
transpire within a government office are of public concern would mean that virtually every
remark-and certainly every criticism directed at a public official-would plant the seed of a
constitutional case." Other expressions of exaggerated anxiety on the part of the Connick




for speaking about matters involving the employees' own interests. 536 These
cases illustrate the deleterious consequences of the Supreme Court's tacit
presumption that employee speech on such matters necessarily interferes with
the efficiency of governmental operations. 537 Yet in a few cases, the court
has credited employees with having a valid interest in the content and func-
tion of their speech, if not in their right to freedom of expression as such. In
Thompson the court urged that "loyal employees seeking to rectify problems
[should enjoy] constitutional protection for attempting to correct problems
in house."53 8 Correcting such problems presumably would not only benefit
the public, but would also make for better working conditions such as im-
proved morale or safety, for employees, including the speaker. Similarly, in
Moore the court found that the employee speaker himself had a legitimate
interest in his speech, though the court identified that interest mainly in
terms of making public information regarding the effectiveness of the agency
so as to awaken the community's political concern. 539
ii. The Public's Interest
The Moore court also explicitly identified the public's interest as "a willing
listener" in hearing agency employees' speech on matters relating to the
agency's ability to perform its duties efficiently and effectively. 54 The value
of such speech has also been recognized in other cases. 54 1 In Gonzalez, the
court found that employee speech regarding an agency policy that had "gen-
erated friction and reduced the efficiency of the agency" was important as a
matter of public concern.5 42 And as early as Porter, the court had insisted
that the first amendment concerned "the right and need of the society's citi-
zens to receive information helpful to their economic, social, and political
activities . . .,,143 Most Fifth Circuit cases, however, failed to specify or
weigh the nature and importance of the public's interest in particular em-
ployees' speech. Instead, once they determined that such speech related to
matters of public concern, the cases typically proceeded directly to consider-
ing the weight of purported, countervailing governmental interests without
further attention to benefits the community might derive from the em-
ployee's speech. 5 "
b. Weighing Governmental Interests in Suppressing Employee Speech
More than a decade after Pickering, the Fifth Circuit made it clear that it
536. See supra notes 267-309 and accompanying text.
537. See supra notes 80, 118, 309, 446-50 and accompanying text.
538. See supra note 482 and accompanying text.
539. See supra notes 248, 396-401 and accompanying text.
540. See supra notes 402, 404-05 and accompanying text.
541. See supra notes 402-03 and accompanying text. See Piver v. Pinder Co. Bd. of Ed.,
835 F.2d 1076, 1078, 1081 (4th Cir. 1987) (considering the interests of the speaker as well as
those of the community).
542. See supra note 230 and accompanying text.
543. Porter v. Califano, 592 F.2d 770, 773 (5th Cir. 1979) (citing Virginia State Board of
Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumers Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748 (1976)).
544. Compare the Ninth Circuit's formula, supra notes 257, 488 and accompanying text.
[Vol. 45
FIRST AMENDMENT SPEECH RIGHTS
would not be enough for governmental agency superiors to make vague
claims that employee speech somehow "hurt agency efficiency." ' 54 5 Instead,
construing Pickering, the court held that
"[i]n order for the government to constitutionally remove an em-
ployee from government service for exercising the right of free speech, it
is incumbent upon it to clearly demonstrate that the employee's con-
duct substantially and materially interferes with the discharge of duties
and responsibilities inherent in such employment. "546
As noted earlier, Connick opened the door for courts to credit agency super-
visors' "reasonable" fears or speculations as to possible future harm that
might result from employees' speech.5 47 Rankin, on the other hand, focused
attention upon the actual impact of employee speech on the agency's effec-
tive delivery of public services, and required a government agency that had
discharged an employee for exercising her speech rights to bear the burden
of justifying that discharge on legitimate grounds. 548
Relatively few Fifth Circuit panels have been willing to accord weight to
agency officials' speculations as to possible harm that might result from em-
ployees' speech. 549 In most cases, the court attempted to identify the actual
impact employees' speech had on relevant governmental operations. 550 One
panel, drawing on Rankin, held that when the employee's speech "more sub-
stantially involves matters of public concern," the governmental agency is
required to bring forward objective evidence of any purported disruption. 551
More recently, in Moore, the court held that Rankin requires the govern-
ment to bear "the burden of producing evidence which shows its interest in
disciplining [an employee] for his speech" in all cases that proceed to balanc-
ing. 552 The Moore court carefully examined the nature and extent to which
the employee's speech, on the record evidence, had actually impacted upon
those interests, and found such impact rather minimal. 553 It found, for ex-
ample, that although the employee's alleged "insubordination" may have
personally offended one of his superiors, it did not impair the agency's effec-
tiveness in performing its particular public responsibilities. It may be noted
in passing that in some cases where the speech in question failed the "thresh-
old" test, the agency superiors merely perceived a threat to their sense of
authority or will-to-power, with no demonstrably negative effect on agency
545. Porter, 592 F.2d at 780.
546. Id. at 773; see also Smith v. United States, 502 F.2d 512, 517 (5th Cir. 1974); Battle v.
Mulholland, 439 F.2d 321, 323 (5th Cir. 1971).
547. See supra notes 101-03 and accompanying text.
548. See supra notes 140-46, 151-55, 461-66, 468 and accompanying text.
549. See Kinsey v Salado Indep. School Dist., 916 F.2d 273, 280 (5th Cir. 1990); Scott v.
Flowers, 910 F.2d 201, 213 (5th Cir. 1990). One possible exception is Price v. Brittain, 874
F.2d 252, 258-59 (5th Cir. 1989).
550. See, e.g., Frazier v. King, 873 F.2d 820, 820-23, 826-27 (5th Cir. 1989); Matherne v.
Wilson, 851 F.2d 752, 760-61 (5th Cir. 1988); Gonzalez v. Benavides, 774 F.2d 1295, 1301-
1303 (5th Cir. 1985).
551. Matherne, 851 F.2d at 761 n.53.
552. Moore v. City of Kilgore, 877 F.2d 362, 372 (5th Cir. 1989) (emphasis added).




c. Balancing the Competing Interests
In a few Fifth Circuit cases, the court appears to have skipped the balanc-
ing step. In these cases, the court did not attempt to weigh the importance
of the employee's, or the public's interest in her speech, against governmen-
tal interests. Instead, the court summarily concluded that the governmental
interests were paramount.555 On the other hand, where the court found that
the employee's speech had little or no impact on governmental interests, it
has adjudged the employee's speech interest the more important.55 6
The court has undertaken to balance the importance of competing inter-
ests in a number of cases. Generally, where the employee's speech was di-
rected toward calling attention to misconduct on the part of other
government employees or officials, the court has found the speech's disrup-
tive effects less significant than the public's interest in the disclosure of such
misconduct.557 In that context, the court has found the government's inter-
est in preventing "disruption" a minimal interest.558 If the employee's alle-
gations of misconduct were true, the court observed, his statements "could
not have adversely affected the proper functioning of the department since
the statements were made for the very reason that the department was not
functioning properly due to corruption." 559 In another case, the court fac-
tored in the effects of the government's retaliatory action on the effectiveness
of the agency's operations, as reflected in the statement that "appellees have
made no claim that [the employee] was not performing her government job
adequately. Thus, by suspending [her] instead of neutralizing or balancing
her speech with rebuttal management speech, management has deprived the
government of 30 days work of one of its otherwise competent and produc-
tive employees.s6° The court hinted that the government employer might
have found less intrusive means to protect its purported interests. Curiously,
this issue has not been raised in subsequent government employee speech
cases. 561 Nor has the court determined whether governmental interests
must be "compelling" in order to outweigh employee speech interests.5 62
554. See supra notes 282-95, 301-14, 322-28, 333-42 and accompanying text. See also supra
notes 80, 309.
555. See Price v. Brittain, 874 F.2d 252, 258-59 (5th Cir. 1989).
556. See, e.g., Kinsey v. Salado Indep. School Dist., 916 F.2d 273, 279-81 (5th Cir. 1990);
Matherne v. Wilson, 851 F.2d 752, 760-61 (5th Cir. 1988); Brown v. Texas A&M Univ., 804
F.2d 327, 337 (5th Cir. 1986); United Carolina Bank v. Board of Regents, 665 F.2d 553, 563-
64 (5th Cir. 1982).
557. See Frazier v. King, 873 F.2d 820, 826 (5th Cir. 1989); Brawner v. City of Richard-
son, 855 F.2d 187, 192 (5th Cir. 1988); Porter v. Califano, 592 F.2d 770, 773-80 (5th Cir.
1979).
558. Frazier, 873 F.2d at 826.
559. Brawner, 855 F.2d at 192.
560. Porter, 592 F.2d at 780.
561. See supra note 18 and accompanying text.
562. Bowen v. Watkins, 669 F.2d 979, 982 n.2. (5th Cir. 1982). Both issues may have been
mooted by Connick's extreme deference to purported governmental interests. See supra note
118.
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Recently, the court has held that the state's interest in suppressing speech is
substantially "weaker" when the speaker is an elected official. In that cir-
cumstance, the government cannot justify discipline "on the ground that it
was necessary to preserve coworker harmony or office discipline," for an
elected official is expected to "exercise independent judgment" and "speak
out against what he perceived to be serious defects" in the area of public
affairs. 56 3
Balancing is more difficult where there are substantial interests or values
on both sides of the scales, values which may amount to apples on one side
and oranges on the other. Because it had already carefully analyzed the
governmental interests actually affected by the employee's speech, and had
found that speech beneficial to the community's interest in the effective oper-
ation of the agency, the Moore court concluded that the speech interests
clearly outweighed the governmental interests in suppressing it5 64 Possibly
the court made its closest call in Gonzalez.565 Here, as later in Moore, the
court found that the employee's speech concerned the effective operation of
the agency. For this and other reasons, his speech was deemed important to
the community and to have "addressed matters of substantial public con-
cern."' 566 On the basis of Connick, the court therefore held that the govern-
ment defendants were required to make a stronger showing of disruption. It
found that Gonzalez's "speech" posed no immediate threat to the agency's
operation, and that although he had protested the commissioners' conduct
as violating agency regulations, he was polite and cooperative in his dealings
with them, considerations relevant to the "manner, time, and place" factors
set out in Givhan.567 The Gonzalez court commended this kind of "individu-
alized balancing" rather than "the predictable but inflexible categorical ap-
proach. ' 568 Gonzalez is itself an exemplary model for the former approach.
d. Comments and Recommendations
Neither the Supreme Court nor the Fifth Circuit has given much attention
to the nature and weight of governmental employee speech interests. By
requiring that employee speech must address a matter of public concern in
order to be protected, the Court unnecessarily stripped government employ-
ees of their right to freedom of speech under the first amendment. The
"matter-of-public-concern" requirement, fails to make clear that the public
has an interest in employee speech regarding the efficiency and effectiveness
of agency operations. The public interest is not served when government
employees are punished for putting ideas into the suggestion box, sharing
563. Scott v. Flowers, 910 F.2d 201,211-12 (5th Cir. 1990). The court did not explain why
it extended Pickering/Connick/Rankin analysis to speech by elected officials. In Scott, the
government employee, a justice of the peace, was not disciplined by an employer. The issue
was whether his speech rights had been violated through reprimand by the state judicial con-
duct commission.
564. See supra notes 396-406, 432-35 and accompanying text.
565. See supra notes 224-30, 418-22 and accompanying text.
566. Gonzalez v. Benavides, 774 F.2d 1295, 1302 (5th Cir. 1985).
567. Id. at 1302-03.
568. Id. at 1303.
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them with their superiors, or passing them on to others in the community.
Where the employee's speech raises questions or provides information that
would be relevant to the public's evaluation of the governmental agency's
performance,5 69 such benefit to the public should be considered. Courts
should also consider the employee's own legitimate interest in his agency's
effectiveness on the "employee's speech interest" side of the scales, as some
Fifth Circuit cases have done.570
In some cases the court may have summarily accepted an agency's claims
as to the damaging effects of alleged "insubordination" or "disruption."
Other decisions, however, include careful analysis of the actual impact of
employee speech on the effectiveness or efficiency of the agency's fulfilment
of its particular responsibility for delivering services to the public. Moore is
an especially fine example of this type of analysis. The central question
should be whether the employee's speech significantly diminished her capac-
ity to carry out her duties, or in any significant way interfered with the
agency's performance of its services to the public. The public employee's
first amendment speech right should not turn on whether an agency superior
was displeased with her speech's content.
If the court has carefully identified and analyzed the interests on both
sides of the scales, balancing, or determining their relative importance may
be fairly easy. For instance, balancing would be easy where the employee's
speech was primarily a personal grievance as to her own working conditions,
while its impact on the agency's delivery of services to the public was clearly
detrimental; or where an employee's speech brought to light important infor-
mation as to misconduct by agency officials without otherwise adversely af-
fecting the agency's delivery of public services. But when important
interests are present on both sides of the scales, the court should be espe-
cially meticulous in assessing their weight as well as any actual negative ef-
fects of the employee's speech upon bona fide and significant governmental
interests. The public has a proper and substantial interest not only in the
efficiency of governmental services, but also in hearing from knowledgeable
governmental employees at all levels who have ideas about how their agency
can function more productively or otherwise address matters of public con-
cern. The public has an interest in the courts' seeing to it that such speech is
not "chilled" so long as it does not demonstrably undermine the agency's
effective performance of its responsibilities.
569. See supra note 257 and accompanying text.
570. See supra notes 540-43 and accompanying text. The Connick Court itself suggested as
much, though in typically cryptic language. Observing that "discipline and morale in the work
place are related to an agency's efficient performance of its duties," the Court concluded, "the
focus of Myers's questionnaire is not to evaluate the performance of the office but rather to
gather ammunition for another round of controversy with her superiors." Connick v. Myers,
461 U.S. 138, 148 (1983). Presumably the Court would have considered Myers' questions as to
"discipline and morale in the workplace" related to matters of public concern if it had thought
that her purpose was "to evaluate the performance of the office." See supra note 118.
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